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On the Economic Viability of Network Systems and Architectures
Abstract
Understanding the relationship between technology and economics is fundamental to making judicious
policy and design decisions. Many technologies that are successful in meeting their technical goals often
fail to get adopted due to economic factors. This holds true even for networked systems, e.g., the Internet,
which witnessed failures in the adoption of QoS solutions, IPv6 migration etc., due to factors such as high
costs, lack of demand, and weight of incumbency. To gain better insights into these issues, researchers
need access to analytical frameworks that account for both technological and economic factors and
provide useful design guidelines. This dissertation was motivated primarily by the need to undertake such
a holistic, multidisciplinary approach towards creating such analytical frameworks.
We focus on three important aspect related to deployment, adoption, and design of network systems and
architectures. The Internet has been one of the most successful network technologies, serving both as a
shared platform for easy deployment of new services and a driver for their adoption. But recent trends in
convergence of voice, video, and data services, along with advances in virtualization technologies, raise
questions as to whether deploying heterogeneous services on a shared network is right or not, especially
given the operational complexity and costs involved. We develop a model to investigate the trade-offs
between shared and dedicated infrastructures and identify the operational metrics that influence which
infrastructure choice benefits more from resource reprovisioning. Closely related to the issue of network
service deployment is that of its successful adoption, which serves as the second topic of this
dissertation. An entrant’s success hinges not only on technical superiority but also on other factors,
including its ability to win over an incumbent’s installed base by using gateways. Our model for adoption
of competing technologies reveals several interesting behaviors, including the possibility for converters to
reduce overall market penetration across both technologies and to prevent the convergence of the
adoption process to a stable state. Lastly, we consider the issue of network platform design. The
emergence and adoption of new technologies depend on the functional capabilities provided by the
underlying network platform. Answering whether the minimalist design of Internet is still relevant as it
evolves into an ecosystem of software services, require a cost-benefit analysis of choosing between a
functionality-rich and a minimalist design. We develop a two-sided market model to show how this design
choice crucially depends on the relationship between the cost of adding features to the platform and the
benefits that application developers derive from them. The frameworks developed in this dissertation
have the potential for application in many different network settings, and can spur further research on
various topics in network economics.
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Understanding the relationship between technology and economics is fundamental
to making judicious policy and design decisions. Many technologies that are successful
in meeting their technical goals often fail to get adopted due to economic factors. This
holds true even for networked systems, e.g., the Internet, which witnessed failures in
the adoption of QoS solutions, IPv6 migration etc., due to factors such as high costs,
lack of demand, and weight of incumbency. To gain better insights into these issues,
researchers need access to analytical frameworks that account for both technological
and economic factors and provide useful design guidelines. This dissertation was motivated primarily by the need to undertake such a holistic, multidisciplinary approach
towards creating such analytical frameworks.
We focus on three important aspect related to deployment, adoption, and design of
network systems and architectures. The Internet has been one of the most successful
network technologies, serving both as a shared platform for easy deployment of new
services and a driver for their adoption. But recent trends in convergence of voice,
video, and data services, along with advances in virtualization technologies, raise quesvi

tions as to whether deploying heterogeneous services on a shared network is right or
not, especially given the operational complexity and costs involved. We develop a
model to investigate the trade-offs between shared and dedicated infrastructures and
identify the operational metrics that influence which infrastructure choice benefits more
from resource reprovisioning. Closely related to the issue of network service deployment is that of its successful adoption, which serves as the second topic of this dissertation. An entrant’s success hinges not only on technical superiority but also on other
factors, including its ability to win over an incumbent’s installed base by using gateways. Our model for adoption of competing technologies reveals several interesting
behaviors, including the possibility for converters to reduce overall market penetration
across both technologies and to prevent the convergence of the adoption process to a
stable state. Lastly, we consider the issue of network platform design. The emergence
and adoption of new technologies depend on the functional capabilities provided by the
underlying network platform. Answering whether the minimalist design of Internet is
still relevant as it evolves into an ecosystem of software services, require a cost-benefit
analysis of choosing between a functionality-rich and a minimalist design. We develop
a two-sided market model to show how this design choice crucially depends on the
relationship between the cost of adding features to the platform and the benefits that
application developers derive from them. The frameworks developed in this dissertation have the potential for application in many different network settings, and can spur
further research on various topics in network economics.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Network systems and architectures have a ubiquitous presence in today’s world. The
Internet, electrical power grids, facilities management networks etc., are just a few
examples of such systems that surround us today. The potential for both economic and
technological growth offered by these networked systems have attracted the attention
of researchers and entrepreneurs, and allowed for convergence of ideas from various
fields like computer science, economics, and operations research. The impact of these
advances on different network systems are easily observable, none more so than in the
case of the Internet. Over the years, the Internet has seen a huge growth both in its user
base and the number of innovative services (e.g., P2P, Social networks, IPTV) being
offered on it [84]. For the providers of these new services, the Internet served both
as a shared platform for easy and inexpensive deployment as well as a driver for their
growth.

1

But in recent times, the convergence of voice, video, and data services has led to
questioning whether using a shared platform for services with disparate requirements
is recommended or not. This is because although sharing helps to save on infrastructural expenses, deploying multiple services on a shared network comes at the cost of
increased complexity in operation, manageability, security, and troubleshooting. With
such shortcomings of shared network solutions becoming more evident, many providers
are now introducing dedicated platforms with built-in functionalities for their own services. Therefore, a natural question that arises is whether deploying a new service on
dedicated infrastructure is better than a shared solution, and to determine when and why
this is the case or not. The question has become even more relevant with the advent of
new technologies such as virtualization [69, 83], which can further facilitate the deployment of new network “slices” dedicated to an individual new service. Conversely,
even in the absence of new technologies recent instances of service deployments point
to a complex decision process. For example, in 2006, AT&T introduced its U-Verse
infrastructure as a dedicated solution to better control and manage its resources in delivering high quality video for its data and IPTV services [2]. In contrast, one of its
competitors, Verizon, chose to share a common fiber optic network [15] for its own
voice, video, and data services. These examples point to a rather complex, or perhaps
an ad-hoc decision process that is being followed presently due to the lack of a coherent
framework to estimate the underlying trade-offs between the network choices.
Such trends are not limited to the Internet. As networking and communication tech-

2

nology continue to improve and new service sectors get network-enabled, e.g., healthcare [46], infrastructure monitoring [10], surveillance, etc., the question of whether to
create a shared or a dedicated network becomes important. For instance, the emergence
of green buildings results in a facilities management infrastructure that relies upon networked sensors and actuators to monitor and control building operation [73, 35]. This
can be realized either by piggy-backing the existing IT infrastructure of a building [10],
or by creating a dedicated facilities management network [51], and neither shared nor
dedicated network choice emerge as an obvious winner.
The complexity of such decisions is further enhanced by technological factors like
virtualization. While virtualization allows better resource sharing on a platform by minimizing interactions among the deployed services, it also allows for easier on-demand
reprovisioning of network resources. The impact of the latter ability on the network
choice is rather unclear, and as we shall see later in this dissertation, this factor alone
can play an important role in the network choice. The rapid advancements made in
virtualization technologies are now making network infrastructures akin to services,
e.g., IaaS, SaaS. Major corporations, such as IBM, Google, AT&T etc., are using these
technologies to invest in the creation of large scale data-centers that provide on-demand
computational, storage, and infrastructure resources. To get a better understanding of
how the availability of these new technologies influence the way services are deployed
and how network infrastructures evolve in the future, we need analytical frameworks
and general principles that revise the current ad-hoc practices. The first part of this dis-
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sertation (Chapter 2) aims to provide such a framework that will help in understanding
these issues and in identifying operational metrics that influence the choice of shared
or dedicated infrastructures.
Closely related to the issue of new network service and technology deployment is
the question of their successful adoption. Network technologies (e.g., services, platform
architectures, protocols etc.) often have to compete against formidable incumbents for
adoption. An entrant’s success hinges not only on technical superiority but also on several other factors. In the past, we have witnessed many Internet technologies, e.g., IP
multicast, QoS solutions, IPv6 etc., which were successful in meeting their technical
goals but failed to get wide adoption due to factors like high costs, lack of demand,
weight of incumbency etc. Understanding how these different factors can potentially
impact the adoption of competing technologies is of much interest to the research community. With networking researchers exploring new experimental architectures that
can eventually replace the existing Internet architecture and address many of its shortcomings [30, 40, 68], this discussion is very relevant today. The second part of this
dissertation (Chapter 3) introduces a modeling framework for the adoption of competing network technologies, and in particular, reveals several interesting insights into the
role of converters (or gateways) compatibility on the adoption process.
The emergence and adoption of new technologies and services also depend on the
functional capabilities provided by the underlying platforms on which they are deployed. The Internet started out with a minimalist design but has since evolved from
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a physical infrastructure into a broader ecosystem of software and web services that
serve as a platform between two market segments, application developers and consumers. The realization of services like the Amazon web services, Google App Engine,
social network platforms etc, bear witness to the progress made in the creation of that
ecosystem. A question that therefore arise is whether the minimalist design principle
of Internet is still relevant and suitable in today’s world of complex interconnected systems and infrastructures. Answering what is the right level of functionalities that a
platform should offer calls for evaluating the cost-benefit trade-offs between choosing
a functionality-rich and a minimalist design. The third part of the dissertation (Chapter
4) addresses this topic and identifies how various factors influence the choice between
functionality-rich versus minimalist design for network platforms.
Each of these topics are introduced in greater details in Section 1.1-1.3. Each of
these sections has three parts: positioning the specific research challenge addressed,
providing an outline for the model by illustrating the technological and economic factors considered, and presenting a brief outline of the quantitative insights obtained using
the proposed frameworks in this dissertation. The results presented here have policy implications as well as significance in the context of design and deployment of network
technologies. The frameworks developed as a part of this dissertation have the potential for application in many different network settings, and can spur further research on
various topics in the general area of network economics.
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1.1
1.1.1

Network Infrastructure Choice
Problem Description

The ubiquity and capabilities of the Internet have led to a rapid growth in networked
services and applications. This extends well beyond the migration of voice and video
onto the Internet, and has the potential to reach areas either traditionally not networked
or accessible only through dedicated networks, e.g., health-care, infrastructure monitoring, surveillance, etc. The introduction of such new technologies and services require
the network providers to identify the right architecture for their deployment, that is,
whether multiple services should share resources on a common network infrastructure,
or should each service be offered on a dedicated network of its own. The benefits of a
shared infrastructure notwithstanding, combining services with disparate requirements
onto a single common network comes at the cost of increased complexity. It often calls
for upgrading the network with features required by the new services. This cost scales
with overall network size, i.e., is borne by services with no need for the features. It
can also introduce complex interactions and the need for tracking and trouble-shooting
problems of previously little consequences. Therefore, assessing the relative benefits
of shared and dedicated networks calls for understanding the trade-off between the
economies of scale and scope that sharing allows, and the diseconomies of scope [66]
it gives rise to.
A model that allows providers to analyze these trade-offs must capture all the differ-
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ent network deployment and operational cost components [21], and how these costs are
affected by the needs of the services. Additionally, it also has to account for the fact that
the actual demand of a new service is initially uncertain, and so the provider has to allocate capacity (resources) in anticipation of the demand. But networks are not the first to
face these issues. There is a long tradition of investigating the trade-offs between flexible and dedicated resources and their allocation decisions in the manufacturing systems
literature. For example, the Manufacturing Process Flexibility literature has focused on
efficient-plant product assignments [42, 32], the effect of process flexibility in handling
demand variability [9], and the optimal resource planning and allocation in presence
of demand uncertainty [25, 60]. Although the network provider’s problem of choosing
between shared and separate networks parallels selecting flexible or dedicated manufacturing plants, and making the right capacity allocations, there are key important
differences. First, rather than explore the benefits of a flexible (shared) plant (network)
in dealing with uncertain demand, our focus is on investigating the impact of various
economies and diseconomies of scope in the cost components. A second and more
significant difference is that these traditional manufacturing plant models assume that
due to large time-lag in building new plants, production cannot be ramped-up rapidly
in response to higher than expected demand, whereas in many networks it is quite feasible to increase the capacity on a relatively short time scale, and hence accommodate
a portion of the excess demand. This ability to dynamically adjust the network’s capacity through resource ‘reprovisioning’ is becoming increasingly easy with technological
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advancements, such as virtualization [83, 69]. The emergence of virtualization technology has made the question of whether to add a new service on an existing network
or on a network ‘slice’ a more practical one. This capability is also very common in
distributed database, cloud computing etc. The earlier manufacturing system models
are therefore no longer applicable in this new environment; they need to be extended to
incorporate the impact of such dynamic provisioning ability, which can not only affect
the optimal resource allocation decisions but also the choice of network infrastructure
itself.

1.1.2

Model Description

The most basic setting in which the question of network sharing arise is the case of two
network services. The model we develop considers the case where a network provider
has an existing service that has already been deployed and runs on its existing network.
The second service that the provider wants to introduce is a new service with an uncertain demand. We assume that the provider only knows the demand distribution but
not the actual demand that will be realized once the service is made available. The
provider has to decide whether to deploy this new service alongside the first service on
the existing network, or to create another dedicated network for it. Additionally, the
provider also needs to decide how much capacity (resources) has to be allocated for the
new service given its choice of network architecture. These decisions have to be made
prior to the actual realization of the new service’s demand. Once the actual demand
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is known, the provider can increase its capacity if excess demand is realized. In order
to account for different levels of reprovisioning ability, we introduce a reprovisioning
coefficient that captures the extent to which the provider can recoup excess demand,
i.e., it provides a measure for the penalty cost of underprovisioning resources.
The first step of the model involves identifying the various deployment and operational cost components. We group these costs under the categories of fixed costs,
variable costs (which grow with the realized demand), and capacity costs (which grows
with allocated resources), and use them to formulate the revenue functions for shared
and dedicated network infrastructure choice. The model we develop is generic enough
to capture various levels of economies or diseconomies of scope in the cost and revenue parameters. We introduce a three stage sequential decision process to solve the
provider’s decision problems. In the first stage, the provider chooses the network infrastructure. In the second stage, the provider decides on how much capacity to allocate
for the new service. The third stage is one in which the new service’s actual demand
finally gets realized and the provider reprovisions resources, if necessary, to accommodate excess demand. We solve this model by working backwards through the three
stages, i.e., given the possible realizations of demand; the corresponding profits are
computed in the third stage. Using these demand-profit relationships, the net estimated
profit for a given allocated capacity can be computed for each network infrastructure
choice. This is done in the second stage, where the ‘optimal’ capacity that generates the
highest estimated profit for each of the two architectural options is calculated. Using

9

these optimal capacity decisions, the provider can compare the resulting profits for the
two infrastructures in the first stage, and thus decide to choose the one with a higher
profitability.

1.1.3

Summary of Key Results

In this work, we developed an analytical model that addresses the fundamental issue of
network architecture selection. It creates a reasoning framework that includes not only
factors like the economic relationships among various cost and revenue components,
but also incorporates the impact of demand uncertainties and resource reprovisioning
into the decision process. We use this model to show that the extent of (dis)economies
in various cost or revenue components can impact the network choice. The results
illustrate the impact that reprovisioning can have on the choice of network solution,
and validates the need for models that incorporate such a feature [77]. Our analysis
also identifies two key operational metrics, namely gross profit margin and return on
capacity, which influence when, why, and to what extent the ability to reprovisioning
can impact the choice of shared versus dedicated network infrastructure [81]. The
insights gained from our model have particular significance in the context of software
ecosystems and cloud computing environments where virtualization technologies are
facilitating shared deployment and faster reprovisioining of resources. It can also be
used to explain many trends in network choices of the past and the present, and can
also be useful in developing guidelines for providers to choose between shared and

10

dedicated infrastructures in many network settings.

1.2
1.2.1

Adoption of Competing Network Technologies
Problem Description

Networks, like other technologies, constantly improve over time as newer and better solutions become available. These entrant technologies compete against the incumbents
they seek to eventually replace. The Internet itself is an example of such a technology that competed against other alternative packet data networks to finally displace the
traditional phone network as the de facto communication infrastructure. But the adoption of a new network technology is fraught with challenges [65, 47, 82]. A successful
migration from an incumbent technology to an entrant depends not only on technical
superiority but also on economic factors [19, 48], and the ability to win over the incumbent’s installed base.
The traditional networking approach to facilitate technology migration has been the
introduction of converters or gateways. Converters can help a technology to increase its
network externality benefits by allowing its users to connect with users of the another
technology. However, developing, deploying, and operating converters come at a cost,
one that often grows as a function of the converter’s quality. Further, converters can play
a directionally ambiguous role. On one hand, converters can help the entrant overcome
the advantage of the incumbent’s large installed base by allowing connectivity to it. But
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on the other hand, they also help the incumbent technology by mitigating the impact of
its users migrating to the newer technology.
To help network technology providers better understand how the deployment of converters and other economic factors influence network technology migration, we develop
an economic model which incorporates these factors (e.g., quality, externality, price).
We consider the utility derived from network technologies by individual heterogeneous
users, and use it to build an aggregate model for technology adoption that is consistent
with individual rational decision-making.
Modeling the adoption of new products and technologies has a long tradition in
marketing. Fourt and Woodlock [27] proposed a product diffusion model in which a
fixed fraction of consumers who have not yet bought the product did so at every period;
this is also known as constant hazard rate model. Bass [6] extended it to incorporate
word-of-mouth communication between current adopters and potential buyers. These
earlier single technology adoption models were later extended to study the joint diffusion of successive generations of technologies by Norton & Bass [63]. However, the
focus of all these works is on the aggregate adoption dynamics as opposed to modeling
the individual user’s decision-making process. As a result, these models fail to develop
an understanding of how the consumer decision process affects adoption dynamics and
how various economic factors impact adoption decisions. Only a few models have focused on individual-level adoption [11], which provide much greater insights into the
mechanism through which rational individual decisions result in aggregate system dy-
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namics. Due the complexity of such models, their use has been limited to the case of a
single technology. We have extended these models to a two technology settings -an essential step towards making them suitable for studying migration from an incumbent to
an entrant network technology and for investigating the role that converters play in that
process. Other prior works that have considered converters in the adoption of incompatible technologies include Farrell & Saloner [24, 23], Katz [47], Choi [14], Joseph et
al. [43]. The key findings of these works have been that network externalities can often
lead to multiple equilibria and that converters can have significant impact on equilibrium adoption levels. However, these works only consider static models, that is, they
do not incorporate how heterogeneous user decisions lead to the adoption dynamics,
and hence, do not study the dynamics of technology adoption or identify which one of
the several possible equilibria gets realized.

1.2.2

Model Description

The process of migration from an incumbent to an entrant network technology is governed by the user’s adoption decisions. An individual user joins the network technology
that offers a higher ‘value’ in terms of the technology’s quality, externality benefits and
price. We account for these factors and their effect on technology adoption through a
utility function. For each of the two competing technologies, the utility function increases with the technology’s intrinsic (stand-alone) quality and the number of other
users reachable using it (externality), while it decreases with price. The utility function
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accounts for user heterogeneity in their evaluation of a technology’s intrinsic quality.
The network externality benefits that users enjoy from a technology grows in proportional to the number of users that are using the same technology as well as those who
are reachable through gateways or converters that their technology deploys. The model
we develop considers ‘technology-level’ converters (gateways), i.e., these converters,
once deployed, are available to all users of the technology. The price (fees) that users
pay for subscription to a technology is assumed to be recurrent because of the service
nature of most network technologies.
A user adopts a technology when it provides a utility that is both positive (i.e., satisfies individual rationality constraint) and higher than that of the other technology (i.e.,
satisfies incentive compatibility constraint). The users continuously re-evaluate their
technology choices, and can switch from one technology to another. Since changes in
the adoption decision of one user affects the externality benefits of other users as well,
they all revisit their adoption decision over time, resulting in the dynamics of technology migration. This process is commonly captured through continuous time models, as
in [39]. We study the process of technology diffusion using a similar continuous time
model whose solution provides us with the characterization of equilibrium outcomes,
adoption trajectories, and system stability.
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1.2.3

Summary of Key Results

Our analysis reveals a number of interesting behaviors, as reported in our published
works [41, 80, 79]. Some of the main findings are described here. Firstly, we show
that the adoption process can exhibit multiple steady state equilibrium outcomes; each
with a specific range of initial adoption levels of the two technologies. We also find
that this behavior may arise both in the presence and absence of converters. Secondly,
we find that converters can help a technology improve its own standing in the market,
and even ensure its dominance while it would have entirely disappeared in the absence
of converters. For example, a low-quality but low-cost technology may thwart the success of a better but more expensive competitor by preserving the ability of its users
to access adopters of the costlier technology, whose usage would then be limited to a
few ‘techno-buffs’. Thirdly, we observe a non-intuitive behavior that improving a converter’s efficiency can at times be harmful; they can result in lower market share for
an individual technology or for both of them. For instance, high market penetration
may depend on the combination of a cheap but low-end technology with a high-end
but more expensive one to adequately serve the full spectrum of user preferences. A
situation where converters allow the better technology to gain market share at the expense of the lesser technology may result in low-end users of that technology dropping
out altogether; thereby contributing to a lower overall market penetration. Fourthly, we
show that while in the absence of converters, technology migration always converges to
stable steady-state equilibrium; this need not be so when technologies deploy convert15

ers for compatibility. The presence of converters can create ‘boom-and-bust’ cycles in
which users switch back-and-forth between the two technologies.
The identification of these behaviors allow network providers to realize the potential impact of various economic and technical factors, and thus help devise competition
strategies for network migration. Additionally, the knowledge of possible adverse impact of converters that our model reveals is also useful in deciding on policy interventions by regulators.
We have also verified using numerical evaluations that the results obtained from the
model are robust to inclusion of switching and learning costs as well as a broad range
of variations in the structure of the user utility functions [79].

1.3
1.3.1

Network Platform Design
Problem Description

The transformation of the Internet from a physical network to an ecosystem of software
and services is leading many to question its original minimalist design. Answering
whether or not this design remains appropriate is, however, a complex issue. Although
we do not have a definitive answer to this multi-faceted question, our work presented
here will offer an initial quantitative step towards exploring it. We formulate the question using a two-sided market model [74]. The network is the platform and seeks to
“connect” users to services. The Internet and Android offer two recent examples of
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(network and operating system) platforms whose success largely comes from their ability to connect users and service/application developers.
Services are offered by developers that rely on the platform and its features. A
feature-rich platform facilitates service development, which yields more services. This
in turn attracts more users and benefits the platform. It, however, comes at a greater
implementation cost for the platform. The focus of this work is to explore the decision problem faced by a monopolist platform provider seeking to select the level of
functionality the platform should offer.

1.3.2

Model Description

A platform provider attracts developers and consumers by creating value that entices
them to join the platform. This ‘value’ depends on a number of factors, such as the subscription fees to join it, the cost of developing applications for it, and externalities that
affect the value that either developers or customers derive from joining the platform.
In a two-sided market, both sides of the market derives cross-externality benefits from
the presence of the other, i.e., consumers benefit from more applications offered by developers, and conversely developers benefit from being able to target their applications
to more consumers. Our model measures this value for the two market sides through
utility functions that incorporate the different factors discussed above, in addition to the
heterogeneity among the participants on each market side. Similarly, the impact of the
decisions that the platform provider makes, i.e., pricing and selection of the platform’s
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functionality, are also reflected through the platform provider’s utility function.
Two important assumptions that our model makes are: (i) applications all make use
of the same set of platform features, and (ii) the functionality embedded in these features can be built by either the platform or the developers, possibly with different costs
but no difference in quality. Assumption (i) implies homogeneous development needs
across applications (services). In other words, they rely on the same platform application programming interfaces (APIs) or independent features created by developers.
They can still be differentiated, but this clearly limits the range of their differences.
Assumption (ii) calls for the platform provider to know application development needs
ahead of time, and for application developers to be able to independently develop features that the platform decides not to incorporate. This is reasonable for many software
products and services, where platform and applications share a common technology.
Implicit in assumption (ii) is that the development quality (and cost) of a feature by either the platform or the developers, is fixed and not a decision variable. In general, these
assumptions limit the model’s applicability to platforms that are software ecosystems,
e.g., cloud computing, web services, OSes, etc.
The model is solved using a three stage sequential decision process for the platform
to select the level of functionality to offer. In the first stage, the platform provider
chooses the number of features to build into the platform. Given this choice for number
of feature, participation prices (fees) for the two market sides are chosen in the second
stage. Equilibrium adoption levels of consumers and developers are simultaneously
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realized in the third stage. This sequential decision process is then solved in the reverse
order. Equilibrium adoption levels for users and developers are first computed for a
given choice of participation prices and number of built-in features. Next, given a
choice for the number of built-in features, ‘optimal’ participation prices are computed
based on the equilibrium adoption levels of the previous step. The results characterize
the platform’s profit for any given number of built-in features. This is then used to find
the ‘optimal’ number of features that maximizes the platform’s profit.

1.3.3

Summary of Key Results

The analytical model we develop can be used to explore the trade-offs between
functionality-rich and minimalist design from a monopolist platform provider’s perspective. The solution reveals that the answer is strongly dependent on how additional
features affect the rate of change of the respective costs of the platform and service
developers. It also offers a somewhat “negative” result in that minor changes in these
costs can produce drastically different choices for the platform. We provided illustrative
examples to show that there can be multiple values for the number of platform features
that maximize the platform’s profit, and this can make the platform provider’s decision
far from obvious. In other words, minimalist or functionality-rich platforms can both
arise across a wide range of scenarios.
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1.4

Research Publications

The research work presented here has been published in several leading journals and
conferences. An initial version of our work on the choice of shared versus dedicated
networks, titled “Shared versus Separate Networks: The Impact of Re-provisioning”
(coauthored with Roch Guerin and Kartik Hosanagar) [77], was first published in the
proceedings of ReArch’09, CoNEXT, in Rome, Italy, on December 1, 2009. A more
matured version of the work was published as “The Impact of Re-provisioning on the
Choice of Network Infrastructures” (coauthored with Kristin Yamauchi, Roch Guerin
and Kartik Hosanagar) [81] in the proceedings of the Ninth Workshop on E-Business
(WEB’10), held in St. Louis, Missouri, USA, on December 11, 2010. A journal version
of the work is currently under submission in one of the leading information systems
journal.
The work on network technology adoption was first published as “Dynamics of
Competition between Incumbent and Emerging Network Technologies” (coauthored
with Youngmi Jin, Roch Guerin, Kartik Hosanagar, and Zhi-Li Zhang) [41] in the proceedings of NetEcon, SIGCOMM’08, held in Seattle, USA, between August 17-22,
2008. The work was further extended to consider the impact of converters, and was
published as a journal version, titled “Modeling the Dynamics of Network Technology
Adoption and the Role of Converters” (coauthored with Youngmi Jin, Roch Guerin,
and Kartik Hosanagar) [80] in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 18(6),
2010, along with a detailed technical report in 2009 [79], available at the University of
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Pennsylvania repository.
Our results on the last topic is available in the paper titled, “Functionality-rich versus
Minimalist Platforms: A Two-sided Market Analysis” (coauthored with Roch Guerin
and Kartik Hosanagar) [78] in 2011, is under submission at a networking conference
and plans for a journal version of the work is under consideration.
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Chapter 2

Network Infrastructure Choice:
Shared Versus Dedicated Networks

2.1

Introduction

Advances in network technologies have resulted in the Internet evolving from a simple data network to a global communication infrastructure that carries a multiplicity of
services. This integration has many obvious advantages, but combining services with
disparate requirements onto a shared network can also have a cost. It often calls for the
entire network to be “upgraded” with features required by only a handful of services,
and at a cost that is borne by all of them. Resource sharing can also introduce complex interactions among services and call for tracking and trouble-shooting problems
of previously little consequence, e.g., minor routing instabilities don’t affect most data
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services but can severely degrade voice or video quality.
Hence, while sharing a network across many services is often advantageous, it need
not always be, and it is of interest to determine when and why this is the case or not.
The question has become even more relevant with the advent of new technologies such
as virtualization [69, 83], which can further facilitate the deployment of new network
“slices” dedicated to an individual new service. Conversely, even in the absence of
new technologies recent instances of service deployments point to a complex decision
process. For example, in deploying its new U-verse TV service AT&T chose to create a
dedicated network. This was in part to ensure it could be managed more easily for better
reliability and for delivering higher quality video [2]. In contrast, one of its competitors,
Verizon, chose to share a common fiber optic network [15] for its own voice, video,
and data services. As networking and communication technology continues to improve
and more services are network-enabled, e.g., health-care, infrastructure monitoring,
surveillance, etc., the question of whether to offer this access over shared or dedicated
networks will become even more important.
For instance, the emergence of green buildings results in a facilities management
infrastructure that relies upon networked sensors and actuators to monitor and control building operation. This can be realized either by piggy-backing the existing IT
infrastructure of a building [10], or by creating a dedicated facilities management network [51]. In particular, [10] provides an example of greener schools in New York that
are using a shared IT and facilities management infrastructure to reduce their peak elec-
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trical usage by enabling real-time monitoring over the web. In contrast, it also cites a
second example, that of a sportswear retailer, which created a dedicated ethernet backbone for its facilities management traffic because of concerns over costs, throughput
and security. Thus, neither shared nor dedicated network choice emerge as an obvious
winner.
Making these decisions calls for a framework that systematically examines the tradeoff between shared and dedicated network infrastructures. Although the issue has received some attention, particularly from the business press, it has seen little formal
analysis. Developing a framework to evaluate the underlying trade-off is the primary
motivation for this work.
In this chapter, we propose a model for offering two network services, an existing
service with a known demand and a new one with uncertain demand that can either be
deployed on the same network as the existing service or on its own dedicated network.
The model allows for economies or diseconomies of scope in network resources, and
also accounts for the ability to adjust network resources (reprovision) in response to
a higher than anticipated demand for the new service. The main contribution of this
study is in offering a framework for service providers to evaluate network infrastructure
options, and in particular to decide whether it is profitable to deploy a new service on
an existing network infrastructure. The model also establishes that the extent to which
reprovisioning is feasible can by itself affect which infrastructure, shared or dedicated,
is more effective. In particular, two operational metrics, the gross profit margin and the
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return on capacity play a major role in determining which infrastructure benefits more
from reprovisioning.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews prior work
from the manufacturing flexibility literature, and highlights its relevance to our research
question. Section 2.3 introduces the model and its parameters. Section 2.4 presents the
analysis. Section 2.6 summarizes the work’s findings and concludes the study.

2.2

Literature Review

Recall that investigating whether to use shared or dedicated infrastructures involves
two main aspects, provisioning and reprovisioning capacity in response to demand
uncertainty and assessing the economies and diseconomies of scope that arise from
sharing resources across services. Both of those issues have been the subject of a
number of past investigations, and we now briefly review the most relevant ones.

Capacity Planning under Uncertain Demand: The key question in our work is
to choose between shared and dedicated infrastructures, while accounting for demand
uncertainty and economies or diseconomies of scope in various costs. For either
infrastructure choice, we need to find the optimal capacity allocation and compare the
expected profits. The question of capacity sizing for a given infrastructure choice in our
setting is analogous to that of the classical news-vendor problem. A number of papers
in Operations Management have studied capacity sizing under stochastic demand. The
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most relevant papers are those on the news-vendor problem [50, 54]. The classical
single-period single-product news-vendor problem is to select an inventory/order level
for a product under uncertain demand so as to maximize the expected profit in a single
period. Both over-provisioning and under-provisioning have associated costs and the
inventory level cannot be readjusted if demand exceeds capacity. A rich literature
has extended the study of the classical news-vendor to allow for multiple periods
[70, 52], multiple products [88, 1, 55, 22], and multi-product multi-period decision
problems [61]. The capacity sizing decision in our model is similar to these classical
news-vendor models, but with an additional feature that the service provider can
reprovision resources to accommodate some excess demand. Although this feature of
resource reprovisioning is present in a some works like [5, 31], their main focus is on
accounting, product costing, and pricing. In contrast, our central question relates to deciding between shared and dedicated infrastructures under optimal capacity allocation.
This also differentiates our model from papers on studied multi-product news-vendors
in that they focus on finding the optimal production quantities of each product under
capacity or budget constraints and do not delve into the tradeoffs associated with
servicing the demands for the two products on dedicated versus shared infrastructure.

Manufacturing Flexibility: The manufacturing flexibility literature investigates the
trade-off between using flexible resources to manufacture multiple products versus using dedicated resources for each product. Flexible plants capable of producing different
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types of products are more expensive to build, but have benefits in dealing with uncertain demand. There is, therefore, a trade-off that needs to be investigated to determine
how much capacity to build into flexible and dedicated plants. In all these models, investment decisions in manufacturing plants have to be made before the actual demand
for products are realized. Fine and Freund [25] develop a two-stage model to analyze
this trade-off. Plant capacity decisions are made in the first stage, when demand is still
uncertain. Production decisions are implemented in the second stage after demand is
realized. The authors set up an optimization problem to establish the firm’s optimal
investments in flexible and/or dedicated resources and the optimal production levels
using these resources. A similar setting is considered by Van Mieghem [60], with an
emphasis on the role of price margin and cost mix differentials. The author shows
that an investment in flexible resources can be beneficial even with perfectly positively
correlated product demands because a flexible plant can shift production towards the
product with a higher profit margin.
Our decision problem also shares basic properties with these works. Choosing between shared and dedicated networks parallels selecting flexible or dedicated manufacturing plants, as does the need to decide how to provision the network in the face
of demand uncertainty. There are, however, several differences between our setup and
these earlier works. Unlike manufacturing plants where production usually cannot be
rapidly ramped-up in response to higher than expected demand, “upgrading” network
capacity on a relatively short time-scale is becoming increasingly feasible1 . As a result,
1 As

mentioned in the previous section, the advent of virtualization technology will contribute further
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even if some excess demand is ultimately lost during reprovisioning, network services
can recover from suboptimal upfront capacity decisions. We show that this affects not
only the optimal capacity levels chosen by providers, but can also impact the decision
to go with a shared or dedicated infrastructure. In addition, the manufacturing flexibility literature focuses on the benefits from pooling uncertain demand for two or more
products but does not consider the impact of economies and diseconomies of scope in
the underlying cost parameters, which is a key aspect of our investigation.
The above discussion reveals two themes. The literature on news-vendor problems
investigates how to size capacity when demand for a product is uncertain. Recent extensions consider multi-product problems but do not delve into the benefits of infrastructure sharing between these products. The manufacturing flexibility literature considers the benefits of resource sharing but focuses primarily on manufacturing settings
in which reprovisioning of capacity is often too slow or completely infeasible. This is
a major limitation when considering network services because virtualization and other
technologies facilitate the reprovisioning of network resources in short order. Our study
builds on these streams of work to study the deployment of network services in shared
versus dedicated infrastructure, while allowing for the reprovisioning of network resources in response to realized demand.
to this ability.
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2.3

Model Formulation

We consider the most basic setting in which to explore whether to share a network
across services, or instead deploy them on separate dedicated networks2 . Specifically,
one service has already been deployed and has a stable demand, and the service provider
is introducing a second one. There is uncertainty in the demand for the second service,
and possible economies or diseconomies of scope when adding it to the same network
as the existing service. Our goal is to develop a simple model that accounts for these
economies and diseconomies of scope in determining the optimal infrastructure choice.
For analytical tractability, we ignore any economies of scale that may arise when combining services on a shared infrastructure. The magnitude of such economies of scale
are typically limited in networks, e.g., [53](ref. Fig. 5), [71] show almost linear growth
of both access and backbone bandwidth and router costs, and furthermore Section 2.5
shows that they do not qualitatively affect the model’s outcome.
The provider’s objective is to maximize its total profit from the two services. This
decision problem can be modeled as a three stage sequential process, as shown in Figure 2.1.
In the first stage, the provider makes an infrastructure choice, namely a shared or a
dedicated network. At this stage, the provider does not know the profit from Service 2
since its demand is uncertain. Given an infrastructure choice, in the second stage the
provider provisions capacity for the yet unknown demand for Service 2. Demand for
2 We

use the words network and infrastructure interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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Service 2 is realized in the third stage, where the provider now has the opportunity
to reprovision the network if this demand exceeds the capacity provisioned upfront.
A penalty for under-provisioning is incurred, and only a fraction of the excess demand
can be captured through reprovisioning. Conversely, when the realized demand is lower
than the existing capacity, the provider takes no further action3 . The three stages of the
decision process are referred to as Infrastructure Decision Stage, Capacity Allocation
Stage and Reprovisioning Stage, respectively.
The above sequential decision problem is solved in the reverse order. We first
solve for the provider’s decision in the Reprovisioning Stage, i.e., we evaluate whether
the provider must reprovision resources after demand is realized, conditional on both
the capacity provisioned upfront and the infrastructure choice. Next, we evaluate the
provider’s expected profit as a function of its capacity sizing decision in stage 2 when
demand is uncertain. This is used to compute the optimal capacity to be provisioned upfront. Based on these results for Capacity Allocation Stage and Reprovisioning Stage,
we finally evaluate the provider’s total expected profit for each infrastructure choice,
and select the one that yields the higher expected profit. These three steps are discussed
in greater details in Section 2.3.2 after introducing the model parameters.
3 Contractual

obligations are assumed to preclude downward adjustment of resources.
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Figure 2.1: The three-stage sequential decision process

2.3.1

Model Parameters

Given that Service 1 is an existing service with a mature demand, we assume for simplicity that it operates at full capacity, i.e., its provisioned capacity matches its realized
demand, X1 . The new service, Service 2, has uncertainty in its demand that is denoted
by a random variable x2 with known distribution, fx2 . We use the notation X2 to indicate
a realization of this demand. The provisioned capacity (number of users the network
can handle) for Service 2 is a decision variable denoted by Ks2 and Kd2 for shared and
dedicated networks, respectively4 . If the demand for Service 2 exceeds the provisioned
level (X2 > Ki , i = {s2, d2}), network resources can be adjusted to accommodate a
fraction α of the excess demand, i.e., resources are increased to Ki + α(X2 − Ki ). The
4A

shared network is, therefore, provisioned to handle X1 + Ks2 users.
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parameter α or reprovisioning coefficient, represents the fraction of excess demand that
reprovisioning can capture. This fraction is assumed to be independent of the magnitude of the reprovisioning effort. In other words, the feasibility of and latency in securing additional capacity are the same regardless of the amount of capacity requested
(at least within some bounds), with the latter possibly affecting the network’s ability to
retain all the excess demand that was present. This is consistent with the provisioning
process of most computing and communications facilities. When α = 0, reprovisioning
is unable, e.g., too slow, to capture any excess demand, while α = 1 corresponds to a
scenario where reprovisioning succeeds in accommodating the entire excess demand.
In other words, when α = 1, a “provisioning phase,” is unnecessary as resources can
be secured on-the-fly. Different levels of provisioning flexibility, e.g., as afforded by
different types of virtualization technology, can be accounted for by varying α. Of
interest, as discussed in Section 2.4, is the fact that changing α can also change the
outcome of the provider’s decision process, i.e., which infrastructure yields the highest
profit. Note that α is not a decision variable for the provider; it is an exogenous system parameter whose value depends on the reprovisioning technology available to the
service provider.
An additional point which bears mention is that a linear adjustment to α can transform our model to an alternative one in which a service provider can always accommodate the entire excess demand, but pays a higher per unit capacity cost in doing so.
This equivalence between the two models is shown in Appendix A.3.
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Next, we describe and contrast revenue and cost components of shared and dedicated
networks. To facilitate comparisons, we follow the standard practice, e.g., [25, 60], and
consider only the present value of all future revenues and costs.
Services generate revenues from subscription fees paid by users. These fees are assumed set based on exogeneous market factors. Offering a service also incurs a per user
connection cost, e.g., cost of enabling last-mile connectivity, installing end-user access
equipments, operational costs of billing, etc. We denote by ps1 and ps2 the per user
contribution margins- price less the variable costs- for Services 1 and 2 respectively in
a shared network. Similarly, pd1 and pd2 denote contribution margins for the two services in dedicated networks. We note that ps1 and pd1 can differ from each other. For
example, support for voice service in a FiOS network5 (a shared network used to carry
voice, data and video) calls for network termination equipment that is significantly
more complex than that used in a traditional voice network, e.g., the FiOS equipment
needs to come with a battery pack to handle power outages. This then translates into
ps1 > pd1 . We also note that implicit in the definition of individual contribution margins
for each service is the assumption that they are incurred independently for each service,
i.e., there are no economies of scope associated with users subscribing to both services.
This assumes that there is no bundling discount for subscribing to both services, and
that per user connection costs are additive across services. This is reasonable in settings
such as the FiOS example, where the bulk of the connection costs are in termination
equipment specific to each service.
5 See

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verizon FiOS for an informal description.
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In addition to per-user connection costs, offering network services also involves
fixed and capacity costs. Upfront fixed costs are independent of demand and capacity
levels, e.g., they include facility rent, research & development expenses. These costs
are denoted by cs for a shared network, and by cd1 and cd2 when each service is deployed on a dedicated network. Capacity costs grow with network resources; they are
incurred upfront because of provisioning and may also be incurred subsequently during
reprovisioning. Unit capacity costs for Service 1 are denoted by as1 and ad1 in shared
and dedicated networks, respectively, and by as2 and ad2 for Service 2. We use the
term return on capacity to refer to the ratio of contribution margin to capacity cost,
pi
ai ,

i = {s2, d2} for Service 2, with a parallel definition for Service 1.
The values that the above parameters take in shared and dedicated networks are obvi-

ously related to each other. These relationships can exhibit different levels of economies
and diseconomies of scope. We illustrate this through the example of overlay and integrated networks, which represent two possible options for realizing a shared network.
An overlay involves limited use of an existing infrastructure to deploy a new network
service. For example, early versions of the Internet were deployed as an overlay on the
existing phone network. End-systems connected using modems to transmit data over
existing phone lines, and early routers were interconnected using available telephony
transmission facilities such as T1 and T3 links. Control functions of the nascent Internet
were, however, kept separate from those of the phone network, e.g., the Internet relied
on its own routing protocols and did not use the phone network signalling system (SS7).
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In general, when a new service is deployed by way of an overlay, the networks of
the two services share a common infrastructure (that of Service 1), but remain largely
decoupled from each other. This limits the diseconomies of scope that could arise
from complex interactions between them, but it also precludes significant economies of
scope.
In contrast, an integrated network solution will operate both services on a truly common network infrastructure. For example, many cable providers with “triple-play” offerings, have upgraded their infrastructure (backbone network and cable access network) so that it can carry the voice, data, and video traffic from those three services.
This required upgrading backbone and access routers to allow differentiation (and prioritization) of different traffic types, but allowed reuse of the same router platforms
and transmission facilities for all three services. In other words, an integrated network
solution offers opportunities for greater economies of scope, but often mandates more
expensive equipment to handle the individual requirements of each service. This in
turn can translate into higher diseconomies of scope. The model of Section 2.3.2 can
be configured to reflect any combination of economies and diseconomies of scope between shared and dedicated networks.

2.3.2

Model Setup and Solution

We describe next solving the Three Stage model of Figure 2.1 to obtain the expected
profits associated with shared and dedicated networks. As alluded to earlier, the so-
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lution proceeds in the reverse order of the decision process of Figure 2.1, i.e., the reprovisioning stage is first solved, followed by capacity allocation stage, and finally the
infrastructure choice stage. Because the solution method is essentially identical for
dedicated and shared networks, we present it for the former and simply provide final
expressions for the latter. Furthermore, we note that because Service 1 is a mature service with a stable, known demand, it is only relevant in the final infrastructure choice
stage.

2.3.2.1

Reprovisioning Stage

As mentioned earlier, reprovisioning takes place after the demand for Service 2 has
been realized. In the presence of excess demand, i.e., the realized demand exceeded
the originally provisioned capacity, the provider secures additional capacity to capture
a fraction α of the excess demand. In the absence of excess demand, no reprovisioning
takes place.
We present next an expression for the gross profit from Service 2 after the reprovisioning phase in a dedicated network. As defined in Sub-section 2.3.1, the contribution margin for Service 2 is pd2 , and the variable cost of provisioning capacity is
ad2 . If the realized demand X2 exceeds the provisioned capacity Kd2 , the capacity is
adjusted to accommodate a fraction α of the excess demand, i.e., capacity increases to
Kd2 + α(X2 − Kd2 ). The gross profit for Service 2 is then given by
Rd2 (X2 > Kd2 ) = (pd2 − ad2 )(Kd2 + α(X2 − Kd2 ))
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(2.1)

Conversely, when the realized demand is less than the provisioned capacity Kd2 , the
gross profit for Service 2 is
Rd2 (X2 ≤ Kd2 ) = pd2 X2 − ad2 Kd2

(2.2)

Similar expressions can be obtained in the case of a shared network, and Equations (2.3)
and (2.4) parallel the expressions of Equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Rs2 (X2 > Ks2 ) = (ps2 − as2 )(Ks2 + α(X2 − Ks2 ))

(2.3)

Rs2 (X2 ≤ Ks2 ) = ps2 X2 − as2 Ks2

(2.4)

Next, we use these expressions to compute the optimal upfront capacity for Service
2 in the capacity allocation stage.

2.3.2.2

Capacity Allocation Stage

Assuming a known distribution fx2 for the demand of Service 2, the expected gross
profit Rd2 given the capacity provisioned upfront Kd2 in a dedicated network can be
expressed as
E(Rd2 )[Kd2 ] =

Z Kd2
0

Rd2 (X2 ≤ Kd2 ) fx02 d(x2 ) +

Z X max
2
Kd2

Rd2 (X2 > Kd2 ) fx02 d(x2 ) , (2.5)

where Rd2 (X2 > Kd2 ) and Rd2 (X2 ≤ Kd2 ) are given in Equations (2.1) and (2.2).
For analytical tractability, we assume that fx2 is uniformly distributed6 in [0, X2max ].
6 Results

typically extend [8, 28] to other distributions that share with the uniform distribution the

important property of a non-decreasing hazard-rate function F 0 (θ)/(1 − F(θ)).
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Assuming a uniform distribution for X2 , Equation (2.5) becomes
E(Rd2 )[Kd2 ] =

1
X2max

α  ∗2
(α − 1)
∗
pd2 − ad2 Kd2
+ (1 − α)(pd2 − ad2 )X2max Kd2
2
2


α(pd2 − ad2 ) max 2
max
(X2 ) − cd2 X2
+
(2.6)
2



∗ such that
Using Equation (2.6), we can compute the optimal capacity Kd2

∂E(Rd2 )[Kd2 ]
∂Kd2

=

0:
∗
Kd2


=


(1 − α)(pd2 − ad2 )
X2max
(1 − α)pd2 + αad2

(2.7)

∗ from Equation (2.7) can be used to show that
The expression for Kd2
∗
∗
ad2 P(X2 ≤ Kd2
) = (1 − α)(pd2 − ad2 )P(X2 > Kd2
)

(2.8)

∗ is one at which the cost incurred
Equation (2.8) shows that the optimal capacity Kd2
∗ )) is balanced against the
from each unit of over-provisioning (i.e., ai for P(X2 ≤ Kd2
∗ )).
loss from each unit of under-provisioning (i.e., (1 − α)(pi − ai ) for P(X2 > Kd2

Also notice that the optimal capacity in Equation (2.7) is analogous to the notion of
‘critical fractile’7 in single period news-vendor problems. As expected, Equation (2.7)
∗ = 0 when α = 1, i.e., the ability to reprovision without penalty obviates the
yields Kd2

need for provisioning upfront.
7 Single-period

news-vendor problems with selling price p and inventory purchase price c use the

notion of ‘critical fractile’, given by the ratio (p − c)/p, to determine the optimal inventory level q∗ ,

where q∗ = F −1 p−c
and F −1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function of demand. Intuitively,
c
the critical fractile balances the cost of being understocked (a lost sale worth (p − c)) and the total costs
of being either overstocked or understocked (where the cost of being overstocked is the inventory cost,
c, thus giving a total cost of simply p = (p − c) + c).
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∗ from Equation (2.7) in Equation (2.6), we get
Substituting the expression for Kd2



(pd2 − ad2 )X2max
(1 − α)ad2
∗ ] =
E(Rd2 )[Kd2
1−
.
2
(1 − α)pd2 + αad2

(2.9)

Similar expressions can be obtained for a shared network as shown below
∗
Ks2


=


(1 − α)(ps2 − as2 )
X2max .
(1 − α)ps2 + αas2



(ps2 − as2 )X2max
(1 − α)as2
1−
.
E(Rs2 )[Ks2∗ ] =
2
(1 − α)ps2 + αas2

(2.10)

(2.11)

Next we proceed to use the results of Equations (2.9) and (2.11) to compute profits
from shared and dedicated networks and finalize a choice of infrastructure.

2.3.2.3

Infrastructure Choice Stage

In this last stage, the overall profit of the two network options, shared or dedicated, are
evaluated to select the one with the higher profit. We consider dedicated and shared
networks in turn.
Dedicated Networks
The gross profit for Service 1 in a dedicated network is of the form Rd1 = X1 (pd1 −
ad1 ), where pd1 and ad1 are as defined earlier. As a result, the profit Πd1 of Service 1
deployed on a dedicated network is of the form
Πd1 = X1 (pd1 − ad1 ) − cd1

(2.12)

The expected profit under optimal provisioning for Service 2 is given by subtracting the
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fixed cost from Equation (2.9):


(pd2 − ad2 )X2max
(1 − α)ad2
Πd2 =
1−
− cd2
2
(1 − α)pd2 + αad2

(2.13)

The total profit from both services, Πd = Πd1 + Πd2 , is therefore



(pd2 − ad2 )X2max
(1 − α)ad2
1−
− cd2 + X1 (pd1 − ad1 ) − cd1 (2.14)
Πd =
2
(1 − α)pd2 + αad2
Shared Networks
The gross profit Rs1 for Service 1 is of the form
Rs1 = X1 (ps1 − as1 ) ,

(2.15)

while the gross profit for Service 2 is given by Equation (2.11). Hence, the total profit
from both services is given by


(ps2 − as2 )X2max
(1 − α)as2
Πs =
1−
+ X1 (ps1 − as1 ) − cs
2
(1 − α)ps2 + αas2

(2.16)

The optimal network infrastructure choice is the one yielding the highest overall
profit. In the next section, we explore how this choice is affected by the model parameters. Before proceeding, we first derive a number of basic properties that are used later
in the analysis (the proofs of the corresponding lemmas are available in Appendix A.1.

Lemma 2.3.1 The network infrastructure with a higher return on capacity has a higher
optimal capacity, i.e., if
8 The

pd2
ad2

>

ps2
as2 ,

∗ ≥ K ∗ , and vice-versa8 .
then Kd2
s2

∗ = K ∗ can hold only at α = 1, where both K ∗ and K ∗ are zero.
equality Kd2
s2
s2
d2
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Figure 2.2: Network Resource Allocation for pd2 /ad2 > ps2 /as2

For a given demand distribution, investing in greater capacity increases the likelihood of having excess capacity. Thus the network with greater capacity has greater
expected cost of unused capacity. But if the network also has higher return on capacity
then that is offset by the greater potential upside, namely higher returns if the capacity
is utilized. Thus, the network with the greater return on capacity is the one that can
invest in additional capacity.

Lemma 2.3.2 For both shared and dedicated infrastructures, the optimal capacity decreases with α.

An increase in alpha allows a provider to recover more of the excess demand and
therefore reduces the provider’s cost of under-provisioning resources. With the cost of
under-provisioning going down while the cost of over-provisioning remaining the same,
the provider reduces the capacity it provisions upfront. In particular, when α = 1, i.e.,
∗ = K ∗ = 0.
the entire excess demand is captured, no provisioning is needed i.e., Kd2
s2
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Lemma 2.3.3 When the return on capacity (i.e.,

pi
ai ,

i = {d2, s2}) is large, the optimal

capacity decreases slowly with α when α is small and decreases rapidly with α as
α → 1.
Lemmas 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 are illustrated in Figure 2.2 (the ratio pd2 /ad2 is assumed
large in this figure). In the figure, the optimal capacity provisioned upfront for the
dedicated network is always greater than or equal to that for the shared network on account of its greater return on capacity. The optimal capacities for both network choices
are decreasing with α. And finally, the decrease is relatively small at low α for the
dedicated network and very rapidly as α → 1.

2.4

Analysis

In this section, we use the analytical results obtained in Section 2.3 to study the impact of various system parameters on the choice of network infrastructure. This will
be done in two phases. First, in Section 2.4.1, we consider the impact of the different
cost and revenue parameters (cd1 , cd2 , cs , ai , pi ; i = {d1, s1, d2, s2}). All these parameters exhibit similar behavior, i.e., economies of scope in costs favor the creation
of shared networks while diseconomies of scope favor dedicated networks. Second,
in Section 2.4.2, we focus on the impact of the reprovisioning coefficient (α) on the
network choice, and show that it can produce more subtle and interesting behaviors.
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2.4.1

Impact of Cost/Revenue parameters

The preferred network infrastructure is found by comparing Πs and Πd (Equations (2.14) and (2.16)) of the shared and dedicated networks respectively, and
choosing the one that yields a higher profit. These profits depend on the various cost
and revenue parameters, all of which have a similar kind of impact on the network
choice. We provide an illustrative example by evaluating the impact of ps2 (i.e.,
Service 2’s contribution margin in a shared network). Detailed analyses for other cost
parameters are provided in Appendix A.4.

Impact of ps2
Using Equations (2.14) and (2.16), the condition for choosing shared over dedicated
(Πs > Πd ) can be written as:
−1
ps2
<
− γ0
ps2
(1 − α) as2 + α as2


2
where γ0 = − as2 X max Πd − X1 (ps1 − as1 ) + cs is independent of ps2 .

(2.17)

2

Suppose ps2 is small and Equation (2.17) is invalid, i.e., dedicated networks are preferred. When ps2 increases sufficiently, it is possible for Equation (2.17) to be satisfied.
That is, a shared network becomes more profitable, as expected. Additionally, it can be
shown that there can be at most one such transition from dedicated to shared network
as ps2 increases. In Appendix A.4, we show that other system cost/revenue parameters
give rise to similar behaviors.
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2.4.2

Impact of Reprovisioning

To study the impact of reprovisioning coefficient (α), we substitute the expressions for
∗ and K ∗ from Equations (2.7) and (2.10) into the condition Π > Π to obtain:
Kd2
s
d
s2
∗
∗
(α) > 2γ,
ad2 Kd2
(α) − as2 Ks2

(2.18)

where γ is independent of α and is given by
 X max
γ = (pd2 − ad2 ) − (ps2 − as2 ) 2 + (Rd1 − Rs1 ) − (cd1 + cd2 − cs )
2

(2.19)

As seen in Equation (2.19), γ captures the difference in expected profits between
the dedicated and shared networks conditioned on capacity exactly meeting the realized demand (as would for example be the case when α = 1). The left hand side of
Equation (2.18) captures the difference in capacity costs under optimal provisioning
between the dedicated and shared network infrastructures as a function of α. For ease
∗ (α) − a K ∗ (α) to denote this
of exposition, we introduce the notation h(α) = ad2 Kd2
s2 s2

difference. Note that h(1) = 0 as the required up-front capacity is zero for both shared
and dedicated infrastructures when α = 1. In contrast, h(0) can be positive or negative
depending on whether the dedicated or shared network incurs a higher capacity cost in
the absence of reprovisioning.
As specified in Equation (2.18), the network infrastructure choice at any value of α
depends on the value of h(α) relative to the constant baseline of 2γ. At each value of α
where h(α) intersects with 2γ, a switch occurs from preferring one network choice to
another. Understanding how reprovisioning affects network choice therefore calls for
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understanding how the capacity cost difference, h(α), varies with α. This is the topic
of Subsection 2.4.2.1. In Subsection 2.4.2.2, we enumerate the possible intersection(s)
of h(α) with 2γ and their implications on network choice.

2.4.2.1

Analyzing the effect of α on capacity cost difference

The cost of the capacity that needs to be provisioned up-front is decreasing with α for
both shared and dedicated networks. This follows from Lemma 2.3.2 which shows
that an increase in α benefits both shared and dedicated networks by helping them
reduce their up-front capacity requirements, and hence their corresponding capacity
costs (ai Ki∗ , i = {d2, s2}). But the difference in these costs, as captured by h(α), may
increase or decrease as α varies in [0, 1]. Proposition 1 specifies the conditions under
which h(α) is increasing (shared benefits more) or decreasing (dedicated benefit more).

Proposition 1 Increasing α benefits both shared and dedicated networks by reducing
their optimal capacity costs. Additionally,
(i) if h0 (0) ≥ 0 and h0 (1) ≥ 0, an increase in α benefits a shared network more than a
dedicated network ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) if h0 (0) < 0 and h0 (1) < 0, an increase in α benefits a dedicated network more than
a shared network ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) if h0 (0) ≥ 0 and h0 (1) < 0, an increase in α benefits a shared network more at low
α and a dedicated network at high α.
(iv) if h0 (0) < 0 and h0 (1) ≥ 0, an increase in α benefits a dedicated network more at
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low α and a shared network at high α.
Proposition 1 establishes that the signs of h0 (0) and h0 (1) fully characterize the behavior of h(α). Implicit in this characterization is that h0 (α) can change its sign at
most once for α ∈ [0, 1]. The proof that there can be at most one value of α at which
h0 (α) = 0 for α ∈ [0, 1] is given in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 is useful for two reasons. First, it helps identify key operational metrics that determine whether a dedicated or a shared network benefits more from improvements in reprovisioning. Second, it provides a useful graphical aid to understand
the factors driving the optimal network choice. We elaborate on both these points below.
Since the sign of h0 (α) at α = 0 and α = 1 determines which network benefits more
from reprovisioning, substituting, we focus on the relations h0 (0) = 0 and h0 (1) = 0:
h0 (0) = 0 :

pd2 − ad2
ps2 − as2
pd2 2 =
( ad2 )
( aps2s2 )2

(2.20)

h0 (1) = 0 :

pd2 − ad2 = ps2 − as2

(2.21)

From Equations (2.20) and (2.21), we observe that two operational metrics, the return on capacity ( apii ; i = {s2, d2}) and the gross profit margin for each unit of used
capacity (pi − ai ; i = {s2, d2}), determine which network choice benefits more from
increases in α. In Figure 2.3, we identify the regions in the

ps2
as2

(y-axis) and ps2 − as2

d2
(x-axis) plane associated with the four conditions from Proposition 1 ( apd2
and pd2 − ad2

are held constant). Note that the y-axis,

ps2
as2 ,

46

only takes values greater than 1 since

d2
, pd2 − ad2 ) plane, by holding
Π2 > 0. A similar plot can be obtained for the ( apd2

ps2
as2

and ps2 − as2 constants.
Return on capacity
for shared

ps2
as2

Low α: Dedicated
High α: Shared

h′(1) = 0
h′ (1) < 0

h′ (1) > 0
h′ (0) < 0

h′(0) = 0

pd2
ad2

Dedicated

Shared

Dedicated

Shared

h′ (0) > 0

ps2
as2
ps2
as2

>
<

pd2
ad2
pd2
ad2

pd2 − ad2

ps2 − as2

Low α: Shared
High α: Dedicated

Gross profit margin for shared

Figure 2.3: Partition of parameter space into regions corresponding to cases of Proposition 1 for the
s2
(ps2 − as2 , aps2
) plane

We observe from Figure 2.3 that the line pd2 − ad2 = ps2 − as2 (h0 (1) = 0) partitions
the plane into two regions such that at high α a dedicated network always benefits
more on one side and a shared network on the other. This observation is formalized in
Proposition 2.

Proposition 2 A dedicated network benefits more from reprovisioning at high α (i.e.,
α → 1) iff pd2 − ad2 > ps2 − as2 , i.e., if it has a higher gross profit margin.
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For α close to 1, the network choice with a higher gross profit margin has the higher
capacity cost9 . When α = 1, those costs become zero (for both network choices),
i.e., Ki∗ (α = 1) = 0; i = {s2, d2}. As a result, the network with the greater gross
profit margin that started with a higher capacity cost experiences a more significant
decrease in its up-front capacity cost as α approaches 1. Given that the only impact of
reprovisioning is on up-front capacity needs, this network clearly benefits more from
reprovisioning.
Proposition 2 focused on scenarios with high α, and we now turn to scenarios with
low α, i.e., very limited reprovisioning. We observe from Figure 2.3 that h0 (0) = 0
partitions the plane into two regions. More formally,

Proposition 3 A dedicated network benefits more from reprovisioning at low α (i.e.,
α → 0) if

pd2 −ad2

pd2 −ad2

ps2 −as2

pd2
ad2

2 <

pd2
ad2

ps2
as2

2 >

ps2 −as2
ps2
as2

2 , and a shared network benefits benefits more at low α if

2 .

Proposition 3 indicates that in addition to pi − ai ; ai = {s2, d2}, another metric, return on capacity ( apii , i = {d2, s2}), affects which network choice benefits more from
increase in reprovisioning at low α.
Our analysis thus far identifies for given values of the metrics,

pi
ai

and pi − ai , i =

{d2, s2}, which region of Figure 2.3 we operate in. Next, we further examine how these
metrics influence how each network choice benefits from reprovisioning.
9a K∗
i i

=

(pi −ai )
pi
α
ai + 1−α

; i = {s2, d2}. Hence, for α ≈ 1, the numerator pi − ai determines which network

has a higher ai Ki∗ .
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Capacity Cost

Capacity Cost

ad2Kd2
ad2Kd2
as2Ks2

as2Ks2

1

0

1

0
Reprovisioning Coefficient, α
pd2
ps2
ad2 ≪ as2

Reprovisioning Coefficient, α
pd2
ps2
ad2 ≫ as2

Figure 2.4: (A) Shared benefits more at low α, dedicated benefits more at high α
(B) Dedicated benefits more ∀α ∈ [0, 1]

Consider the case in which the dedicated network enjoys a higher gross profit margin than the shared, i.e., pd2 − ad2 > ps2 − as2 . Suppose first that

pd2
ad2

scenario similar to the one shown in Figure 2.4(A) may arise. Since



pd2
ad2

ps2
as2 ,

then a

is high, we

know from Lemma 2.3.3 that the up-front capacity remains almost unaffected for the
dedicated network for low α. Consequently, the drop in the capacity provisioning cost
for the dedicated network is not very significant at low α. On the other hand, since
the shared network has a much lower return on capacity, its capacity and the associated
provisioning cost decreases faster with increase in α at low α. But when α is high
the dedicated network starts to benefit more because the capacity requirements drop
from a relatively high value to zero. Therefore, a shared network benefits more from
an increase in reprovisioning at low α while a dedicated network does at high α. This
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observation is consistent with Figure 2.3, where the relationships pd2 − ad2 > ps2 − as2
and

pd2
ad2



ps2
as2

result in a point in the shaded region in the lower left hand side.

Next consider the case in which

pd2
ad2



ps2
as2 .

In Figure 2.4(B), since

ps2
as2

is high,

the capacity cost of the shared network remains unaffected at low α in accordance
with Lemma 2.3.3. But the dedicated network, which has a lower return on capacity,
drops its capacity faster at low α. Moreover, in accordance with Proposition 2, the
dedicated network continues to benefit more from increase in α even as α → 1 since
pd2 − ad2 > ps2 − as2 (i.e., h0 (1) < 0). Thus, in this scenario, a dedicated network
benefits more for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Once again, this is consistent with Figure 2.3(A), where
the conditions pd2 − ad2 > ps2 − as2 and

pd2
ad2



ps2
as2

correspond to a point in the upper

left hand side region.
Similar explanations can be given for other parameter values, e.g., pd2 − ad2 < ps2 −
as2 , and how these map onto the regions of Figure 2.3.

2.4.2.2

Optimal Network Choice

The analysis in Section 2.4.2.1 characterized which network choice benefits more from
reprovisioning. However, the provider’s optimal network choice depends on how these
relative benefits compare to the other cost and revenue parameters. As specified in
Equation (2.18), this choice depends on the value of h(α) with respect to the baseline
of 2γ, and each intersection between them marks a switch in network choice. In this
section, we evaluate the provider’s optimal network choice.
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As specified in Proposition 1 (see also Figure 2.3), there are four possible behaviors
associated with an increase in reprovisioning coefficient, α.
First, consider the region in which a shared network always benefits more from
increases in α. Now, if shared network is already the preferred choice at α = 0, then it
obviously remains the provider’s optimal network choice irrespective of reprovisioning
ability. This requires γ < 0 (because h(α) > 2γ, ∀α and h(1) = 0), which can arise if the
shared network enjoys significantly lower fixed costs (i.e., cs  cd1 + cd2 ) or variable
costs (ps2 − as2  pd2 − ad2 and/or Rs1  Rd1 ). A numerical example is shown in
Figure 2.5(A). On the other hand, if a dedicated network is initially preferred and if
the benefits that the shared network receives from reprovisioning are never sufficient to
overcome the impact of other parameters (i.e., h(α) < 2γ, ∀α ∈ [0, 1]), then a dedicated
network remains preferred irrespective of α, as shown in Figure 2.5(B) (where a low
fixed cost, cd2 = 0.5 favors a dedicated network). A more interesting outcome arises
when a dedicated network is the preferred choice for α = 0, but as α increases, the
benefits that the shared network receives are sufficiently high to overcome the impact
of diseconomies of scope in other costs (i.e., h(α) and 2γ intersect). As a result, the
optimal network choice switches to a shared network at high α. A numerical example
is shown in Figure 2.5(C), in which a dedicated network is preferred for α . 0.6 and
shared for higher values.
Second, consider the region in which a shared network benefits more from increases
in α at low α and a dedicated network at high α. A numerical example for this sce-
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Figure 2.5: (A) Shared network ∀α ∈ [0, 1], (B) Dedicated network ∀α ∈ [0, 1], (C) Dedicated at low α,
d2
shared network at high α (Parameter values: pd2 − ad2 = 9 < 16.7 = ps2 − as2 , apd2
= 10 > 8.2609 =

ps2
as2 , Rd1

= 30, Rs1 = 25, cs = 20, cd1 = 5, cd2 = 4).

nario is shown in Figure 2.6, which shows that there are four possible network choice
outcomes depending on 2γ: (i) a dedicated network is preferred irrespective of α, (ii)
a shared network is preferred irrespective of α, (iii) a shared network is preferred at
low α and a dedicated network at high α, (iv) a dedicated network is preferred at both
low and high α, and a shared network for intermediate values. A dedicated (shared)
network is chosen irrespective of α if there are significant diseconomies (economies)
of scope as shown in Figure 2.6(A) (Figure 2.6(B)). In both cases, the impact of reprovisioning is negligible relative to the impact of other cost and revenue parameters. For
values of cost parameters such that h(α) and 2γ intersect, the optimal network choice
switches. As shown in Figure 2.6(C) and (D), there can be one or two such switches in
the optimal network choice.
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Figure 2.6: (A) Dedicated network ∀α ∈ [0, 1], (B) Shared network ∀α ∈ [0, 1], (C) Dedicated at both
high and low α, shared for intermediate α, (D) Shared at low α, dedicated network at high α (Parameter
d2
values: pd2 − ad2 = 18 > 11 = ps2 − as2 , apd2
= 10 > 6.5 =

ps2
as2 , Rd1

= 25, Rs1 = 25, cs = 14, cd1 = 11).

Next, we consider the region in which a dedicated network always benefits more
than a shared network ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. In this scenario, if the diseconomies (economies) of
scope in the costs are very large, a dedicated (shared) network is preferred irrespective
of α, else the network choice switches from shared to dedicated as α increases. Lastly,
when a dedicated network benefits more from increase in α at low α and a shared
network at high α, there can be four possible outcomes. The analyses for these last two
cases are analogous to the previous ones in which the shared network was benefiting
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more.

2.4.3

Discussion

In this section, we illustrate the paper’s findings through two examples that help contrast the different possible outcomes the model predicts when the ability to reprovision
resources improves (α increases).
Recall that shared infrastructures benefit from reusing equipment across services,
but that these benefits can all but disappear when the sharing is poorly controlled and
produces diseconomies rather than economies of scope. Technologies that control sharing have, therefore, played an important role in the emergence of shared solutions, e.g.,
witness the impact of “virtualization” on the growing popularity of both cloud computing and virtual networks. However, the same technologies that enable better control
of shared resources, often also facilitate more dynamic provisioning of those same resources. As seen in the previous section, better reprovisioning abilities and greater
economies of scope, as measured by improvements in gross profit margin and return
on capacity, need not always combine to favor shared solutions. We illustrate this next
through two examples10 .
Consider the task of providing computing services in the late eighties, early nineties.
There were two major competing options for delivering such services. Systems such
as IBM mainframes were representative of shared solutions that would support multi10 The

examples draw from computation as opposed to network services, but as mentioned earlier, the

model is applicable to different types of services infrastructures.
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ple services (and users). In contrast, DEC mini-computers and later on a wide range
of “workstations” were the pillars of dedicated solutions, with individual machines assigned to specific tasks or users. The cost of equipment and therefore computational
capacity was substantially lower for dedicated solutions than it was for IBM mainframe
shared solutions, i.e., ad < as . As a result, and even if services based on IBM mainframes often carried a premium (ps & pd ), this is a scenario that maps to the lower
left quadrant of Figure 2.3, i.e., shared solutions boast lower gross profit margins and
return on capacity than dedicated ones. Furthermore, in the context of this example,
both solutions can be argued to have remained within competitive range of each other.
Hence, they belong to the “shaded area” of the lower left quadrant of Figure 2.3; an
area where better reprovisioning abilities (α) can favor either shared or dedicated solutions. In particular, improving α in the low-α region benefits shared solutions more
than dedicated ones. This can be claimed to capture the small improvements in reprovisioning that technology advances afforded both mainframes and mini-computers, e.g.,
through processor and memory upgrades or even additional processors cards. As shown
in Figure 2.3, these improvements would have then favored (shared) IBM mainframes
more than (dedicated) mini-computer based solutions. This factor, and obviously many
others, may have enabled mainframes to survive in spite of the emergence of cheaper
distributed solutions.
Contrast the previous situation with the current environment for computing services,
where dedicated and shared solutions both rely on the same type of equipment, i.e., a
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stand-alone blade server fulfills the needs of an individual computation service, while
racks of the same blade servers can be shared across services. In addition, previously
mentioned technologies such as virtualization offer tight control of resources sharing
across services, which enables shared solutions to take full advantage of the economies
of scope they afford. The similar equipment costs (as ≈ ad ) and the ability to fully
leverage the economies of scope of shared solutions (ps ≥ pd ) imply that we are now
operating in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 2.3, i.e., shared solutions display both
higher gross profit margins and return on capacity than their dedicated counterparts.
Furthermore, the same technology that is behind stackable blade servers and virtualization makes highly dynamic reprovisioning a reality, i.e., idle CPUs can be rapidly
allocated to individual services, and adding new blades to an existing system can be
done with little turn-around time. In other words, we are now in a high α environment.
Hence, throughout the upper-right quadrant of Figure 2.3, improvements in reprovisioning abilities only further the advantage of shared solutions. In other words, unlike
the “mainframe vs. workstation” scenario where improving reprovisioning tilted the
balance back towards the less competitive mainframe solution, it now further strengthens the solution of choice, shared systems, which augurs well for the continued growth
of large-scale cloud computing systems.
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2.5

Robustness to Alternative Models

In this section, we provide numerical examples to show that the different possible outcomes reported in Section 2.4 about the impact of reprovisioning coefficient (α ∈ [0, 1])
on the network infrastructure choice can arise even in the presence of economies of
scale and non-uniform demand distribution. Of particular interest is the observation
that even the more complex outcome that involves choosing one type of network for
both high and low values of α and the other for intermediate values is also present.
Some of these results are presented below.

2.5.1

Economies of Scale and Non-uniform Demand Distribution

The motivation for these numerical investigations is to show that while economies of
scale may provide an additional advantage to a shared network, and a non-uniform demand distribution can affect the benefits of reprovisioning for the two network choices
differently, their presence (or absence) alone is not enough to strongly favor a shared
solution over dedicated ones (or vice-versa).
γ

We use ai Ki , i = {s2, d2}, γ < 1 to account for the economies of scale in capacity
costs. In addition to economies of scale, the two examples provided below consider
positively and negatively skewed beta distributions, respectively, for Service 2’s demand.
In Figure 2.7 (Rs1 = 30.5, Rd1 = 10, cd1 = 12.03, cd2 = 14, cs = 6, ps2 = 6.8, as2 =
2, pd2 = 16.5, ad2 = 2), the economies of scale in capacity grow as ai Ki0.8 , i = {s2, d2}
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and Service 2’s demand distribution follows a positively skewed beta distribution between [0, X2max ] with parameters (1.5, 2), i.e., skewness of 0.2226. The example shows
an instance of infrastructure choice where dedicated networks are preferred at both high
and low α, while a shared network is preferred in the intermediate range of α.
In presesnce of economies of scale and positively skewed distribution of demand
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Figure 2.7: Impact of α for positively skewed beta distribution & economies of scale

In Figure 2.8 (Rs1 = 9.68, Rd1 = 20, cd1 = 10, cd2 = 13, cs = 16.1, ps2 = 5.2, as2 =
2.1, pd2 = 4.5, ad2 = 2), we have ai Ki0.85 , i = {s2, d2} (i.e., γ = 0.85) and the demand
distribution of Service 2 follows a negatively skewed beta distribution between [0, X2max ]
with parameters (1.5,1), i.e., skewness of -0.2223. In this scenario, a shared network is
preferred at both high and low α, while dedicated networks are preferred for intermediate values.
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2.6

Conclusions

This work introduces an analytical framework to investigate when shared or dedicated
infrastructures offer a more cost-effective solution in the deployment of new services.
The choice of an infrastructure is influenced by many factors such as fixed and variable costs, capacity costs, and the ability to dynamically reprovision resources as made
possible by technologies such as virtualization. The results demonstrate that although
strong economies or diseconomies of scope in the cost components can, as one would
expect, favor a shared or a dedicated solution, the ability to dynamically provision resources can have a similar influence. Reprovisioning improves the profits of both shared
and dedicated solutions, but can do so differently as a function of their respective gross
profit margins and returns on capacity. The selection of a preferred infrastructure is,
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therefore, influenced not only by economies and diseconomies of scope, but also by
how the infrastructure is affected by reprovisioning. The work identifies the presence
of complex interactions between these factors, and characterizes when they give rise to
different outcomes.
Although the model demonstrates the impact of reprovisioning and identifies operational metrics that influence network choice, it relied on a number of assumptions that
we briefly review. First, the model focused on economies of scope, and ignored the
possible impact of economies of scale. As discussed in Section 2.3, this is a realistic
assumption in many settings, including networks. Furthermore, the numerical investigation of a model that incorporates economies of scale in Section 2.5 demonstrated
qualitatively similar results. Second, for analytical tractability the model assumed a
uniform distribution for the demand of Service 2. As shown again in Section 2.5, the
results remain qualitatively valid even under non-uniform demand distributions. The
model also assumed that reprovisioning was equally available in shared and dedicated
networks. The use of different reprovisioning parameters for shared and dedicated solutions, i.e., αs and αd , can be readily incorporated in the model, albeit at the cost of
greater notational complexity. Finally, the model also assumed that reprovisioning was
invoked only in the presence of excess demand, i.e., provisioned capacity could not be
relinquished when demand was insufficient. Allowing symmetric reprovisioning represents an interesting extension to the model, although it is intuitively not expected to
yield drastically different results.
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Chapter 3

Adoption of Competing Network
Technologies

3.1

Introduction

Advances in technology often see newer and better solutions replacing older ones. Networking is no exception. For example, the Internet competed against alternative packet
data technologies before finally displacing the phone network as the de facto communication infrastructure. Recently, there have been calls for new architectures to succeed
it, and these will face a formidable incumbent in the Internet. Their eventual success in
replacing it will likely depend not just on technical superiority, but also on economic
factors, and on their ability to win over the Internet’s installed base.
A large installed base can give an incumbent an edge even if a new (entrant) tech-
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nology is technically superior. The traditional networking approach to this problem has
been converters (a.k.a. gateways) to ease migration from one technology to another.
This is not unique to networks, but converters are particularly important in network
settings where “communication” is the primary function, and its benefits grow with the
number of users that can be reached, e.g., as in Metcalfe’s Law. Since converters allow
users of one technology to connect with users of another, they are an important tool in
the adoption of network technologies. However, developing, deploying, and operating
converters comes at a cost, one that often grows as a function of the converter’s quality.
Further, converters can play a directionally ambiguous role. On one hand, a converter
can help the entrant overcome the advantage of the incumbent’s large installed base by
allowing connectivity to it. On the other hand, the converter also helps the incumbent
technology by mitigating the impact of its users migrating to the newer technology.
Understanding the impact of converters on network technology adoption is, therefore,
a topic that deserves further scrutiny.
In this work, we develop a modeling framework to study adoption dynamics of entrant and incumbent technologies in the presence of network externalities. Specifically,
we introduce a model for the utility derived by an individual user from a communication network, and use it to build an aggregate model for technology adoption that
is consistent with individual rational decision-making. We apply the model to study
the role that converters can play in the adoption of network technologies. Our main
findings are:
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• The adoption process can exhibit multiple steady state outcomes (equilibria); each
associated with a specific region of initial adoption levels for the two technologies.
For example, an entrant technology may succeed only if the incumbent is not
already well entrenched.
• Converters can help a technology improve its own standing, i.e., market share, and
even ensure its dominance while it would have entirely disappeared in the absence
of converters. For example, a low-quality but low-cost technology may thwart the
success of a better but more expensive competitor by preserving the ability of its
users to access adopters of the pricier technology, whose usage would then be
limited to a few “techno-buffs.”
• Improving converters’ efficiency can at times be harmful. They can result in lower
market shares for an individual technology or for both. For instance, high market
penetration may depend on the combination of a cheap but low-end technology
with a high-end but more expensive one to adequately serve the full spectrum of
user preferences. A situation where converters allow the better technology to gain
market share at the expense of the lesser technology may result in low-end users
of that technology dropping out altogether; thereby contributing to a lower overall
market penetration.
• While in the absence of converters technology adoption always converges to a
stable steady-state equilibrium, this need not be so when converters are present.
Boom-and-bust cycles in which users switch back-and-forth between technologies
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can arise when technologies are asymmetric in the externality benefits they offer.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces our model
and problem formulation. Section 3.3 characterizes technology adoption trajectories
and equilibrium adoption levels. Section 3.4 explores the role of converters in influencing adoption outcomes. Section 3.6 reviews prior work and positions the work in
the literature. We discuss the limitations of this study and conclude the chapter with
remarks on future work in Section 3.7. The proofs of all propositions can be found in
Appendix B.

3.2
3.2.1

Technology Adoption Model
Technology Valuation

As in most competitive situations, the choice of one technology over another depends
on the “value” they provide. Value is a somewhat elusive concept that depends in part
on the quality and functionality of the technology and its cost. In the context of network technologies whose main purpose is to enable communication among users, the
number of users11 accessible through it is another important component, often termed
network effect or externality. As commonly done, we account for these factors and their
effect on technology adoption through a utility function. For two competing network
11 Users

can be individuals or organizations, and include resources and content.
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technologies, 1 and 2, the respective utility functions are given by eqs. (3.1) and (3.2).
U1 = θq1 + (x1 + α1 βx2 ) − p1

(3.1)

U2 = θq2 + (βx2 + α2 x1 ) − p2

(3.2)

Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) consist of three distinct terms. Focusing on, say, Technology 1, the
first term, θq1 represents the stand-alone benefits from the technology, with q1 representing the intrinsic quality of the technology, and θ a random variable accounting for
heterogeneity in how users value technology. The quantity q1 incorporates aspects of
functionality, reliability, performance, etc., for the technology. In the rest of the chapter,
we assume q2 > q1 , i.e., Technology 2 is superior to Technology 1 and correspondingly
can be viewed as the entrant with Technology 1 playing the role of the incumbent. The
model, however, does not mandate such an assignment of roles, e.g., it can be used to
study settings where Technology 1 is the entrant and offers, say, a lower quality but
cheaper alternative than the incumbent Technology 2. The random variable θ ∈ [0, 1]
determines the relative weight a user places on the intrinsic quality of a technology. It
is private information, but we assume that the distribution of θ across users is known.
We make the common assumption [11] that θ is uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, 1]. This choice affects the magnitude of equilibrium adoption levels, but does not
qualitatively affect findings regarding technology adoption dynamics and outcomes as
demonstrated in Section 3.5.1.
The second component of the user’s utility is the network externality (or network effect), which refers to benefits derived from the ability to connect with other users. Net65

work externalities are chosen to be proportional to the number of users to which each
technology gives access. This linear dependency of network benefits on the number of
adopters is consistent with Metcalfe’s Law and commonly used in the literature [24].
In Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we investigate other models and demonstrate the robustness of our findings across different functional forms for network externality, including
non-linear ones. Denoting as x1 and x2 the fractions of adopters of each technology
out of a large population of size N, the externality benefits for Technology 1 consist of
x1 , the fraction of Technology 1 users, plus α1 βx2 , a term that includes the fraction of
Technology 2 users weighed by two additional factors. The first, 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, captures
the availability of converters offering connectivity from Technology 1 to Technology
2 (α1 = 0 corresponds to no converter and α1 = 1 to “perfect” converters). The second parameter, β, allows different externality benefits for the two technologies12 . We
note that converters, once deployed, are available to all users of the technology. This
corresponds to what we term “technology-level” converters, i.e., their development and
deployment are decisions made by the providers of network technologies.
Converters can be characterized as either duplex or simplex, symmetric or asymmetric, and constrained or unconstrained. Duplex converters provide bi-directional
connectivity between technologies, while simplex converters are present in only one
direction (most network technologies involve duplex converters, but the model does
not mandate them). Asymmetric converters simply refer to the fact that converter ef12 Eqs.

(3.1) and (3.2) implicitly express utility in units of Technology 1 externality benefits, i.e.,

Technology 1 externality benefits are equal to 1 when its penetration level is 100% (x1 = 1).
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ficiency can be different in each direction i.e., α1 6= α2 . The notion of constrained
vs. unconstrained converters arises in the presence of technologies that exhibit different
externalities, i.e., β 6= 1. For example, when β > 1, it captures whether converters allow
users of Technology 1 access to the greater externality benefits of Technology 2 when
connecting to its users. A converter is unconstrained if this is permitted, i.e., α1 β > 1.
We discuss an example where this can arise at the end of the section.
The last element of eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) is the price, pi , i ∈ {1, 2}. Because of our
focus on networks and connectivity that is typically offered as a service rather than a
good or product, price is recurrent. In other words, maintaining connectivity through
a particular network technology incurs new charges at regular intervals. As a result,
users continuously reevaluate their technology choices, and can switch from one technology to another and possibly back. For analytical tractability, the model assumes
that switching costs are negligible. This represents a reasonable assumption in many
settings. For example, the very high customer churn (reported to range from 72% all
the way up to 98% per year [17, 59]) that prevails in the ISP market points to little or
no switching costs in that market. On the other hand, non-zero switching costs, in the
form of contract breaking penalties and learning costs, are the norm in many settings.
A natural question is, therefore, whether behaviors observed in the absence of switching costs hold when they are present. Extending the analytical model to incorporate
switching costs is challenging, especially if one is to consider the many possible types
of switching costs, but numerical investigations are feasible. Section 3.5.4 reports on
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these investigations, which demonstrate a relative insensitivity to switching costs. Obviously, as switching costs increase, they eventually eliminate all adoption dynamics,
but the different behaviors that the (simple) model of this work helped reveal persist
over a non-trivial range.
We note that the model parameters, i.e., qi , pi , αi , β, are static and exogenously
specified. An obvious extension is to make them time-varying, e.g., technology gets
better and/or cheaper as time goes by, and the outcome of strategic decision-making.
Developing game-theoretic models that incorporate such effects is clearly of interest,
especially in the context of competitive scenarios where firms may offer introductory
pricing or seed the market to gain an initial foothold. Exploring those issues, however,
requires that we first understand the basic tenets of technology adoption and dynamics
in the simpler setting considered in this work.
Another important question is how to assign actual values to the model’s parameters. This is a topic that goes well beyond this work, and we only point to a possible approach. A common method to estimate utility weights is conjoint analysis, a technique
that has been widely adopted by marketing researchers and practitioners (see [34, 33]
for a detailed review). It relies on surveys offering users different combinations of
functionality and attributes to extract a relative ordering among them, and ultimately
produce individual weight assignments.
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3.2.2

User Decisions

Given current adoption levels, x1 and x2 , the utility functions of eqs. (3.1) and (3.2)
identify how a user values each technology, which in turn determines her technology
selection decisions. Specifically, a user chooses Technology i whenever it provides
a surplus that is both positive (Individual Rationality constraint) and higher than that
of the other technology (Incentive Compatibility constraint). In other words, a user
chooses



no technology




Technology 1





 Technology 2

if Ui < 0 for all i,
if U1 > 0 and U1 > U2 ,
if U2 > 0 and U2 > U1 .

Note that the model assumes an exclusive choice of technology by users, i.e., they
select Technology 1, or 2, or neither, but not both. This translates into the constraint
0 ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 1. The dynamics of technology adoption arise from the dependency of
the Ui ’s on the xi ’s that change with users’ adoption decisions. Capturing these dynamics, therefore, calls for specifying when users become aware of changes in the xi ’s and
update their adoption decisions. Knowledge of changes in adoption levels is likely to
diffuse through the user population and users’ reactions are often heterogeneous, i.e.,
some switch quickly, while others defer. An approach, commonly used in individuallevel diffusion models [39] and that captures these aspects is a continuous time approximation. Specifically, assume that at time t the “current” technology adoption levels,
x(t) = (x1 (t), x2 (t)), are known to all users. With this information, users can compute
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their utility for each technology and make adoption decisions. Let Hi (x(t)), i ∈ {1, 2}
denote the fraction of users for whom Technology i provides the highest (and positive)
utility13 . The quantity Hi (x(t)) − xi (t) corresponds to the fraction of users that would
normally proceed to adopt (disadopt) Technology i at time t. To capture a progressive
adoption process, we assume that the rate of change in users’ technology choices is
proportional to this quantity, namely,

dxi (t)
= γ Hi (x(t)) − xi (t) , i ∈ {1, 2},
dt

(3.3)

The quantity γ < 1 is analogous to the hazard rate in diffusion models, and can be
viewed as the expected conditional probability that an individual who has not yet
adopted technology i will do so at time t. In our analysis, we assume that the propensity
of individuals to adopt does not change with time, i.e., γ is constant.
Two aspects of this diffusion process need further clarification. First, users are myopic. At any instant, the adoption decisions are driven by the number of adopters at
that time (xi (t)) and users are not able to anticipate likely adoption levels in the future.
This is analogous to a best response dynamic. Second, the model identifies the rate
of technology adoption across users, but not which users are making the change. To
preserve consistency with user preferences, θ, we assume that the first users to adopt
Technology i are those that stand to benefit most from the action. This ensures that
at all times the sets of users having adopted either technology correspond to blocks of
users with contiguous technology preferences.
13 We

discuss the derivation of Hi (x(t)) in Section 3.3.1.
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The diffusion dynamics governed by eq. (3.3) can converge to a steady-state equilibrium x∗ characterized by:
dxi (t)
dt

=0
x(t)=x∗

⇔ xi∗ = Hi (x∗ ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.

(3.4)

In other words, at equilibrium, the fraction of users for whom it is individually rational
and incentive compatible to choose Technology i equals the current fraction of adopters
of Technology i. Based on this formulation, our goal is to characterize, as a function
of the exogenous system parameters β, pi , qi , αi for i ∈ {1, 2}, the equilibrium adoption
levels, i.e., the fixed points of eq. (3.4), and the dynamics leading to them.
Before exploring the dynamics and equilibria of technology adoption that the model
gives rise to, we pause to briefly introduce a couple of examples that illustrate the
model’s parameters and applicability.

IPv4 vs. IPv6

The impending exhaustion of IPv4 addresses, e.g., http:/www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4
for a daily countdown, implies that service providers signing up new Internet customers
will have to start using IPv6 addresses or charge more users who insist on an IPv4 address, i.e., pIPv4 = p1 > p2 = pIPv6 . As technologies, although IPv4 and IPv6 are incompatible, they are largely similar so that for the purpose of our model one can reasonably
assume q1 . q2 and β = 1. Because of their incompatibility, converters (gateways),
e.g., see [18] for a representative recent proposal, are needed for IPv6 users to access
the IPv4 content that is the bulk of today’s Internet content and unlikely to become na71

tively accessible over IPv6 any time soon14 . Conversely, those converters also enable
the reverse flow from IPv4 to IPv6, i.e., they are duplex converters, albeit not necessarily delivering the same performance in both directions, i.e., they can be asymmetric, so
that both α1 and α2 are non-zero but not always equal.
Users then decide between subscribing to an IPv4 or IPv6 service on the basis of
price (pi ), the level of content they are able to access (xi ), and the quality of that access
(αi ).

Low Def. vs. High Def. Video

The previous example illustrated a common adoption scenario with two mostly equivalent technologies and duplex, asymmetric converters. Because of the similarity of the
two technologies (β = 1), converters were by default constrained (α1 β ≤ 1). However,
when technologies exhibit significant differences in externality benefits, e.g., β > 1,
converters can be unconstrained (α1 β > 1) and we present next a possible example.
Consider a provider that offers its customers a video-conferencing service with the
associated equipment. The service comes in two versions, high-definition (HD) and
standard-definition (SD), i.e., HD equipment generates a high-quality (q2 ) video signal
while SD equipment produces a lower resolution (q1 < q2 ). Users derive value from
video-conferencing with one another, with β > 1 reflecting the higher quality of an HD
signal. The two services are priced accordingly (p2 > p1 ). However, because video is a
14 Although

the servers hosting most web sites can typically get an IPv6 address, very few have both-

ered registering one with DNS, e.g., see http://bgp.he.net/ipv6-progress-report.cgi.
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highly asymmetric technology (encoding is hard but decoding is comparatively easy), it
is possible for the provider to enable the decoding of HD signal on SD equipment (and
obviously conversely). This conversion can introduce quality degradations (α1 < 1),
but more importantly it allows SD users access to the externality benefits associated
with receiving HD signals. Assuming HD↔SD conversion is available in both direction, this is an instance of a duplex, possibly asymmetric (α1 6= α2 ), and unconstrained
(α1 β > 1) converter.
Many users may then opt for the SD service because of its lower price and the ability
to still enjoy the higher benefits of viewing HD signals. On the other hand, if all users
were to select the SD service, those externality benefits would disappear. In general,
users with high technology valuation (θ close to 1) may still opt for the HD service, but
the decision depends on choices made by others.

3.3

Trajectories and Equilibria

Solving the evolution of technology adoption decisions over time described in eq. (3.3)
calls for first computing expressions for Hi (x(t)), i = {1, 2} as functions of known
parameters.

3.3.1

Characterizing Potential Adoption Levels

For notational convenience we omit dependency on time and write x(t) simply as x.
Recall that Hi (x), i ∈ {1, 2}, corresponds to the fraction of users for whom it is ra73

tional to adopt Technology i, given the current adoption levels, x. To determine the
fraction of adopters of each technology, we introduce the notion of indifference points,
which identify thresholds in users technology valuation (θ) corresponding to changes
in technology preference. Specifically, θ0i (x), i ∈ {1, 2} identify the θ value separating
users with a negative utility for Technology i from those with a positive utility. In other
words, for technology penetration levels x, θ0i (x) is such that Ui (θ0i , x) = 0, and Ui (θ, x)
is positive (negative) for θ values larger (smaller) than θ0i .
From eqs. (3.1) and (3.2), Ui (θ0i , x) = 0 gives
θ01 (x) =
θ02 (x) =

p1 − (x1 + α1 βx2 )
q1
p2 − (βx2 + α2 x1 )
q2

(3.5)
(3.6)

Similarly, θ12 (x) corresponds to the θ value separating users preferring Technology 1
from those preferring Technology 2, i.e., U1 (θ12 , x) = U2 (θ12 , x) and users with θ > θ12 (x)
derive greater utility from Technology 2 than Technology 1 (recall that q2 > q1 ). Setting, U1 (θ12 , x) = U2 (θ12 , x) gives
θ12 (x) =

(1 − α2 )x1 − β(1 − α1 )x2 + p2 − p1
q2 − q1

(3.7)

Combining eqs. (3.5)-(3.7) gives
q2
(θ0 (x) − θ01 (x)),
q2 − q1 2
q1
θ12 (x) − θ02 (x) =
(θ0 (x) − θ01 (x)),
q2 − q1 2
θ12 (x) − θ01 (x) =

from which the following Proposition can be derived.
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(3.8)
(3.9)

Proposition 4
If θ01 (x) < θ02 (x), then θ12 (x) > θ02 (x) > θ01 (x).
If θ01 (x) ≥ θ02 (x), then θ12 (x) ≤ θ02 (x) ≤ θ01 (x).
Proposition 4 constrains the possible orderings of the indifference points given by
eqs. (3.5)-(3.7), so that Hi (x), i ∈ {1, 2} can be characterized in a compact manner.
H1 (x)

=




 [θ12 (x)][0,1] − [θ01 (x)][0,1]

if θ01 (x) < θ02 (x)



 0

otherwise
(3.10)

H2 (x)

=




 1 − [θ12 (x)][0,1]

if θ01 (x) < θ02 (x)



 1 − [θ0 (x)][0,1]
2

otherwise

where y[a,b] is the ‘projection15 ’ of y into [a, b].
The expressions for H1 (x) and H2 (x) determine the trajectory as well as the equilibrium outcome of the adoption process as per eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) respectively. Eq. (3.10)
characterizes Hi (x), i = {1, 2} through multiple possible expressions that depend on
the relative ordering of θ01 (x), θ02 (x) and θ12 (x), and the outcome of their projections on
[0, 1]. Identifying the different combinations that eq. (3.10) gives rise to calls for partitioning the (x1 , x2 )-plane into regions, each corresponding to unique expressions for
the (H1 (x), H2 (x)) pair. A method for constructing such a partition is described next.
First, consider all values of x which satisfy θ01 (x) ≥ θ02 (x). In the corresponding
half-plane of the (x1 , x2 )-plane, H1 (x) is always 0, but the value of H2 (x) depends on
the projection of θ02 (x) on [0, 1] (i.e., whether θ02 (x) ≤ 0, 0 < θ02 (x) < 1, or 1 ≤ θ02 (x)).
This creates three regions in the (x1 , x2 )-plane, each with a different expression for the
15 i.e.,

its value is y for y ∈ [a, b], a for y < a, and b for y > b.
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(H1 (x), H2 (x)) pair. These three regions, labeled R1 , R2 and R3 , and the corresponding
conditions on θ02 (x) appear in the left side of Table 3.1. The expressions for Hi (x), i =
{1, 2} in each region are provided in Table 3.2.
Conversely, for values of x which satisfy θ01 (x) < θ02 (x) (the other half-plane),
eq. (3.10) indicates that expressions for H1 (x) and H2 (x) depend on the positions of
both θ12 (x) and θ01 (x) relative to 0 and 1 (i.e., whether θ12 (x) ≤ 0, 0 < θ12 (x) < 1 or
1 ≤ θ12 (x), and similarly for θ01 (x)). This yields nine possible combinations. The number of feasible combinations can, however, be reduced to six using Proposition 4, which
constrains θ01 (x) < θ02 (x) < θ12 (x). For example, when θ01 (x) < θ02 (x), θ12 (x) ≤ 0 and
1 ≤ θ01 (x) is infeasible per Proposition 4. Thus in the half-plane θ01 (x) < θ02 (x), there
are six possible expressions for Hi (x), i = {1, 2}. These expressions are reported on
the right side of Table 3.1, with the corresponding regions labeled R4 to R9 . Combining
the two half-planes gives a total of nine regions, R1 to R9 , where in each region the
(H1 (x), H2 (x)) pair has a unique expression as specified in Table 3.2.
This partitioning in nine regions has a graphical representation, as shown in Figure 3.1. The line θ01 (x) = θ02 (x) splits the (x1 , x2 )-plane in the two previously mentioned
half-planes. The two lines corresponding to θ02 (x) = 0 and θ02 (x) = 1 are parallel, and
define the three regions R1 , R2 and R3 in the half-plane θ01 (x) ≥ θ02 (x). Similarly, the
lines θ01 (x) = 0, θ01 (x) = 1, θ12 (x) = 0 and θ12 = 1, divide the second half-plane into the
six regions, R4 to R9 . Figure 3.1 also illustrates that the lines θ02 (x) = 0, θ01 (x) = 0 and
θ12 (x) = 0 always intersect at a point denoted as P, and the lines θ02 (x) = 1, θ01 (x) = 1
76

and θ12 (x) = 1 always intersect at a point denoted as Q, with both P and Q16 lying on
the line θ01 = θ02 . The points P and Q can be shown to act as “anchors” that ensure
that the (x1 , x2 )-plane is always partitioned into exactly nine regions with fixed relative
positions.
It should also be noted that all nine regions need not always be feasible. Whether
or not they are feasible depends on their relative position in the solution space,
S = {(x1 , x2 ) s.t. 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1, x1 + x2 ≤ 1}. The number of regions that lie
inside S (and hence are relevant to the analysis) is a function of the system parameters
(qi , pi , β, αi ; i = {1, 2}). Last but not least, as shown in Appendix B.1, the partitioning
of the solution space into nine regions actually holds for more generic (monotonic) externality functions, i.e., it is not an artifact of the simplified linear externality function.
Finally, we pause to briefly interpret the conditions that define each region, and their
implications for solutions. We do so by way of an example, focusing on Region R8 .
Region R8 is defined as the set of adoption levels, x = (x1 , x2 ), for which 1 ≤ θ12 (x)
and 0 ≤ θ01 (x) < 1. The condition 1 ≤ θ12 (x) implies that in Region 8 all users prefer
Technology 1 over 2. Hence any existing Technology 2 adopter will disadopt. Thus, in
R8 , users can either be non-adopters of both technologies (0 < θ < θ01 (x)) or adopters
of Technology 1 (if θ > θ01 (x)). Similar interpretations are possible for other regions.
16 The

coordinates of the points P and Q can be readily found by solving simple systems of linear

equations given by eqs.(3.5)-(3.7).
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Figure 3.1: Region Partitions

Table 3.1: Partitions characterizing Hi (x)
θ01 (x) ≥ θ02 (x)

θ01 (x) < θ02 (x)

Region

condition

Region

R1

θ02 (x) ≤ 0

R4

θ12 (x) ≤ 0,

0 ≤ θ01 (x)

R2

0 < θ02 (x) < 1

R5

0 < θ12 (x) < 1,

θ01 (x) ≤ 0

R3

1 ≤ θ02 (x)

R6

0 < θ12 (x) < 1,

0 < θ01 (x) < 1

R7

1 ≤ θ12 (x),

θ01 (x) ≤ 0

R8

1 ≤ θ12 (x),

0 < θ01 (x) < 1

R9

1 ≤ θ12 (x),

1 ≤ θ01 (x)
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condition

Table 3.2: Expressions for Hi (x)
H2 (x) = 1

R1
R2

H2 (x) = 1 −

H1 (x) = 0

H2 (x) = 0

R3
R4

H1 (x) = 0

R5

H1 (x) =

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1
q2 −q1

H2 (x) = 1 −

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1
q2 −q1

R6

H1 (x) =

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1
q2 −q1

H2 (x) = 1 −

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1
q2 −q1

−

3.3.2

p2 −(βx2 +α2 x1 )
q2

H2 (x) = 1

p1 −(x1 +βα1 x2 )
q1

R7

H1 (x) = 1

R8

H1 (x) = 1 −

R9

H1 (x) = 0

p1 −(x1 +βα1 x2 )
q1

H2 (x) = 0

Characterizing Adoption Trajectories

By combining eqs. (3.5) to (3.7) with eq. (3.10), explicit expressions can be obtained
for Hi (x) in each of the nine regions (as listed in Table 3.2). Using these expressions, it
is now possible to solve eq. (3.3) and characterize the trajectory of technology adoption
in each region. The trajectories have the following general form:
xi (t) = ai + bi eλ1t + ci eλ2t ,

i ∈ {1, 2}

(3.11)

where λ1 and λ2 can be positive, negative, or complex depending on the region. Individual solutions for each region are listed in Table B.2 of the Appendix.
The full trajectory of technology adoption starting at some initial adoption levels
x(0) within a given region, can then be obtained by “stitching” together trajectories in
individual regions as region boundaries are crossed. The next question is to determine
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whether and where these trajectories may eventually converge as t → ∞. We tackle this
issue next.

3.3.3

Computing Steady-state Equilibria

From eq. (3.11), we see that a technology adoption trajectory in, say, region Rk , converges to a stable equilibrium xi (∞) = ai , i ∈ {1, 2}, if λ1 and λ2 are both negative
(equilibrium is locally stable), and (a1 , a2 ) ∈ S ∩ Rk (the equilibrium is valid, i.e.,
in the region associated with the trajectory). In other words, solutions to eq. (3.4)
(Hi (x∗ ) = xi∗ , i ∈ {1, 2}), must satisfy stability and validity conditions to be valid steadystate outcomes of the technology adoption process17 . The simple nature of eq. (3.4)
makes characterizing valid and stable solutions relatively straightforward, albeit tedious. The results are listed in Tables B.3 and B.4 in the Appendix. Table B.3 of the
Appendix gives the stability conditions associated with each equilibrium, along with
the joint validity and stability conditions (they are inter-dependent) in the last column.
The derivations are mechanical in nature, but we review the implications and properties of their solutions.
First, possible equilibria include instances where one technology wipes out the other
while achieving either full (xi∗ = 1) or partial (0 ≤ xi∗ < 1) market penetration, and
instances where both technologies coexist, again at either full (x1∗ + x2∗ = 1) or partial
market penetration (0 ≤ x1∗ + x2∗ < 1). Instances where both technologies die-out, i.e.,
17 Our

model is well-behaved and instances of boundary fixed points do not arise
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x∗ = (0, 0), while possible (the equilibrium lies in regions R3 or R9 ), are absent from
Table B.3 (see Appendix), as we restrict our focus to scenarios where Technology 1
survives in the absence of the Technology 2’s introduction. This precludes a (0, 0)
outcome.
Second, although not explicitly indicated in Table B.3 (see Appendix), configurations can be found for which the validity and stability conditions of multiple equilibria
are simultaneously satisfied. In other words, depending on the initial conditions x(0),
technology adoption converges to different outcomes. The following proposition identifies the configurations of multiple equilibria that can simultaneously arise for a given
set of parameter values.

Proposition 5 The only combination of multiple valid and stable equilibria that can
coexist are:
1. (1, 0) and (0, 1)
2. (x1∗R , 0) and (0, 1)
8

3. (x1∗R , 0) and (0, x2∗R )
8

2

4. (1, 0) and (0, x2∗R )
2

5. (x1∗R , 1 − x1∗R ) and (0, x2∗R )
5

5

2

6. (x1∗R , x2∗R ) and (0, 1)
6

6

7. (x1∗R , x2∗R ) and (1, 0)
6

6

Additionally, no combination of three or more equilibria can coexist as valid and
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stable equilibria.

The proof of the above proposition is available in Appendix B.4. When multiple
equilibria arise, the initial market penetration determines the equilibrium to which the
adoption process converges. Therefore it is useful to identify the set of all initial market
levels, x(0), for which the adoption trajectory converges to a particular stable equilibrium. This set is known as the ‘Basin of Attraction’ of that stable equilibrium. If
the stable equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium in the system i.e., globally stable,
then the entire region S is its basin of attraction. That is, all starting points lead to the
equilibrium. But whenever a pair of stable equilibria coexist, a ‘separatrix’, demarcating the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria can be computed. Section
3.3.4 provides the expressions for these separatrices and illustrates the methodology
for computing them.
Figure 3.2 provides an illustrative example. The figure, called a phase diagram,
shows the path of the diffusion process in the (t, x1 , x2 ) space projected onto the (x1 , x2 )
plane. In other words, it plots x1 (t) versus x2 (t) and is what one would see if one stood
high on the time axis and looked down into the (x1 , x2 ) plane, sometimes referred to
as the phase plane. We observe that there are two stable steady-state equilibria (of the
form (0, x2∗ ) and (x1∗ , 0)) and an unstable equilibrium in R6 . A separatrix passes through
this unstable equilibrium, separating the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria.
The framework developed here can be used in a wide range of situations to model
the dynamics of adoption. As an illustration of the useful insights that such a model can
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Figure 3.2: Separatix and the Basins of Attraction
(p1 = 1.2, q1 = 2.95, p2 = 2.54, q2 = 5.1, α2 = α1 = 0.01, β = 1)

offer, we apply our model to studying the role of converters in the adoption of incompatible technologies. We see from Tables B.3 and B.4 of the Appendix that converters
can influence (through the parameters αi ) both the validity and the stability of equilibria. In other words, converters may lead technology adoption to an entirely different
equilibrium. A rapid inspection of Table B.2 (see Appendix) shows that a similar conclusion holds for trajectories. In particular, converters can affect the values of λ1 and
λ2 of eq. (3.11). Investigating if and when such changes can happen, is the topic of
Section 3.4.

3.3.4

Computing Separatrices

Table 3.3 provides the characterization of the separatrices in each region when the unstable equilibrium that it passes through lies in that region. The regions R1 , R3 , R7 , R9
are not included in the table as no separatrix can arise in them because by definition
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these equilibria are always stable whenever they are valid.
Table 3.3: Candidates for local separatrix
Region

Candidate of local separatrix
p2 −q2
β−q2

R2

x2 = − αβ2 x1 +

R5

x2 =

1−α2
∗ ) + x∗
(x − x1R
2R5
β(1−α1 ) 1
6

R6

x2 =

2(1−α2 )(x1 −x1∗ R )
6 √
q
α2 +β(1−α1 )− q2 +(q2 −q1 ) A2 −4B

∗
+ x2R
6

1

R8

−q1
x2 = − βα1 x1 + βαp1(1−q
2

2

1)

We briefly illustrate how the expressions for the separatrices may be derived. Consider the separatrix of Region R2 passing through the unstable equilibrium (0, x2∗R ).
2

Note that the equilibrium is valid but unstable, and thus q2 < β from Table B.2. From
the expressions of trajectory in R2 it is clear that if q2 < β, x2 (t) increases if c2 > 0
while it decreases if c2 < 0. Depending on the sign of c2 , the trajectory diverges in
opposite directions. Thus c2 = 0 separates the trajectories with different convergence
behaviors and is the candidate for the local separatrix in R2 , which gives
x2 =

p 2 − q 2 α2
− x1
β − q2
β

as the expression for the boundary separating different basins of attraction.

3.4

The Impact of Converters

As we shall see, converters are capable not just of shifting equilibria around; they can
also eliminate or create equilibria. An exhaustive investigation of the full influence of
converters, while possible, results in a situation where it is difficult to “see the forest
84
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Figure 3.3: On the effect of converters on the existence of equilibria. (p1 = 1.01, q1 = 0.7, p2 = 2.5, q2 =
2.51, β = 3)

for the trees.” As a result, we focus on what we believe are some of the more revealing
and significant effects of converters. We identify the reasons behind these effects, and
provide conditions under which they can arise.
The investigation proceeds along the following thrusts: (i) Can converters help a network technology improve its market standing and in particular avoid elimination? (ii)
Can improving the efficiency of one’s converter hurt a technology? (iii) Can improving
the efficiency of one’s converter hurt the overall market? and (iv) Can the introduction
of converters affect overall market stability? Note that when referring to converters of
a particular technology, we mean converters developed by that technology provider to
let its users communicate with users of the other technology. This distinction is moot
when using symmetric converters, but worth highlighting as the model allows it.
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3.4.1

Impact on Adoption Levels

We begin our investigation with a simple numerical example that illustrates how converters can induce drastic changes in the adoption of network technologies. Specifically, consider the scenario of Figure 3.3 that shows two adoption outcomes for the
same two network technologies (p1 = 1.01, q1 = 0.7, p2 = 2.5, q2 = 2.51, β = 3), with
and without converters.
The plot on the left corresponds to a scenario without converters (α1 = α2 = 0) and
in which Technology 2 eventually eliminates Technology 1 and achieves full market
penetration18 . This corresponds to a single, stable equilibrium (0, 1). The right hand
plot shows how the use of perfect converters results in the elimination of the original
(0, 1) equilibrium, so that the only possible outcome of technology adoption is now one
where both technologies co-exist.
Figure 3.3 answers our question regarding a technology’s ability to avoid elimination
through the introduction of converters, and thus leading to a new equilibrium adoption
outcome. We now state it more formally in the following proposition.

Proposition 6 Converters can help a technology alter market equilibrium from a scenario where it has been eliminated to one where it coexists with the other technology,
or even succeeds in nearly eliminating it.
The proofs of Proposition 6 and subsequent propositions can all be found in Ap18 Note

that this is a scenario in which Technology 1 is marginally competitive, i.e., if left alone it

would achieve a relatively low market penetration.
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pendix B.4.
As discussed above, Figure 3.3 provides a sample configuration illustrating Proposition 6, i.e., Technology 1 goes from elimination to dominating Technology 2 simply
by introducing an efficient converter. Table B.3 (see Appendix) identifies that the equilibrium (0, 1) becomes invalid when the converter efficiency of Technology 1 verifies
α1 > 1 −

p2 −p1
β .

Note that since 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, this requires p1 < p2 . Assuming this is

the case, the difference between the maximum intra-network benefits of Technology
2 and the maximum cross-networks (through the converter) benefits that the users of
Technology 1 derive, becomes equal to the price differential between the two technologies. As a result, low-end users (with small θ values) become indifferent to choosing
either technology i.e., θ12 = 0, and any further increase in α1 leads them to switching to
Technology 1. Depending on the values of the other system parameters, it is possible
that further increases in α1 can allow it to nearly eliminate Technology 2. Note that
while Technology 1 may succeed in nearly eliminating Technology 2, a small number
of users of Technology 2 must remain present to contribute externality benefits to the
users of Technology 1. Note also that Figure 3.3 considers symmetric converters and
thus the outcome is not one that can be changed by the other technology deploying its
own converters. This is a general phenomenon, and most if not all of the results in
this section also hold under the constraint of symmetric converters (we will explicitly
highlight those that don’t).
A similar set of results hold for Technology 2 that, under some conditions, can enjoy
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the same benefits from converters. The symmetric condition that allows Technology 2
to overcome elimination ((1, 0) is now the initial equilibrium), is to introduce a converter whose efficiency α2 exceeds α2 ≥ 1 + (p2 − p1 ) − (q2 − q1 ). In other words,
Technology 2 needs to develop a converter whose efficiency compensates for both the
maximum intra-network benefits of Technology 1 and the difference between the price
and quality differentials of the two technologies19 . At that point, θ12 = 1 so that with
any further improvement in its converter efficiency, Technology 2 will start attracting
some high-end users (large θ values) and eventually re-emerge. As with Technology 1,
further improvements in its converter efficiency can in some cases allow Technology 2
to nearly wipe out Technology 1, although again not entirely.
Similar results can also be obtained from Table B.3 for (x1∗ , 0) and (0, x2∗ ), i.e., instances when the elimination of a technology does not coincide with full market penetration for the other.
The behavior highlighted by Proposition 6 is relatively common. Consider our earlier example of IPv4 and IPv6. The large IPv4 installed base (or conversely, the small
amount of content natively accessible over IPv6) mandates converters (gateways) that
allow IPv6-only users20 to access IPv4 content. Without such converters, IPv6 is unlikely to ever take-off. Conversely, once such converters are in place, it is possible for
IPv6 to eventually fully replace IPv4.
19 The

price differential must be lower than the quality differential, i.e., p2 − p1 < q2 − q1 , for this to

be possible.
20 Those that have only an IPv6 address once IPv4 addresses have been exhausted.
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Proposition 6 focused on a scenario where converters help a technology avoid elimination. Next, we explore whether it is possible for an increase in converter efficiency
to actually harm a technology, i.e., lower its market penetration.

Proposition 7 Technology 1 can hurt its market penetration by introducing a converter
and/or improving its efficiency if Technology 2 offers higher externality benefits (β > 1)
and the users of Technology 1 are able to access these benefits (α1 β > 1). Furthermore,
whenever Technology 1 hurts its own market penetration, it also reduces the overall
market penetration. In contrast, Technology 2 can never hurt itself while improving its
own converter efficiency.

Note that the proposition implicitly assumes asymmetric converters, i.e., explores
the effect of unidirectional converter introduction or improvement.
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Figure 3.4: Better converters harm Technology 1 and the overall market when α1 is increased from 0.85
to 1, (p1 = 1.3, q1 = 0.8, p2 = 2.3, q2 = 2.4, α2 = 0.6, β = 2.5)

The following discussion tries to shed light on when and why the outcome of Proposition 7 arises. Intuitively, the original impetus for Technology 1 to improve the effi89

ciency of its converters, is to make itself more attractive to potential users by allowing
them to better tap into the (higher) externality benefits of Technology 2. It may then
attract new users, either from among those that had not previously adopted any technology or among users of Technology 2 who decide to switch to Technology 1. It is the
acquisition of the latter type of users that can prove harmful to Technology 1. Specifically, because α1 β > 1, the switching of users from Technology 2 to Technology 1
negatively affects the externality benefits of all Technology 1 users. When β is high,
the decrease in externality benefit can be significant. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the
result of this decrease can be that some low-end (small θ) users decide to leave Technology 1 and exit the market. When the influx of new users is less than the outflow, the
overall penetration of Technology 1 decreases. Figure 3.4 shows an instance of such a
decrease. Additionally, the same reasoning shows that this also results in a decrease in
overall market penetration (both x1 and x2 decrease).
This behavior can arise in the earlier example of competing HD and SD video services, as it satisfies the requirement that α1 β > 1. Specifically, although SD users are
limited to generating SD quality videos, through converters they can receive and enjoy
the higher-quality of HD videos. As a result, they will be negatively affected by any
move of HD users back to SD. This can in turn lead some SD users to disadopt the service altogether. Hence, lowering their own user base and the overall market penetration
of both services.
When β ≥ 1, it is easy to see that the argument used for Technology 1 does not hold
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Figure 3.5: Technology 1 hurts itself as well as the overall market penetration.

for Technology 2, i.e., acquiring a customer from Technology 1 will never decrease the
externality benefits of Technology 2 users, so that it cannot experience such a reversal
when improving its own converter. A proof that this property actually holds for all
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Figure 3.6: Greedy Technology 2 harms overall market penetration. (p1 = 0.9, q1 = 1.9, p2 = 2.7, q2 =
4.3, α1 = 0, β = 1.2)

Proposition 7 indicated that Technology 1 could not only hurt itself through better
converters, but also the overall market penetration. The next proposition investigates
the negative impact of converters on overall market penetration, and formally identifies
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conditions under which this takes place.

Proposition 8 Both technologies can hurt overall market penetration through better
converters. Technology 2 can have such an effect only when α1 β < 1, i.e., Technology
1 users derive lower externality benefits from connecting to Technology 2 users than to
their peers. Conversely, Technology 1 demonstrates this behavior only when α1 β > 1,
i.e., its users derive greater externality benefits from connecting to Technology 2 users
than to their peers.

As the discussion of Proposition 7 already highlighted how this could occur with
Technology 1, we focus instead on Technology 2. The motivation for better converters remains the same, namely, allow users of Technology 2 to derive higher externality
benefits by connecting to users of Technology 1. This improvement in the externality
benefits of Technology 2 leads some users (those close to the θ12 boundary) to switch.
When α1 β < 1, the migration of those users from Technology 1 to Technology 2 translates into a net drop in the overall utility Technology 1 offers its remaining users (the
externality benefits contributed by every user that migrates goes down from a relative
weight of 1 to one of α1 β < 1). This decrease in Technology 1 value then leads some
low valuation users (small θ) to drop out altogether. Technology 1 fails to provide
them with enough externality benefits to justify even its low cost, while Technology 2
remains too expensive for them. This brings the overall market penetration down.
It is interesting to note that the use of converters by Technology 2 can effectively
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force low valuation users to leave the market. This may not be desirable and suggests
the possibility of policy interventions- regulations and/or market mechanisms- to offer
low valuation users alternatives that allow them to stay in the market. This can include
increasing the attractiveness of Technology 1 (e.g., subsidizing improvements in its
converter efficiency), or by asking Technology 2 to provide a low-tier, low-cost version
of its service that caters to low valuation users.
For a real world instance where the conditions of Proposition 8 could be satisfied,
consider again the IPv4 vs. IPv6 scenario for which β ≈ 1, and assume that IPv6 has
taken off but that providers serving low valuation customers have not bothered with
converting them to IPv6. If the converters that allow these legacy IPv4 users to access
the now increasingly IPv6-only content are of low quality, it is possible that some of
them will, if not drop their IPv4 service, at least significantly reduce their usage.
Figure 3.6 provides an example. In this configuration, in the absence of converters,
Technology 1 had reached full market penetration. When Technology 2 introduces a
converter of efficiency α2 = 0.45, it emerges and both technologies coexist at equilibrium, while still achieving full market penetration. If the efficiency of Technology
2 converter further improves, it still sees a rise in its own market penetration, but the
overall market penetration now decreases to ≈ 55%, as low valuation users drop out.
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3.4.2

Impact on Adoption Dynamics

The previous sub-section explored the effect that converters can have on equilibria. In
this sub-section we extend the investigation to both trajectories and equilibria. In particular, we concentrate on an unexpected effect of converters, one that can be shown
not to be possible in their absence, namely, the possibility that the introduction of converters can render the process of technology adoption unstable. In the next proposition,
we specify the conditions under which it can arise.

Proposition 9 The introduction of converters can create “boom and bust” cycles in
the technology adoption process. This behavior arises only when Technology 2 exhibits
higher externality benefits (β > 1) than Technology 1 and the users of Technology 1 are
unconstrained in their ability to access these benefits (α1 β > 1).

Conversely, the next corollary establishes that this never occurs in the absence of converters. The proofs are again in Appendix B.4.

Corollary 3.4.1 In the absence of converters, technology adoption trajectories always
converge to a stable equilibrium.

Before trying to offer some insight into the emergence of instabilities when converters
are introduced, we offer an example to illustrate the type of outcomes that can arise.
Figure 3.7 provides a sample scenario of converters affecting the stability of technology adoption, and in particular introducing cycles in the adoption trajectories. The left94
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Figure 3.7: Effect of converters on adoption stability (p1 = 1.05, q1 = 0.4, p2 = 2.1, q2 = 2.11, α2 =
0.3, α1 = 0.675, β = 2.8)

hand-side of the figure shows how in the absence of converters, Technology 2 displaces
Technology 1 and achieves full market penetration. The introduction of a reasonably
efficient converter (α1 ≈ 0.623) by Technology 1, however, drastically changes the situation by introducing two new equilibria; both of them unstable (middle diagram). As
a result, while the original equilibrium of (0, 1) remains valid, its basin of attraction
has now shrunk considerably . Instead, under most initial conditions, a cyclical pattern
of adoption decisions emerges. In other words, users repeatedly switch back and forth
between the two network technologies. Matters only become worse if the efficiency of
the converter of Technology 1 continues improving21 , and with a perfect converter the
original equilibrium of (0, 1) has all but disappeared and only one, unstable equilibrium
remains around which adoption decisions keep circling.
The intuition behind the emergence of such a situation is somewhat similar to that
of a technology harming itself and/or the overall market through the introduction of
21 As

mentioned before, similar situations arise under symmetric converters.
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better converters. Specifically, consider an instance where Technology 2 offers higher
externality benefits that users of Technology 1 can tap into if a converter is available.
When converters are absent, users that value the higher quality of Technology 2 adopt
it (when it offers a higher overall utility), eventually leading to full adoption as shown
on the left most part of Figure 3.7. However, once a converter is introduced, users have
the option to remain with Technology 1 (and enjoy its lower price) without forfeiting
all the benefits of Technology 2, and in particular its externality benefits. As a result,
while Technology 2 will initially still gain market share by attracting high technology
valuation users away from Technology 1, this now happens with Technology 1 also
gaining new customers (low technology valuation customers are now adopting because
of the externality benefits accessible through the new users who joined Technology 2).
This combined effects results in a steady increase in overall market share until a limit
is reached. This limit corresponds to a point where Technology 2 has tapped out all
the high technology valuation users it could attract. As Technology 2 growth tapers
off, Technology 1 continues growing as it still attracts new low technology valuation
customers. Continued growth in Technology 1 customer base eventually makes it attractive to some mid-range technology valuation customers that start switching back to
it. This fuels an accelerated growth in the user base of Technology 1 that now acquires
customers from both Technology 2 and non-adopters. This continues until the user base
of Technology 2 becomes so small that it starts affecting the ability of Technology 1
to grow. At this point, both technologies start loosing customers. This ends when the
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customer base of Technology 1 is small enough to allow Technology 2 to again start
attracting customers (its own customer base had by then all but disappeared), and the
process repeats anew.
To illustrate this behavior in a less abstract setting, we return to the example of HD
and SD video conference services of Section 3.2. The higher quality HD service when
introduced attracts high-valuation users, who switch over from the existing SD service.
This eventually results in a new market equilibrium. If the SD service responds to this
competition by introducing its own converter, it will entice some (low-valuation) nonadopters to adopt, as they now have access to the higher benefits of viewing other users
in HD quality. As the number of SD users grows, the technology attracts back some
of the lesser valuation HD adopters, because of its lower cost and increased externality
benefits (from its larger user base and access to HD users). This results in an increase in
SD adoption level and a corresponding drop in HD’s. However, as the switching from
HD to SD continues, the drop in the number of HD users lowers the overall externality
benefits available to SD users. Consequently, the lowest valuation SD users begin to
disadopt. This decrease in the number of SD users, and therefore the externality benefits
that the SD service affords, makes the higher valuation SD users switch back to the HD
service. This creates a situation where SD adoption drops, while the HD service grows.
As before, the growth of the HD service eventually draws low-valuation users (nonadopters) to the lower-priced SD service. The two services then grow until SD’s user
population has once again grown large enough to attract the lesser valuation HD users.
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At which point the cycle repeats anew.

3.5

Robustness to Alternative Models

In the work we identified several interesting behaviors that arise in presence of converters for a model where users are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the technology’s
quality and benefit from linear externality. However, many of the behaviors identified
in this work will be present in a wide range of alternative models.
To show this robustness of our findings we first show that quantitatively similar behaviors arise for more generic distribution of heterogeneous user preferences. We do
so by considering Beta-distribution of the user preference with positive and negative
skewness. Following this, we also consider some different types of network externality benefits, namely, sub-linear, super-linear and logarithmic network benefits and
provide examples that demonstrate similar behaviors as well. We also consider the case
where user heterogeneity is extended to network benefits in addition to the technology’s
quality. Again for all these scenarios we present illustrative examples for qualitatively
similar behaviors of interest.

3.5.1

Non-Uniform Distribution of User Heterogeneity

We consider the same user utility functions as those in eqs.(3.1) and (3.2), but the
heterogeneous user preferences are assumed to follow a Beta-distribution in [0, 1]
as opposed to an Uniform distribution. The density of Beta-distribution is given by
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xa−1 (1−x)b−1
B(a,b)

is given by

where B(a, b) is the beta function with parameters a and b. Its skewness
√
2(b−a) a+b+1
√
.
(a+b+2) ab

We show qualitatively similar behaviors for both beta

distributions with positive and negative skewness in the following cases.

(i) Positively skewed Beta-distributions
Figure 3.8 shows that instabilities can arise even with such alternative distributions
where a = 1.45, b = 2 with a positive skewness of 0.25.
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Figure 3.8: Positively skewed Beta-distribution showing Instability.

Figure 3.9 shows that Technology 1 can hurt itself as well as the overall market penetration as it improves its converter efficiency from 0.85 to 1. For the scenario shown
in the figure, the beta distribution has a = 0.65, b = 1 and a positive skewness of 0.3872.

(ii) Negatively skewed Beta-distributions
Figure 3.10 shows that instabilities can arise even for negatively skewed (−0.3205)
beta-distributions where a = 2.2, b = 1.45.
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1

x2: Fraction of Technology 2 subscribers

0.9
α1=0.85,α2=0.35,
p1=1.2. p2=1.9,
q =0.6, q =1.95,

0.8

1

0.7

2

β=2.2
a=2.2, b=1.45
skewness= −0.3205

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

0.2

0.4
0.6
0.8
x1: Fraction of Technology 1 subscribers

1

Figure 3.10: Negatively skewed Beta-distribution showing Instability.

100

Figure 3.11 shows that Technology 1 can hurt itself as well as the overall market
penetration as it improves its converter efficiency from 0.85 to 1 as shown in the figure
with a beta distribution for parameters a = 2, b = 1.5 and a negative skewness of
−0.2227.
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Figure 3.11: Technology 1 hurts itself and overall market for a negatively skewed Beta-distribution.

3.5.2

Non-linear Network Externality Effects

U1 = θq1 + (x1 ρ + α1 βx2 ρ ) − p1

(3.12)

U2 = θq2 + (βx2 ρ + α2 x1 ρ ) − p2

(3.13)

(i) Sub-linear network benefits
The plot on the left in Figure 3.12 shows an example of instability in the adoption
process when the externality benefits are of the form xi 0.7 , i = {1, 2}. The plot on the
right provides an example where Technology 1 on improving its converter efficiency
from 0.85 to 0.9 hurts its own market as well as the overall market levels across the
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two technologies.
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Figure 3.12: Effects of sublinear network benefits.

(ii) Super-linear network benefits
The plot on the left in Figure 3.13 shows an example of instability in the adoption
process when the externality benefits are of the form xi 1.4 , i = {1, 2}. Once again,
even for the superlinear externalities, we find that the plot on the right shows that
Technology 1 can potentially harm itself as well as the overall market. In this figure,
the Technology 1 improves its converter efficiency from 0.87 to 0.91 leading to a drop
in its own market by about 0.16.

(iii) Logarithmic network benefits
We also considered the case where the externality benefits are of the form log2 (xi +
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Figure 3.13: Effects of superlinear network benefits.

1), i = {1, 2}.
U1 = θq1 + (log2 (x1 + 1) + α1 β log2 (x2 + 1)) − p1

(3.14)

U2 = θq2 + (β log2 (x2 + 1) + α2 log2 (x1 + 1)) − p2

(3.15)

The plot on the left in Figure 3.14 shows an example of the instabilities that arise in
presence of converters in case of a logarithmic externality function. Technology 1 may
again hurt itself as well as the overall market while improving its converter efficiency
as shown on the plot on the right. Such a behavior is shown in this plot as Technology
1 improves its converter efficiency from 0.9 to 0.99.

3.5.3

User Heterogeneity in Intrinsic Quality and Externality Benefits

If the users have similar heterogeneous preferences over both the intrinsic (stand-alone)
quality of the technology and the network externality benefit, then their utility from the
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Figure 3.14: Instability for logarithmic network benefits.

two alternative technologies are:
U1 = θ(q1 + x1 + α1 βx2 ) − p1

(3.16)

U2 = θ(q2 + βx2 + α2 x1 ) − p2

(3.17)

For this utility form, we again identify that deployment and improvement in converters can lead to behaviors like drop in overall market penetration and adoption instability.
(i) Drop in overall market penetration
The plot on the right in Figure 3.15 considers a case where p1 = 0.6, p2 = 3.9, q1 =
0.5, q2 = 4.2, β = 7, α2 = 0 i.e., Technology 1 is cheaper and lower in quality than
Technology 2, which also provides larger network benefits. In this plot, when Technology 1 introduces a converter of 0.45 efficiency then the overall market penetration
at equilibrium is about 0.54. However if the first technology introduces a converter, it
improves its own market but the overall penetration drops to 0.3737. Therefore even
for this utility form, the overall market penetration across the two technologies can be
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hurt by the converters.
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(ii) Creation of instability in adoption process
We also find that instabilities may be arise in the adoption process when converters
are present. The plot on the left in Figure 3.15 shows such a scenario for α1 = 0.9, α2 =
0, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1.3, q1 = 0.3, q2 = 1.4, β = 10. Thus the behavior for instability in
adoption dynamics may also arise for this alternative utility form.
(iii) Special Case: User’s only value network benefits
U1 = θq1 (x1 + α1 βx2 ) − p1

(3.18)

U2 = θq2 (βx2 + α2 x1 ) − p2

(3.19)

In this case as well we find instances where deployment of converters can hurt the
overall market. Figure 3.16 illustrates such a scenario.
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3.5.4

Presence of Switching Costs

Network technologies often try to introduce switching costs by implementing contracts
with penalty and by developing ‘lock-in’ strategies. For example, ISPs such as AOL
practice ‘lock-in’ by restricting their users to send instant messages only to other fellow subscribers, thus preventing a user who switches to another ISP from messaging
to his/her previous network. Another such strategy is the lowering of provider specific
email addresses (e.g., Comcast, AOL). In spite of such efforts, the annual customer
turnover in the ISP market remain very high at above 72%, suggesting that consumers
in the ISP market still have sufficiently low switching costs [17, 59]. In other online
markets, the use of ‘lock-in’ strategies based on proprietary IT are also on the decline
due to the emergence of web browsers and technologies like XML that lower switching costs by allowing interoperability between disparate systems [17]. However, some
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amount of switching costs may indeed continue to exist through contractual commitments, learning curve, specialized formats and customer loyalty programs.
Our model may be extended to include such switching costs, but it will introduce
non-trivial complexity in the modeling effort because of the “memory” it adds to the
individual users behavior. Additionally, there are different possible types of switching
cost configurations one may need to consider, each requiring different utility forms for
user decision. For example, the learning costs may significantly affect non-adopters
when they join a technology, while contract- breaking cost affect only the users who
disadopt or switch technologies. Also, the lack of a clear answer as to when and how
many times such costs can affect switching behavior, adds complexity from a modeling standpoint. Therefore, a general analytical solution with switching costs quickly
becomes intractable. However, it is possible in some cases to formulate generalized
expressions for the indifference thresholds introduced in this work and derive results in
the way outlined next.
Assume that when a user switches from one technology to the other, or becomes
a non-adopter, he/she incurs a symmetric switching cost of S due to prior contractual
commitments, and that the learning costs for all users are negligible (L = 0). Then
utilities U1 and U2 for the current non-adopters remain the same as before and so does
the corresponding expressions for the indifference points (cite Eqns.). The utilities of
the current adopters of Technology 1 become
U0 = −S
107

U1 = θq1 + (x1 + α1 βx2 ) − p1
U2 = θq2 + (βx2 + α2 x1 ) − (p2 + S)
which give the indifference points as
θ01 (1) =

p1 −S−(x1 +α1 βx2 )
q1

θ02 (1) =

p2 −(βx2 +α2 x1 )
q2

θ12 (1) =

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1 +S
q2 −q1

Similarly, the utilities of the current adopters of Technology 2 will be
U0 = −S
U1 = θq1 + (x1 + α1 βx2 ) − (p1 + S)
U2 = θq2 + (βx2 + α2 x1 ) − p2
which give the indifference points as
θ01 (2) =

p1 −(x1 +α1 βx2 )
q1

θ02 (2) =

p2 −S−(βx2 +α2 x1 )
q2

θ12 (2) =

(1−α2 )x1 −β(1−α1 )x2 +p2 −p1 −S
q2 −q1

Note that the indifference points will now need to be represented as as θij (k), where
the additional index k, k = {0, 1, 2} will be used to represent the user category. Additionally, for any values of x1 (t) and x2 (t) and S > 0, the set of indifference points for
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the above three categories of users must satisfy the following relationships:
θ01 (1) < θ01 (0) = θ01 (2)
θ02 (2) < θ02 (0) = θ02 (1)
θ12 (2) < θ12 (0) < θ12 (1)

(3.20)

Therefore if at time t, the set of indifference points are represented by θij (t), the new
values at t + 1 i.e., θij (t + 1) will have to calculated based on the relative positions of
θij (k)(t + 1) with respect to θij (t). In other words,
θij (t + 1) = F(θij (k)(t), θij (t)), f or k = {0, 1, 2}, i, j = {0, 1, 2}, i < j, i 6= j.
where the function F needs to be carefully determined by considering the possible
arrangements of these indifference points. For example, in the above case if we consider
that the initial arrangement of the indifference point followed the order θ01 (t) < θ02 (t) <
θ12 (t), then the function F for the new position of the indifference point θ12 (t + 1) (based
on relationships in eqn.(3.20)) will be given by:
θ12 (t + 1) = θ12 (2)(t + 1) i f θ12 (2)(t + 1) ≥ θ12 (t)
= θ12 (1)(t + 1) i f θ12 (1)(t + 1) ≤ θ12 (t)
= θ12 (t)

i f θ12 (2)(t + 1) < θ12 (t) < θ12 (1)(t + 1)

Given the complexity of the cases, solutions that account for switching costs need
to resort to either numerical solutions (when it is possible to generalize equations for
indifference thresholds) or simulations. We have investigated using both approaches to
demonstrate that the results that our analytically tractable simplified model allow us to
109

explicitly identify, namely the possible presence of instability in technology adoption
and that better converters can hurt the incumbent as well as the overall market level etc.,
remain present across different switching cost configurations. Figure 3.17 and Figure
3.18 show these behaviors using the numerical solution. For clarity of the plots only
the adoption paths for initial penetration levels of x1 = 0.5, x2 = 0 in Fig. 3.17 and
x1 = 1, x2 = 0 in Fig. 3.18 are shown.
In the next section we provide more evidence of these behaviors under different cost
configurations (learning cost, contract-termination cost etc.) through simulation results
to establish that the results are robust to the introduction of a broad range of switching
costs.

Figure 3.17: Instability in presence of Switching Costs

3.5.4.1

Simulation Results

We consider three types of configurations for the purpose of our simulation to show
the robustness of the observed behavior under different switching cost configurations.
The simulations consider a population size of N = 500, each with a type value θ that is
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Figure 3.18: Market Level drops in presence of Switching Costs

uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The plots for that (i) presence of instability and
(ii) incumbent’s converter hurting itself as well as the overall market, are shown only
for initial penetration levels of x1 = 0.3, x2 = 0 and x1 = 1, x2 = 0 respectively for the
purpose of clarity.

Case (A): Switching Cost due to Contract breaking
In this scenario we consider that a user of either technology who decides to become
a non-adopter or switches to the other technology incurs a certain cost as penalty for
breaking a contract. It is assumed in this case that there is no learning cost for the users.
The instability plot in Fig 3.19 shows the sample diffusion trajectories for switching
cost of S = 0.05. But as the switching cost increases, the outcome stabilizes (e.g., ,
S = 0.3) since the high switching cost makes it difficult for users to infinitely switch
back and forth between the two technologies. Fig 3.20 shows the drop in the overall
market and incumbent’s market as its converter efficiency is increased from 0.9 to 1.
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Figure 3.19: Instability in presence of Switching Costs

Figure 3.20: Market Level drops in presence of Switching Costs
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Case (B): Switching Cost due to Contract breaking & Learning Costs for new
adopters
This scenario considers both the presence of learning and switching costs. A nonadopter incurs a learning cost of L on joining either technology while an existing user of
a technology incurs a switching cost of S for either becoming a non-adopter or switching over to the competing technology. As before, Figures 3.21 and 3.22 demonstrate
the presence of the interesting behaviors.

Figure 3.21: Instability in presence of Learning & Switching Costs

Figure 3.22: Market Level drops in presence of Learning & Switching Costs

Case (C): Switching Cost due to ‘Lock-In’ but no contract breaking costs
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In this scenario we consider a case where a user only incurs a switching cost when
he/she has to move from one technology to its competitor but not if he/she becomes a
non-adopter. This situation arises mainly when the switching cost is not in the form
of a contract but due to ‘lock-in’ strategies. For example, if a user of a online music
service with customization options decides to migrate to a competing site, he/she incurs
a switching cost due to ‘lock-in’, but however if the person gets disinterested in the
technology and becomes a non-adopter he/she does not incur this cost. Again, Figure
3.23 and 3.24 provide examples of the noticed behaviors for this scenario.

Figure 3.23: Instability in presence of only ‘Lock-in’ Costs

Figure 3.24: Market Level drop in presence of only ‘Lock-in’ Costs
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These simulation results therefore demonstrate that the results we identified with
the help of our simplified model are quite robust, and they provide insights into the
possible interesting adoption behaviors that can arise in a wide variety of switching
cost configurations.

3.6

Related work

Modeling the diffusion of new products and technologies has a long tradition in marketing. Fourt and Woodlock [27] first proposed a product diffusion model in which
a fixed fraction of consumers who have not yet bought the product do so at every
period; this is known as the constant hazard rate model. Bass [6] proposed an extension that additionally incorporates word-of-mouth communication between current
adopters and potential adopters. A large body of work has since built on these earlier
models (see [56] for an overview of this literature). Although most of the literature
deals with single-product settings, Norton and Bass [63] study the joint diffusion of
successive generations of technologies. Their model belongs to a class of substitution
models that assume that the newer generation eventually replaces the earlier generation
and thus their interest is only in the time it takes for this to occur. Significantly, both
single-product and multiple-generation diffusion models focus on aggregate adoption
dynamics without explicitly modeling individual decision-making processes. The advantage of such an approach is that it results in relatively simple diffusion models that
can, in turn, be used to study dynamic policies (e.g., dynamic pricing). Unfortunately,
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these aggregate models do not shed sufficient light on the decision processes that lead to
the emergent system dynamics or the exact mechanism through which various decision
variables (pricing, quality, advertising, etc.) impact adoption decisions.
A few models have focused on individual-level adoption (e.g., [39]). These models provide far greater insight into the mechanism through which rational individual
decision-making results in aggregate system dynamics. Given the complexity of these
models, much of the progress to date has been in settings with a single technology. In
contrast, the adoption of new network technologies is often influenced by incumbents.
Moreover, all of the above models and indeed much of the literature refers to generic
durables, e.g., washing machines. Such models do not account for the unique features
of network technologies, including network externalities and the role of converters.
A recent stream of work in economics has studied the role of network externalities
on equilibrium adoption of standards and technologies. Cabral [11] develops a model
of individual decision-making in the presence of network externalities and characterizes the aggregate adoption dynamics. He shows that network externalities are potential
drivers of S-shaped diffusion curves. We build on Cabral’s model but differ in our focus by considering a two-technology setting. Put another way, we are interested in
the diffusion of a new network technology in the presence of an incumbent. A related
paper by Farrell and Saloner [23] evaluates the impact of an installed base on the transition to a new standard. They show that the installed base can cause “excess inertia”
which prevents the transition to the new standard. At the same time, the adoption of the
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new standard by a few users can create “excess momentum” as well. In their model,
users are homogeneous except for the time of their arrival into the system. As a result, they observe a bandwagon effect in which the adoption of a standard by one set
of users makes the same choice more attractive to all other users. Thus, one standard
always wins and coexistence is not feasible. Choi [14] extends the model by Farrell
and Saloner [23] to include converters and shows that converters can in some instances
blockade the transition by weakening the threat of being stranded for users of the incumbent technology. In a more recent study, Joseph et al. [44] also show that increase
in efficiency of a converter can hinder the adoption of a new network architecture.
An important distinction of our work relative to these papers is that we incorporate
heterogeneity in user preferences. We show that this gives rise to equilibria in which
the technologies may coexist, i.e., neither network technology fully captures the market. Further, very little attention is paid to the adoption path in these papers because
all users make the same decision. In contrast, we show that the heterogeneity across
users can result in interesting adoption dynamics including non-monotonic evolution
of the market shares of the technologies. Additionally, these papers focus on environments in which users make the decisions to adopt the converters. This is meaningful
in environments in which the converter functionality and its deployment resides with
individual users, e.g., converters for two incompatible software applications that a user
decides to download. In contrast, our interest is in environments in which converters
are usually deployed by the technology providers upon incurring high fixed costs, and
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in the process made available to all its users.

3.7

Conclusion and Extensions

The work provides a framework to study the adoption and diffusion of a new network
technology in the presence of an incumbent and offers insight into the role of converters. Our model accounts for both externalities and user heterogeneity, and helps
reveal several unexpected behaviors. Of note are that the presence of converters can
hurt overall market penetration, and that under certain conditions they can preclude the
adoption process from ever converging. In Section 3.5, we showed that these behaviors
remain present across a wide range of utility models that differ from the one used for
analytical tractability in this paper. These robustness tests consider nonlinear externality functions, non-uniform distribution of user preferences, user heterogeneity in both
standalone and network benefits and switching costs.
As the first step of our investigation in the dynamics of technology adoption in the
presence of converters, the model clearly has limitations that can be addressed in the future. As mentioned earlier, allowing some of the system parameters to be time-varying
is of obvious interest. Similarly, letting prices be endogenous and/or dynamic variables
that are chosen by strategic service providers is another direction we have started investigating. This work represents an initial framework towards understanding adoption
dynamics of network technologies. Further research building on this work would likely
provide additional insight.
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Chapter 4

Network Platforms: Functionality-rich
Versus Minimalist Design

4.1

Introduction

Platforms provide foundations on which services or products can be developed that deliver value to both their users and the providers that develop them. In general, platforms
succeed based on their ability to “connect” consumers of applications and services to
the developers of those applications and services. The Internet and Android offer two
recent examples of (network and operating system) platforms whose success largely
comes from their ability to connect users and service/application providers. Platforms
are, therefore, commonly studied within the framework of two-sided markets [74]. The
platform is the ‘market’ and customers and applications/services developers are the
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‘two sides’ of the market. This work follows in this tradition.
The specific issue this work is concerned with is the level of functionality that the
platform should offer. A platform typically provides a set of capabilities through builtin APIs, modules, tools, etc., which make it easier for developers to innovate new
applications and services of interest/value to consumers. This, however, comes at a
cost to the platform, and this cost grows with the number of features offered. The
question for the platform provider is then to determine the number of features that
maximizes profits. A minimalist platform has a low cost but makes developing services
and applications more complex, which limits the number of application developed for
the platform. This makes the platform less attractive to consumers and lowers revenues.
Conversely, a functionality-rich platform is expensive to build, but this cost may be
offset by facilitating the development of more applications, therefore attracting more
consumers.
This trade-off arises in many environments and properly assessing it can have farreaching consequences. For example, many attribute the Internet initial success to its
minimalist design principles. However, as it matures and transforms from a “physical”
network platform to a broader ecosystem of software and web services, the question
of whether or not to abandon this minimalist principle is increasingly being raised [58,
13, 85]. The focus of this work is to explore the decision problem faced by a platform
provider22 seeking to select the level of functionality the platform should offer.
22 The

work assumes a monopoly setting with a single platform.
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The investigation identifies the ratio of the rate of change in the cost (to the platform) of adding new features and the cost of developing applications given a number of
platform features, as a key factor in determining the optimal (for the platform) number
of features to offer. This optimal choice is, however, highly sensitive to small relative changes in these two costs, with minor differences producing drastically different
outcomes, i.e., shifting the optimal operating point from a minimalist to a functionalityrich platform. This negative result not-withstanding, the model provides a framework
for reasoning about the impact of introducing more features to a platform. In addition,
in cases where the costs of developing new features and their benefits in lowering application development costs can be estimated, the model offers quantitative tools that
can assist decision makers.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces our two-sided market model. Section 4.3 outlines the solution methodology for this work. Section 4.4
presents the analysis and explores the impact of different factors on the level of platform functionalities. Section 4.5 reviews prior works and positions this work in the
literature. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter with remarks on future work.

4.2

Model Formulation

A platform provider attracts developers and consumers by creating value that entices
them to join the platform. This ‘value’ depends on a number of factors, such as the
platform’s intrinsic value, the subscription fees to join it, the cost of developing appli121

cations for it, and externalities that affect the value that either developers or customers
derive from joining the platform. When modeling a platform as a two-sided market,
externalities are usually classified as same-side externalities and cross-side externalities. Same-side externalities arise in each side of the market from the presence of other
users and can be positive or negative [47, 20, 87]. For example, the users of Android
devices can derive positive benefits from using the same applications as other Android
users (e.g., for applications like Groupon), while developers who produce similar applications face negative externalities from each other through increased competition.
Cross-side externalities measure benefits that one side of the market derives from the
other. These are usually positive, i.e., consumers benefit from more applications offered by developers, and conversely developers benefit from being able to target their
applications to more consumers.
The adoption of the platform by either developers or consumers depends on the
overall value they derive from it. As commonly done, we measure this value through
a utility function that incorporates the different factors that contribute to it. Similarly,
the impact of the decisions that the platform provider makes, i.e., pricing and selection
of the platform’s functionality, are also reflected through the platform provider’s utility
function. The utility functions for the platform, the developers, and the consumers are
described in Subsections 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4, respectively. However, before introducing these utility functions, we briefly review a number of assumptions we make in
the model and their implications on its applicability.
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4.2.1

Assumptions and Implications

Although both same-side and cross-side externalities can arise, the latter are usually
more important in how they affect adoption decisions. As a result and following [4, 20,
67], the model targets cross-side externalities only23 . In addition, it relies on several
further assumptions that we now review.
We assume that developers generate revenue from advertisements and not from consumers purchasing the applications, i.e., application downloads are free and transaction
costs for both developers and consumers are negligible. This is reasonable in many
settings where applications are offered for free and the bulk of the developer’s revenue
comes from location based and personalized advertising [57, 76], a trend that is only expected to grow in the future [26]. The advertising revenue generated by an application
is also assumed to be linear in the number of users of the applications24 .
Two other important assumptions, both of which affect the model’s applicability
are that (i) applications all make use of the same set of platform features, and (ii) the
functionality embedded in these features can be built by either the platform or the
developers themselves, albeit at possibly different costs. We pause briefly to expand on
these two assumptions.
The first implies that applications (services) are homogeneous in their development
requirements. In other words, they make use of the same set of platform application
23 Appendix

C.2.1 establishes that the work’s main results are qualitatively unaffected by the introduc-

tion of same-side externalities.
24 A non-linear relation changes the results quantitatively but not qualitatively
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programming interfaces (APIs) and/or set of independent features created by the developers. Applications can still be differentiated in their offering, but this clearly limits
the range of those differences. The second assumption requires that application development needs be known ahead of time to the platform provider, and that application
developers be able to independently develop features that the platform decides not to
incorporate. This is reasonable when dealing with many software products and services, where both the platform and applications share a common technology. However,
this excludes from the platform decision process hardware features whose presence or
absence determines the feasibility (or not) of certain applications, e.g., a graphic coprocessor is mandatory to enable certain rendering effects.
In general, the last two assumptions limit the model’s applicability to platforms that
are software ecosystems, such as cloud computing platforms, web services, operating
systems, etc. We also assume that application users are oblivious to whether the features
that their applications use are provided natively by the platform or independently by
application developers. In other words, there is no performance or quality penalty with
either choice. In the next sub-sections, we review the utility functions that drive the
decisions of the platform provider, application developers, and users.

4.2.2

Platform Utility

The goal of the platform provider is to maximize its profit, which depends on the revenue it generates from the two sides of the market and the cost of the features it has
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decided to embed in the platform.
We use xc and nd to denote the fraction of a large population of Nc and Nd consumers
and developers, respectively, who join the platform. As in [4, 20], the platform charges
flat fees of pc and bd to the consumers and to the developers, respectively25 . These
fees may be incurred as a monthly membership fee for consumers and as a licensing or
certification fee for application developers.
The revenue for the platform is, therefore, pc xc + bd nd .26
The set of platform features of potential benefits to application developers is assumed known to the platform provider. Embedding more features in the platform incurs
a greater cost, and we denote as C(F) the cumulative cost of incorporating F features.
We assume that the set of possible features is large. Hence, when mapped on to an
interval [0, F max ], they result in a differentiable, monotonically increasing function of
C(F) for F ∈ [0, F max ]. An integrality constraint on F is, therefore, not considered
explicitly.
In Sub-section 4.2.5, we discuss specific, real-world examples that illustrate different possible behaviors for C(F), i.e., concave or convex. The profit (utility) of a
platform with F built-in features and fees of pc and bd is given by
U p = pc xc + bd nd −C(F)
25 The

(4.1)

model does not require either pc or bd to be positive; a negative value is akin a subsidy by the

platform to the corresponding market side.
26 See AppendixC.1 for relabeling of parameters to account for consumer and developer population
sizes.
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As discussed in Section 4.3, Equation (4.1) together with similar expressions for the
utility of consumers and application developers will guide the decisions of how many
features to embed in the platform and how to price it.

4.2.3

Developer Utility

Developing applications incurs a certain cost, which depends on the level of support
provided by the platform (number of features and associated functionality). A featurepoor platform will usually have lower subscription fees, which may partly offset its
correspondingly higher development costs. The revenues generated by an application
depend on the number of users the platform has managed to attract, and grow in proportion to that number. Equation (4.2) captures the combined effect of these factors on
the developers’ utility.
Ud = αxc − bd − (K(F) + τφ)

(4.2)

The first component of Equation (4.2) represents the application revenues generated
from the xc consumers that joined the platform (the factor α is a normalization constant
that can also be interpreted as the marginal value that a consumer generates for the
developer). Those revenues are in the form of advertising revenues, as is commonly
assumed in many two-sided markets. For example, the online service iLike has developed a free application for Facebook (the platform) that based on a user profile allows
her to play clips of music she may like, and collect revenues from both advertising and
referrals to iTunes or Ticketmaster [38].
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The second component of Equation (4.2) is the flat-fee, bd , a developer pays the
platform, e.g., to be certified. This charging model is used by many platforms, e.g.,
Android charges a $25 market developer fee, while Apple’s iPhone offers an annual
$99 licensing fee to distribute applications and $299 for its iOS developer program.
The last component of Equation (4.2) reflects development costs, which as alluded
to earlier depends on the number F of features embedded in the platform. This is captured by the function K(F) that is a differentiable, monotonically decreasing function
of F ∈ [0, F max ]. As for C(F), Section 4.2.5 reviews illustrative, real-world examples
associated with different behaviors for K(F). In particular, K(F) can be convex or concave depending on whether the marginal reduction in development costs is increasing
or decreasing as the platforms adds more features. For a given F, K(F) is the same
for all developers. Hence, it can be interpreted as the base cost of developing applications when the platform includes F built-in features. This assumes that developers
have similar expertise in developing applications, e.g., software engineers draw from
a similar skill base. Developers can, however, be expected to exhibit heterogeneity in
their overall development costs, e.g., because of different fixed costs, overhead, benefit
levels, etc. This is captured in the factor τφ of Equation (4.2), where following [20, 87]
φ is uniformly distributed on a unit interval. The value of φ for an individual developer
is private information, but the distribution is known to all.
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4.2.4

Consumer Utility

The value that consumers derive from joining a platform depends on the subscription
fees charged, and the number of applications and services accessible through the platform. Consumers are typically heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity can manifest itself
in how they value the platform, access to applications and services (cross-side externality), or both. For simplicity and analytical tractability, we focus on a model where heterogeneity is present only in how users value access to applications. Appendix C.2.2
presents an alternative utility function and its analysis, where consumers are instead
heterogeneous in how they value the platform. The results under both utility functions
are qualitatively similar.
The consumer utility function is then of the form:
Uc = θβnd − pc

(4.3)

The first component, θβnd , captures the cross-side externality benefits that consumers
enjoy from accessing applications available on the platform. These benefits grow with
the number of developers, nd , creating applications for the platform, e.g., the many
iPhone developers are responsible for the large number of applications available on
it, which contributes to its attractiveness. The assumption of linear growth in nd is
consistent with past literature [87, 4, 80]. The factor β denotes the marginal externality
benefit associated with each developer. The term θ ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable that
accounts for heterogeneity in how users value these externality benefits. A user who
uses many applications will have a higher θ value, and thus derive higher externality
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benefits for a given number of application developers. The value of θ for individual
users is private information, but its distribution across users is known. We make the
common assumption [20, 80, 4] that θ is uniformly distributed27 in [0, 1]. The last
element of Equation (4.3) is the price pc , which is a flat membership fee paid to the
platform provider.

4.2.5

Representative Examples

Before presenting how the three utility functions just introduced combine in the platform provider decision process, we pause to introduce examples that illustrate possible
combinations of the cost functions C(F) and K(F). In all examples, there is an inherent
ordering of the features the platform provider is considering offering, i.e., from basic
features to more advanced ones, with the latter building on the former. The examples
differ in the relative cost of more advanced features compared to basic ones, and in
how useful each additional feature is to application developers. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the
main combinations of interest between the costs of platform features and their benefits
to application developers.
1. Amazon Web Services Platform: Amazon Web Services (AWS) is a cloud computing
platform that offers functionalities which third-party developers can use to create services for clients (consumers). These functionalities or features include Amazon EC2
(computation), SimpleDB (database), Amazon S3 (storage), FPS (flexible payment),
27 Results

typically extend [8, 28] to other distributions that share with the uniform distribution the

important property of a non-decreasing hazard-rate function F 0 (θ)/(1 − F(θ)).
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IP Multimedia Subsystems

Amazon Web Services

C(F)

C(F)

K(F)

K(F)

C(F): concave, K(F): convex

C(F): concave, K(F): concave

Location based services in
Social Network Platforms
K(F)

K(F)

C(F)

C(F)

C(F): convex, K(F): convex

C(F): convex, K(F): concave

Figure 4.1: Examples for possible shapes of C(F) and K(F)

CloudFront (content delivery), MTurk (Internet marketplace), etc. Consumers and developers of services and applications on the AWS platform enjoy cross-side externality
benefits from joining the platform, for which they pay subscription fees28 .
The introduction of features on the AWS platform proceeded in two steps. Between
28 Although

AWS allows usage based pricing, large customers have the option to make a low, one-time

payment for each reserved instance and in turn receive a significant discount on the hourly usage charged
for that instance.

130

2006-2007, Amazon introduced a set of core features (EC2, FPS, SimpleDB, etc.) that
offered basic capabilities such as computation, database, and payment for its AWS
platform. Additional features (e.g., SQS, SNS, DevPay, etc.) that built on these core
capabilities were subsequently introduced.
Adding each feature to the AWS platform came at a cost. Using API complexity29
as a proxy for the platform’s development cost together with data from [29], it can be
observed that capabilities such as EC2, FPS, and SimpleDB came at a higher cost than
that of follow-on enhancements such as SNS and DevPay. From this data, one can infer
that the AWS platform has a feature development cost function, C(F), that is a concave
increasing function of F.
Conversely, the benefits of each feature can be estimated based on its “popularity”
among developers, i.e., presuming that more useful features are more likely to be used
by developers. Using again [29], we see that most core features are significantly more
popular than subsequent enhancement features30 . In other words, the features that
were the most costly to develop and incorporate in the platform were also the most
useful to developers; at least based on how often developers took advantage of them.
As a result, one can conclude that while the development cost function C(F) of the
AWS platform is a concave increasing function, the benefits that developers derive
from those features, as captured by the function K(F), is a convex decreasing function,
29 The

development cost of a feature can be approximated through the complexity of its API. [29]

measured API complexity based on the number of operations that the feature supports, as captured in the
data required in the specification of its ‘Web Services Description Language’ (WSDL).
30 This is most noticeable when comparing EC2, SimpleDB and FPS to SQS, SNS and DevPay.
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i.e., the more expensive initial features are also the most useful.

2. IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS) Platform: The IMS platform is meant to facilitate the development of new integrated multimedia applications and services. Both
applications developers and subscribers (consumers of services) pay a fee to the IMS
platform. The platform offers a number of built-in capabilities such as a registration
mechanism, co-location of multiple IMS services, quality of service, etc. These capabilities are exposed to developers through APIs using Java specifications (JSRs). There
are multiple “layers” of JSRs [45, 64], from low-level JSRs such as JSR-180, to highlevel JSRs such as JSR-186/187, to more developer friendly APIs for Communication
Services such as JSR-281+. Each layer builds on those below, with the base layer that
implements the core capabilities of the platform the most expensive to develop. Additional layers are typically “wrappers” meant to hide low-level details from developers,
and therefore typically easier for the platform to implement. The development cost
function C(F) of the IMS platform is, therefore, a concave increasing function of the
number F of features (JSRs) it offers.
On the developer side, application development costs are high when only low-level
APIs are available. This is mainly because of the greater technical knowledge and
programming consistency they require from developers. As APIs that hide many of the
platform’s low-level intricacies are made available, development costs decrease rapidly.
In other words, the function K(F) that captures development costs as a function of the
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number F of features (APIs) that the platform offers is a concave decreasing function,
i.e., low-level APIs have little effect on developers costs, while higher-level ones
deliver significant benefits.

3. Social Network Platform with location-based services (LBS) support: A social network platform such as Facebook provides application developers access to basic capabilities, e.g., APIs to access the users’ social graph, database of user interests, affiliations, etc. However, it also offers more sophisticated functionalities such as real
time updates and location-based services (LBS). These have enabled the rapid growth
of applications that offer personalized services, e.g., Facebook’s Recommendation and
Places [72].
Adding this level of sophistication to the platform is, however, technically challenging. It calls for integrating capabilities such as spatial database management, location
tracking, real time generation of cryptographic data [7], all of which are significantly
more complex than the basic functionalities at the core of a social network platform,
e.g., access to the underlying social graph or to a user database. In other words, the
function C(F) that captures the cost of adding new (sophisticated) capabilities to a social network platform such as Facebook is a convex increasing function of F.
On the other hand, the benefits to application developers of those advanced features
can be very high. For example, in the absence of LBS support from the platform,
developers would need to build this capability into their application, e.g., by interfacing
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to the GPS service built into the user’s mobile device, when available. That those development costs are high is readily seen from the growth in the number of applications
that rely on location information once LBS became available. Specifically, in spite
of the large revenue potential of location-based services [72], there were relatively
few applications that used location information before LBS became readily accessible
to application developers31 In other words, the substantial decrease in development
costs that this produced, enabled many more developers to offer such applications.
As a result, it can be argued that a social network platform such as Facebook is an
environment where while sophisticated features are expensive to add, they are the
ones that deliver the most benefits (reduction in development costs) to application
developers. This means that the corresponding function K(F) is a concave decreasing
function of F.

In the next section, we introduce the methodology used by the platform provider to
decide on the “optimal” number of features to incorporate in the platform.

4.3

Solution Methodology

The objective of the platform provider is to select the number of features to include in
the platform, and the fees to charge to consumers and developers so as to maximize its
31 The

CEO of Skyhook Wireless noted that in 2010 the number of applications that location informa-

tion have jumped from 10K to 50K in one year [86].
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Direction of solution

Design Stage

Platform decides
functionalities level, F

Pricing Stage

Platform decides
user fee, pc , developer fee, bd

Adoption Stage

User adoption level, xc
Developer adoption level, nd

Decision Timeline
Figure 4.2: Timeline for the sequential decision process

profit. This objective can be realized by using a three-stage sequential process as shown
in Fig. 4.2. In the first stage, the platform provider chooses the number F of features
to build into the platform. Given a choice for F, participation prices (fees) for the two
market sides are chosen in the second stage. Equilibrium adoption levels of consumers
and developers are simultaneously realized in the third stage. The three stages are
referred to as the Design Stage, Pricing Stage, and Adoption Stage, respectively.
This sequential decision process can then be solved in the reverse order. Equilibrium
adoption levels for users and developers are first computed for a given choice of participation prices and number of built-in features. Next, given a choice for the number
of built-in features, ‘optimal’ participation prices are computed based on the equilibrium adoption levels of the previous step. The results characterize the platform’s profit
for any given number of built-in features. This can then be used to find the ‘optimal’
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number of features, F ∗ , that maximizes the platform’s profit. These steps are detailed
next.

4.3.1

Adoption Stage

Both consumers and application developers are assumed to make incentive-compatible
and rational decisions. Therefore consumers and developers who join the platform derive positive utility from doing so. Let xc∗ and n∗d be the expected fraction of consumers
and developers joining the platform at equilibrium.
Given pc , bd , and F, the value b
θ of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between joining the platform or not is
pc
b
θ = 1 − xc = ∗ .
βnd

(4.4)

Conversely, the value b
φ of the marginal developer who is indifferent between joining
the platform or not is
b
φ = nd = αxc∗ − bd − K(F) .

(4.5)

Note that the system parameters were normalized with respect to the maximum fixed
costs that application developers incur, i.e., we set τ = 1. At equilibrium, xc∗ = xc and
n∗d = nd . Thus, equilibrium adoption levels satisfy

pc = (1 − xc∗ )βn∗d

(4.6)

bd = αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F)

(4.7)
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4.3.2

Pricing Stage

For a given number of features F, the platform provider’s decision problem is to select fees pc and bd that maximize its profit, subject to constraints on the fractions of
consumers and developers joining the platform. This yields
max
Up =
∗ ∗
xc ,nd

s.t.

pc xc∗ + bd n∗d −C(F)

(4.8)

0 ≤ xc∗ ≤ 1
0 ≤ n∗d ≤ 1

Using Equations (4.6) and (4.7) in Equation (4.8), ‘optimal’ fees and corresponding
adoption levels can be derived as described next. The derivation considers separately
the cases of interior (0 < xc∗ , n∗d < 1) and boundary (xC∗ = 0, 1 or n∗d = 0, 1) solutions.

4.3.2.1

Interior Solutions

Interior solutions for optimal prices can be obtained by solving

∂U p
∂xc∗

= 0 and

∂U p
∂n∗d

=0

simultaneously. Details of the derivations can be found in Appendix C.3, and the results
are summarized in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 Optimal price levels (p∗c , b∗d ) and optimal adoption levels (xc∗ , n∗d ) that
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maximize the platform provider’s profit are given by
(β − α)((α + β)2 − 4βK(F))
16β
(3α − β)(α + β) − 4βK(F)
=
8β
α+β
=
2β
(α + β)2 − 4βK(F)
=
8β

p∗c =
b∗d
xc∗
n∗d

(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)

The conditions for an interior solution, i.e., 0 < xc∗ , n∗d < 1, are α < β and 4βK(F) <
(α + β)2 < 4β(2 − K(F)). The second order conditions of the Hessian are then also
found to hold.
Proposition 10 reveals properties that are consistent with prior works in two-sided
markets [4, 87, 12]. In particular, optimal pricing is typically asymmetric, i.e., different
prices are levied on the two sides of the market, and in some cases one market side may
be subsidized, i.e., b∗d < 0 while p∗c > 0.

4.3.2.2

Boundary Solutions

Boundary solutions arise when the fraction of customers joining the platform on either market side is either 0 or 1. Such an outcomes are typically associated with less
interesting configurations, but are provided here for completeness.
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are easily seen to imply that solutions of the form (0, n∗d >
0) or (xc∗ > 0, 0) are not feasible. This is because n∗d = 0 forces p∗c = 0, which results
in a negative profit for the platform. Similarly, when xc∗ = 0, the platform needs to
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subsidize developers b∗d < 0, which again translates into a negative profit. So (0, 0) is
the only feasible equilibrium in such cases, i.e., the system parameters are such that the
platform cannot be profitable.
Other possible boundary solutions arise when one side of the market reaches full
penetration. There are three sub-cases to consider:
i. Both market sides are at full penetration (xc∗ = 1, n∗d = 1): In this scenario, Equations (4.6) and (4.7) give p∗c = β and b∗d = α − K(F) − 1.
ii. Only the consumers side of the market is at full penetration (xc∗ = 1, 0 < n∗d <
1): The adoption level on the developers side of the market is then given by n∗d =
(α + β − K(F))/2, and the prices for the two sides are b∗d = (α − β − K(F))/2 and
p∗c = β(α + β − K(F))/2, respectively. The constraints 0 < n∗d < 1 imply K(F) <
α + β < K(F) + 2, i.e., cross-side benefits, as measured by α + β, cannot be either too
large or too small compared to development costs K(F). When they are large, (1, 1) is
the equilibrium.
iii. Only the developers side of the market is at full penetration (0 < xc∗ < 1, n∗d = 1):
The adoption level on the consumers side of the market is then given by xc∗ = (α+β)/2β
(which requires α < β), and the prices for the two sides are b∗d = (α(α+β)−2β(K(F)−
1))/2β and p∗c = (β − α)/2.
As in the case of interior solutions, pricing is typically asymmetric and instances
where the platform subsidizes one side and charges the other also occur. Boundary
solutions arise mostly when cross-side externalities dominate other system parameters.
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In the remaining of the chapter, the focus is on (the more interesting) scenarios where
neither market-side has achieved full market adoption.

4.3.3

Design Stage

Using the results of Proposition 10 in Equation (4.8), the platform provider can determine the ‘optimal’ number F ∗ of features to include in the platform to maximize profits.
Solving for

∂U p
∂F

= 0, F ∗ can be shown to verify the conditions of Proposition 11.

Proposition 11 The optimal number F ∗ of features that should be built into the platform to maximize profit satisfies

⇒
and

C0 (F ∗ ) K(F ∗ ) (α + β)2
=
−
K 0 (F ∗ )
2
8β
0
∗
C (F )
= −n∗d (F ∗ )
K 0 (F ∗ )
1
C00 (F ∗ ) > −n∗d (F ∗ )K 00 (F ∗ ) + [K 0 (F ∗ )]2
2

(4.13)
(4.14)
(4.15)

where Equation (4.14) is obtained by using Equation (4.12) in Equation (4.13).
The condition C0 (F ∗ )/K 0 (F ∗ ) = −n∗d (F ∗ ) of Equation (4.14) implies that at F ∗ , the
marginal increase in the cost to the platform of adding more features equals the marginal
decrease in development costs across all developers subscribed to the platform32 .
Note though that selecting an optimal number of platform features still calls for
evaluating the platform profits at all F ∗ values that satisfy Equations (4.13) and (4.15)
(see Section 4.4), and at the boundaries F = 0 and F = F max .
32 Equation

(4.14) remains valid for boundary cases where either market sides is at full market pene-

tration.
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4.4

Analysis

In this section, we use Proposition 11 to explore generic properties of F ∗ and the influence of system parameters. We begin with Equations (4.13) and (4.15), which we
use to explore how changes in (cross-side) externality benefits affect F ∗ . These are
summarized Proposition 12.
Proposition 12 for any interior Solution (i.e., 0 < xc∗ , n∗d < 1), increases in the crossside externality benefits α and β, favor adding more functionalities to the platform. In
other words,

∂F ∗
∂α

> 0 and

∂F ∗
∂β

> 0.

Proof 4.4.1 The proof relies on applying the conjugate pair theorem [16], which gives
∂2U p
∂F ∗
= sign
>0
sign
∂α
∂F∂α
∂2U p
∂F ∗
sign
= sign
>0
∂β
∂F∂β
Figures 4.3 and 4.433 provide representative examples which demonstrate that an
increase in the cross-externality benefits (α or β) increases the optimal level of functionalities in the platform, F ∗ .
Figures 4.3 shows that F ∗ increases as developer’s cross-side benefits increase from
α = 0.65 to α = 0.67. We note that Proposition 12 is consistent with arguments in favor
of expanding the Internet’s functionality at a time where the services it offers become
more valuable, and the providers of those services derive more value than previously
33 The

parameters in all the figures of this section are assumed to be normalized with respect to popu-

lations of size Nc = Nd = 103 , and maximum fixed cost for developers, τ = $103 .
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feasible.
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Figure 4.3: Increases in α increases the optimal number of features

Next, we investigate how F ∗ is affected by changes in the relationship between the
cost of adding new features to the platform and the benefits that application developers derive from them. The platform development costs C(F) increase with F, while
application development costs K(F) decrease. The relative rates of these increases
and decreases ultimately determine F ∗ and the associated optimal prices, p∗c (F) and
b∗d (F). The dependency of F ∗ on the relative rate of change of C(F) and K(F) is
captured in Equation (4.13). Note that the platform utility function of Equation (4.1)
includes product terms of the form pc xc and bd nd , which imply complex dependencies
on the functions C(F) and K(F). Hence, the function U p (F) that the platform provider
seeks to maximize can exhibit a wide range of variations, e.g., multiple maxima and/or
minima, even when the functions C(F) and K(F) are themselves “well-behaved,” e.g.,
concave or convex. Clearly, the possibility of more than one value of F satisfying Equa142

Figure 4.4: Increases in β increases the optimal number of features

tions (4.13) and (4.15) complicates the platform provider’s decision process. Furthermore, the optimal decision also depends on how profits at these local maxima compare
to “boundary” profits, i.e., for F = 0 and F = F max .
Numerical investigations demonstrate that multiple local maxima of the platform’s
utility as a function of F easily arise, i.e., for various combinations of C(F) and K(F).
In general small adjustments in the relative rate of increase and decrease of C(F) and
K(F) are sufficient to yield drastic shifts in outcome. This is to a large extent borne by
Equation (4.13), which shows that small changes in either C(F) or K(F) can substantially vary the value of the ratio

C0 (F)
K 0 (F) .

The implications are that determining how much

to invest in a platform and deciding whether or not to develop new features cannot be
easily predicted from general properties of C(F) and K(F), e.g., concavity or convexity. Instead, it calls for a fine-grain comparison of the costs of developing features and
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their benefits to application developers.
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Figure 4.5: Provider provisions either at F = 0 or F = F max when both K(F) and C(F) are concave

The one instance for which it is possible to somewhat narrow down the range of
possible outcomes is when both C(F) and K(F) are concave, e.g., the IMS platform
example. In this case, the optimal number of features can be shown to always be at one
of the two boundaries, i.e., F = 0 or F = F max (see Appendix C.3 for a proof). This
still does not finalize a decision between a minimalist or a functionality-rich platform,
but by eliminating intermediate values, it considerably reduces the number of options
to consider. In particular, it calls for only evaluating “extreme” scenarios. We illustrate
this with a numerical example in Fig. 4.5. The figure shows the platform’s profit as a
function of the number of features it offers for two different configurations. In both
configurations, the platform cost grows like

√
F, while the cost decrease that applica-

tion developers experience is super-linear in the number of features (the parameter z2
of the legend). The figure shows that when development costs decrease nearly linearly
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in F(z2 = 1.03), a minimalist platform is more efficient, while when the decrease if
steeper (z2 = 1.3) a functionality-rich platform is preferred. This is obviously intuitive,
but the model offers a quantitative framework in which to carry out such an assessment.
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Figure 4.6: Presence of multiple local maxima for convex K(F) and concave C(F)

For all other combinations of convex or concave C(F) and K(F), more complex
outcomes can arise, including instances where the optimal outcome involves selecting
an intermediate number of features. We illustrate this with a numerical example in
Fig. 4.6, which corresponds to a scenario where the platform’s cost function C(F) is
concave increasing and the developer’s cost function K(F) is convex decreasing in F,
much like the AWS example of Section 4.2.5. Once again, the plot shows the platform’s
(profit) utility U p (y-axis) as a function of the number of features F (x-axis), where F ∈
[0, 4]. The figure displays two utility curves corresponding to two different developer
cost functions K(F) (convex decreasing), while keeping the functional expression for
the platform provider’s cost C(F) = 0.01F 0.7 (concave increasing) identical in both
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cases. The two application developer cost functions, given by K(F) = 0.25e−g2 F ; g2 =
{0.35, 0.43}, differ in their rate of decrease with the number of platform features F.
The figure reveals the following three interesting behaviors.
First, it shows that there are two local maxima for the platform provider’s utility
for the given system configuration; one corresponding to a minimalist choice (F = 0),
and the other to an intermediate value F ∗ that satisfies Equations (4.13) and (4.15).
Selecting the globally optimal solution calls not only for computing F ∗ , but also for
comparing profits at F = 0 and F = F ∗ .
Second, it shows that a relatively small changes in the rate of decrease in the developers’ cost K(F) can result in drastically different choices for the platform provider. In
the case of K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F , the provider’s optimal decision is to choose a minimalist design (i.e., F = 0) , while for K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F , the provider should create a
platform with a large set of built-in features (i.e., F = F ∗ ≈ 3). This illustrates the dependency of the decision process in the rate at which development costs decrease as the
number of features increases. A similar outcome could have been obtained by keeping
K(F) constant, and changing the rate of increase in the platform provider’s cost (i.e.,
C0 (F)).
Third, the figure illustrates a behavior that at first sight may seem counterintuitive. Consider the two developers cost functions K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F and K(F) =
0.25e−0.43F . The rate of decrease of K(F) is higher in the second case, so that most
of the benefits are realized early on as the first few features are added. In contrast,
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the slower decrease in the first case implies that more features need to be added before a similar decrease is realized. This would seem to suggest that a larger number
of features would be preferable in that case than in the other one. The figure shows
that the opposite is actually true, i.e., a minimalist choice (F = 0) is preferred when
K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F , while K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F calls for investing in a relatively large
number of features in the platform. The reason is that when K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F and
costs drop fast, adding features ultimately yields a lower absolute value of K(F), which
encourages more developers to join and ultimately produces a higher profit. In contrast,
the slower cost decrease of K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F is such that the smaller number of developers that join is not sufficient to produce a higher profit than when F = 0.
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Figure 4.7: Presence of multiple local maxima for convex K(F) and convex C(F)

Finally, we should point out that while the scenario of Fig. 4.6 showed only one interior maximum, it is possible to have more than one. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.7, which
involves a convex decreasing K(F) function and a convex increasing C(F) function. As
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in the previous example and for essentially the same reasons, the choice of which maximum yields the highest overall profit depends on the relative rates of change of the two
cost functions.

4.5

Related Literature

This work is related to two streams of information systems and network economics literature, namely, (i) Two-sided markets and (ii) Platform intermediaries in e-commerce
markets.
Our model shares a key structural element with the two-sided markets literature in
that we consider a platform provider who facilitates interaction between two interdependent customer groups (i.e., app developers and consumers). We also address the
topics of platform pricing and customer adoption decisions which have received considerable attention in many of the earlier works.
The second stream of literature mentioned above focus on the question of how can a
platform invest in impacting the cross-side network effects in an e-commerce market so
as to increase its profits. A key difference from these earlier works is that the platform
provider in our model does not directly alter the network effects, instead it invests in
adding platform functionalities that reduce the development costs for application developers. Such a scenario is typical in many software ecosystems where the trade-offs
lie in the costs borne by the platform in adding functionalities and the benefits these
bring to the developers. It also opens up an interesting question that we investigate,
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namely, what factors influence whether a platform is functionality-rich or minimalist in
its design. Thus, we contribute to the existing e-commerce platform literature by investigating the trade-offs in the platform’s investments in built-in functionalities. Next, we
discuss the related works in these two areas of research.
Two-sided markets: Two-sided markets are made of two interdependent groups
of customers (e.g., sellers and buyers) who benefit from each other’s participation. A
platform intermediary facilitates interactions between these two customer groups and
generates its revenue by charging them a price for joining the platform. The adoption of
the platform by the two customers groups and the volume of interaction between them
depend not only the prices set by the platform provider but also on the price structure
[74]. [37, 74] provide definition and examples of two-sided platforms along with extensive literature survey on the topic. Two-sided models have also been used recently
to analyze net-neutrality issues [20, 62]. Many works have also focused on pricing
strategies for two-sided platform [67, 36, 87]. While our work builds on the existing
literature, we use the two-sided platform model to consider issues that were not the focus of these earlier works. We consider software based platforms that bring application
developers and consumers together, and focus on the question of functionality design.
This environment is particularly relevant in the context of today’s Internet as it evolves
from a physical infrastructure to a software ecosystem. The success of the Amazon
Web Services platform, Facebook platform etc, bear witness to the progress made in
that direction. Although the Internet started out with a minimalist design, its gradual
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evolution raises new questions as to whether a functionality-rich or a minimalist design
is desirable in this new environment. The model of the two-sided platform we develop
is aimed towards creating an analytical framework that explores such questions.
Platform intermediaries in e-commerce markets: The literature in electronic intermediaries is also related to this work. Electronic market intermediaries lower search
costs for buyers and increases price competition among sellers [3]. While much of the
work in this area have analyzed the role of electronic intermediaries, some [4, 87] have
focused on the impact of infrastructural investments of the intermediary platform on
its cross-network externalities. [4] shows that it is optimal for an intermediary to invest in network externalities asymmetrically to maximize the network benefits for one
market side. Our work differs from the above in that we consider scenarios where the
platform provider does not have the means to directly impact the cross-externalities.
Instead, the platform can invest in functionalities that make application development
easier for developers, and thus indirectly influence the customer adoption levels and
pricing. Such scenarios are typical for most web services and social network platforms
where the level of functionality investments determine how the costs and benefits are
shared by the platform and its developers. Also, our focus is different from the previous
works since we are interested in analyzing the factors that influence the platform’s decision regarding a functionality-rich or a minimalist design. The results of our work will
therefore contribute to the growing literature on e-commerce intermediary investments
and platform design.
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4.6

Conclusions

This chapter develops a model to explore when a platform should seek minimalist or
functionality-rich designs. The question is formulated using a two-sided market model
in which the platform is the market and service developers and consumers are the two
sides of the market. Consumers, developers and the platform provider have utility
functions that account for externality benefits, prices, and costs. The platform provider
seeks to identify how many features to include in the platform to maximize its profit.
This is formulated as a three stage sequential decision process, for which the solution
is characterized.
The solution reveals the impact of cross-externalities and confirms the benefits of
asymmetric pricing. More importantly, it shows that the platform choice is highly sensitive to how additional features affect the costs of the platform and service developers.
This unfortunately establishes that minor changes in either costs can yield drastically
different solutions. This is illustrated through numerical examples, which point to the
significant challenge of answering the question of optimal platform design in practice.
In spite of the limitations of its results, the work provides initial insight and a possible
methodology for tackling the complex question of (software) platform design.
There are many directions in which the work’s initial results can be extended. Empirical validations are obviously at the forefront, and exploring if this can be done for
one of the examples of Section 4.2.5 is of interest. Some modeling extensions are also
worth pursuing. One involves allowing developers to use different subsets (bundles) of
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features, each assigned a different price. Another is to introduce multiple platforms and
allow competition, e.g., between minimalist and functionality-rich platforms. Both are
topics that can be pursued by building on the model presented in the chapter.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions
In this dissertation, we focused on understanding the interplay between technological
and economic factors in the context of network systems and architectures, and investigated in depth three fundamental issues. These issues deal with the deployment of
network services, the adoption of competing network technologies, and the design of
network platforms. Our contribution involves developing robust analytical frameworks
that study these issues by accounting for relevant technological and economic factors,
identifying behaviors of interest, and demonstrating their impact on design decisions.
The first part of this dissertation considered the question of network choice for deployment of new services, namely whether heterogeneous services should share a common network infrastructure or have dedicated networks of their own. We introduced
an analytical framework to explore the trade-offs involved in choosing between shared
and dedicated infrastructures. This required identifying various economic factors of
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relevance, e.g., deployment and operational costs, capacity costs, fixed costs, etc., and
accounting for possible economies and/or diseconomies of scope that these costs exhibit
in a shared infrastructure. We then developed on the traditional news-vendor models
to find the optimal capacity allocation for the new service in the presence of demand
uncertainty and the ability to reprovision resources in response to excess demand. Resource reprovisioning is becoming increasingly feasible with progress in virtualization
technologies, and therefore, its impact on the network choice is a key area of study.
We showed that the extent to which reprovisioning is feasible can by itself affect which
infrastructure, shared or dedicated, is more effective. Moreover, we demonstrated that
the impact of reprovisioning can be quite non-intuitive, thereby motivating the need for
network providers to consider its impact while making network design choices. We also
identified two operational metrics, the gross profit margin and the return on capacity,
that play a major role in determining which infrastructure benefits more from reprovisioning, and are thus useful in making managerial decisions. Thus, the first part of the
thesis contributes to offering a framework for service providers to evaluate network infrastructure options, and in particular to decide whether it is profitable to deploy a new
service on an existing network infrastructure while accounting for both technological
capabilities and economic factors.
In the second topic of this dissertation, we dealt with the issue of network technology
adoption. As new network technologies and services emerge, questions about their
successful adoption arise, as they often need to compete against formidable incumbents

154

with large installed base. Developing an understanding of the competition between
network technologies, and identifying the extent to which different factors, in particular
converters (gateways), affect the outcome was the focus of our work. To this end,
we proposed and solved a model for adoption of competing network technologies by
individual heterogeneous users. We identified a number of interesting and at times
unexpected behaviors, including the possibility for converters to hurt the adoption of
its own technology, reduce overall market penetration across both the technologies, and
prevent convergence to a stable state; something that never arises in their absence. The
findings were tested for robustness, e.g., different utility functions and adoption models,
and found to remain valid across a broad range of scenarios. The key contribution of
this work is in providing a framework to study the adoption and diffusion of a new
network technology in the presence of an incumbent and in offering insight into the
role of converters.
Related to the questions of new service deployment and adoption is the issue of the
right design for the underlying network platform (e.g., Internet). Platforms generate
value by bringing together two interdependent groups of customers, the developers and
the consumers, and provide functionalities to foster service innovation and user adoption. But there is natural trade-offs in the cost of creating a functionality-rich versus a
minimalist platform. The last part of the dissertation is concerned with this issue. In
particular, we develop a model to explore the decision problem faced by a monopolist
platform provider seeking to select the level of functionality that the platform should

155

offer. In doing so, we considered a framework of a two-sided market, with the platform
as the market and the developers and consumers as the two sides of this market. We
introduced utility functions for the two sides and the platform and incorporated in them
the impact of network externalities, prices, and functionality development costs. The
investigation revealed a number of interesting properties depending on how the cost of
features to the platform and the benefits application developers derive from them relate
to each other. In particular, it showed that the ratio of the marginal increase in platform
provider’s cost to the marginal decrease in application developer’s cost from an increase
in the platform’s functionalities play an important role in determining the optimal functionality level. Besides contributing to the growing economics literature on two-sided
markets, this work improves our understanding of functionality-rich versus minimalist
platform design by providing an analytical framework to assess the underlying design
trade-offs.
Next, we discuss some areas for future investigation and explore the potential for
improvements to the frameworks we have proposed in this dissertation.

5.1

Potential Extensions

The broad area of network economics is ripe for investigation along several directions.
In this work, we dealt with three key aspects related to technology adoption, deployment, and design, each of which have potential for several interesting extensions as
discussed below.
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In the context of new service deployment, one related topic that can be investigated
is the issue of choosing between private and public clouds. Companies, such as Google,
are promoting the idea of a shared public cloud in which many different companies can
utilize a common pool of network resources and infrastructure for purpose of storage,
computation, etc. In contrast, companies like IBM are pushing for the adoption of
private or dedicated cloud which can be provided on their mainframe infrastructure. An
investigation that aims to understand the trade-offs in this tussle between the proposed
ideas of private and public cloud can be of considerable interest. The framework for
such a study can use ideas from the model we developed for understanding the tradeoffs between shared and dedicated networks, albeit with the additional feature that users
can potentially impose negative externality on each other.
A potential extension of our work on the role of converters in technology adoption is to consider a game-theoretic framework in which the two competing technology
providers choose converter efficiencies and/or pricing in a strategic manner. Additionally, allowing some of the system parameters, e.g., technology’s quality, price, to be
time-varying is also of obvious interest. These issues may be investigated for additional insights in by building on the framework laid out in our work.
Lastly, the issue of platform design too provides many opportunities for further studies. As discussed in the work on the choice of functionality-rich versus minimalist platform design, our model is tailored to investigate platforms that are software ecosystems,
such as cloud computing platforms, web services, etc. This is because we assume that
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the applications make use of the same set of features and that these can be developed
either by the platform or the developers themselves. One natural extension would be to
extend this work and allow different applications to use different subset of functionalities, and then explore the impact of bundling subsets of functionalities on the platform’s
profitability.
These three pieces of work that form the core of this dissertation provide the initial
impetus for investigations into a wide range of interesting questions about the economic
viability of network solutions. They present a reasoning framework that can be used
to systematically account for key economic and technological factors and to study their
impact in a variety of network system settings.
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Appendix A

Appendix: Network Infrastructure
Deployment

A.1

Proofs of Lemmas and Proposition

Proof of Lemma 2.3.1: It can be easily verified from Equations (2.7) and (2.10) that if
pd2
ad2

>

ps2
ad2

( aps2s2 >

pd2
ad2 )

∗ ≥ K ∗ (∀α K ∗ ≥ K ∗ ). Moreover, this relationship is
then ∀α Kd2
s2
s2
d2

2

independent of α.

Proof of Lemma 2.3.2:
−as2 2 (ps2 −as2 )X2max
[(1−α)ps2 +αas2 ]2

∗
∂Kd2
∂α

=

−ad2 2 (pd2 −ad2 )X2max
[(1−α)pd2 +αad2 ]2

< 0

and

∗
∂Ks2
∂α

=
2

<0

∗ , K ∗ from Eq.(2) (i = {s2, d2}) of Chapter 2 can be written
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3: Kd2
s2
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a

as Ki∗ =

(1− pi )X2max
i

a

α
1+( 1−α
) pi

i

ratio

α
1−α

, i = {d2, s2}, We see that the dependency of Ki∗ on α is through the

that multiplies the term

on capacity is large,

ai
pi

ai
pi

(the inverse of the return on capacity). When return

is small, and the term

ai
α
1−α pi



remains small as α increases

from an initial value of 0. As a result, the denominator of Ki∗ remains essentially
constant for small values of α. This only changes when α starts approaching 1, so
that the ratio

α
1−α

becomes large, which eventually translates in a steep decrease of Ki∗
2

down to a value of 0 when α = 1.

Proof related to Proposition 1: Show that h0 (α) can change its sign at most once for
α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: We need to show that the equation h0 (α) = 0 can have at most one solution for
α ∈ [0, 1].

∂h(α)
∂α

as2 2
(ps2 −as2 )

= 0 can be rewritten as:

β1
(γ1 −α)2

=

β2
,
(γ2 −α)2

where β1 =

ad2 2
(pd2 −ad2 )

> 0,

s2
> 1, and γ2 = ps2p−a
> 1. The solutions to the above
s2
q
q
equation are obtained either from (γ1 −α) = ββ12 (γ2 −α) or (γ1 −α) = − ββ12 (γ2 −α).

β2 =

> 0, γ1 =

pd2
pd2 −ad2

Note that γ1 > 1, γ2 > 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 together imply that (γ1 − α) > 0 and (γ2 −
α) > 0. Moreover, since ββ12 > 0, a valid value of α ∈ [0, 1] may only be obtained from
q
solving (γ1 − α) = ββ12 (γ2 − α). Hence, there can be at most one solution to h0 (α) = 0
2

for α ∈ [0, 1].
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A.2

Optimal Resource Allocation for Generalized Demand

This section provides the results for the optimal resource allocation for generic demand
distributions. Let i = {s2, d2} be the index for the cases of Service 2 deployment on
shared and dedicated networks respectively. The contribution margin for Service 2 is pi ,
and the capacity cost is ai . If the realized demand X2 exceeds the provisioned capacity
Ki , the capacity is adjusted to accommodate a fraction α of the excess demand, i.e.,
capacity is increased to Ki + α(X2 − Ki ). The gross profit for Service 2 is then given by
Ri (X2 > Ki ) = (pi − ai )(Ki + α(X2 − Ki ))

(A.1)

Conversely, when the realized demand is less than the provisioned capacity Ki , the gross
profit for Service 2 is
Ri (X2 ≤ Ki ) = pi X2 − ai Ki

(A.2)

Assuming a known distribution Fx2 with a support in [0, X2max ]34 for the demand of
Service 2, the expected gross profit Ri given the capacity provisioned upfront Ki in a
dedicated network can be expressed as
E(Ri )[Ki ] =

Z Ki
0

Ri (X2 ≤ Ki ) fx2 d(x2 ) +

Z X max
2
Ki

Ri (X2 > Ki ) fx2 d(x2 ) ,

(A.3)

where Ri (X2 > Ki ) and Ri (X2 ≤ Ki ) are given in Equations (A.1) and (A.2).
34 F(0)

= 0, F(X2max ) = 1, and to simplify the analysis we assume that F(.) is strictly increasing and

continuous, with a valid inverse function F −1 (.).
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E(Ri )[Ki ] =

Z Ki

pi

0

x2 fx2 d(x2 ) + α(pi − ai )

Z X max
2
Ki

x2 fx2 d(x2 )

+(1 − α)(pi − ai )Ki − [(1 − α)pi + αai ]Ki F(Ki )
Taking

dE(Ri )[Ki ]
dKi

(A.4)

= 0, we get Ki∗ :
F(Ki∗ ) =

(1 − α)(pi − ai )
(1 − α)pi + αai

If F −1 (.) is the inverse distribution function, then the optimal capacity provisioned is
Ki∗

=F

−1



(1 − α)(pi − ai )
(1 − α)pi + αai


(A.5)

Notice that this formulation for Ki∗ is analogous to the notion of ‘critical fractile’
for the newsvendor problem, with the extension that in this case we allow for capacity
relaxation when excess demand is realized, albeit with a penalty. The optimal capacity decreases with increase in reprovisioning ability, α. Moreover, as with the case
of uniform demand distribution, the optimal capacity, Ki∗ , depends on pi − ai and pi /ai
values. The capacity cost will be ai Ki∗ = ai F −1

(1−α)(pi −ai ) 
(1−α)pi +αai , which suggests that these

two operational metrics can play an important role, as with the uniform demand distribution.
E(Ri )[Ki∗ ] for optimal provisioning is given by
E(Ri )[Ki∗ ] =

pi

Z K∗
i
0

x2 fx2 d(x2 ) + α(pi − ai )

Z X max
2
Ki∗

x2 fx2 d(x2 )



+ ((1 − α)pi + αai )(1 − F(Ki∗ )) − ai Ki∗

(A.6)


Note that when we substitute the expression for Ki∗ , the component ((1 − α)pi +
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αai )(1 − F(Ki∗ )) − ai Ki∗ = 0. This is no coincidence, and it must be satisfied. Notice
that it can be rearranged to write:
ai Ki∗ F(Ki∗ ) = (1 − α)(pi − ai )Ki∗ (1 − F(Ki∗ ))

(A.7)

⇒ ai P(X2 ≤ Ki∗ ) = (1 − α)(pi − ai )P(X2 > Ki∗ )

(A.8)

The above equation means that at the optimal capacity allocation, the cost incurred
from an unit of over-provisioning (i.e., P(X2 ≤ Ki∗ )) given by the left hand side must
be balanced against the penalty cost from an unit of under-provisioning (i.e., P(X2 >
Ki∗ )) given by the right hand side. This is the principle what governs the expression
we obtained earlier, i.e., Ki∗ = F −1

(1−α)(pi −ai ) 
(1−α)pi +αai ,

which can also be obtained from

Equation (A.7).

A.3

Capacity Cost increase as a Reprovisioning Penalty

In our model we considered that the reprovisioning coefficient, α, accounts for the
amount of excess demand that can be recaptured through resource reprovisioning. In
other words, α governed the extent of penalty paid by the service provider for underprovisioning network resources. Consider that the realized demand for Service 2 is X2
and the provisioned capacity is Ki , where i = {s2, d2} is the index for the cases when
Service 2 is deployed on a shared and a dedicated network respectively. Let the contribution margin for Service 2 be pi , and the unit capacity cost be ai for these cases. Thus,
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when an excess demand is realized (i.e., X2 > Ki ), the revenue function is given by
Ri (X2 > Ki ) = (pi − ai )(Ki + α(D2 − Ki ))

(A.9)

An alternative way of modeling the penalty of underprovisioning is to consider that
whenever an excess demand is realized, the provider can accommodate it entirely, but
at a higher per unit capacity cost for each unit of excess demand accommodated. As
before, let pi be the profit margin for unit demand and ai be the unit capacity cost. But
now, the provider incurs an additional cost of ai + δ for each unit of excess demand35 .
Therefore, when an excess demand is realized (i.e., X2 > Ki ), the revenue function for
this model is given by
Ri (X2 > Ki ) = pi X2 − ai Ki − (ai + δi )(X2 − Ki )

(A.10)

We show that these two models are equivalent i.e., there is a one-to-one mapping
between the parameters α and δ which account for the penalty of underprovisioning in
the two respective models.
(pi − ai )(Ki + α(X2 − Ki )) = pi X2 − ai Ki − (ai + δi )(X2 − Ki )
α = 1−

δi
, 0 ≤ δi ≤ pi − ai
pi − ai

(A.11)
(A.12)

This establishes that the findings of our model can also be used for this alternative
scenario where a provider can accommodate the entire excess demand, but at a penalty
of a larger unit capacity cost.
35 Notice

that δ < pi − ai because the profit per user needs to be positive.
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A.4

Impact of cost parameters on Network Choice

In this section we consider the impact of various cost and revenue components on the
network choice. As stated in Section 2.4, a shared network is preferred if Πs > Πd .
Economies of scope in costs favor the creation of shared networks while large diseconomies of scope favor dedicated networks. This behavior is easily observed for certain cost components, such as fixed costs (cd1 , cd2 , cs ) and Service 1 profit components
(pi , ai ; i = {d1, s1}), by analyzing the impact of these parameters on the expressions for
Πd and Πs (ref. Equations (2.14) and (2.16) of Chapter 2). But, the impact of the other
cost and revenue parameters, e.g., the contribution margins and capacity costs, pi and
ai (i={d2, s2}), are less obvious. In particular, we would like to know if (dis)economies
of scope in these parameters can alter the network choice from shared to dedicated (or
vice versa), and whether there can be more than one threshold for altering back and
forth between the network choices as these (dis)economies increase.
To investigate the impact of the cost parameters, we first identify the different deployment and operational cost components that these parameters represent. This identification of cost components is important in order to identify which of these parameters
may vary independent of the others, and which parameters will vary in lock-step if
increase in (dis)economies of scope were to be found in these cost components.
Economies (diseconomies) in contribution margins can be captured by considering
the presence of diseconomies (economies) in the variable costs, vs1 , vd1 and vs2 , vd2 for
the two services. The contribution margins can be written as pd1 = p1 − vd1 , ps1 =
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p1 − vs1 , pd2 = p2 − vd2 and ps2 = p2 − vs2 , where p1 , p2 are the prices of Service 1
and 2 respectively. These variable cost for Service 2 consists of both the deployment
costs for new equipments (e, es2 ) and operational costs (η, ηs ). Service 1, which is
an existing service incurs an operational cost of η and ηs in the dedicated and shared
networks. Therefore, the total variable costs for Service 1 and Service 2 in dedicated
and shared networks are captured by the following parameters:
Service 1 : vd1 = η, vs1 = ηs

(A.13)

Service 2 : vd2 = e + η, vs2 = es2 + ηs
Note that the parameter vd2 can increase/decrease alone if the equipment cost e increases/decreases in the dedicated network. This corresponds to the case where the
contribution margin pd2 changes. On the other hand, we could have a scenario where
both vs1 and vs2 change simultaneously, which happens when the operational cost, ηs ,
is increased/decreased. This corresponds to scenarios where the corresponding contribution margins ps2 and ps1 both changes in lock-step. We will analyze this case later
in the discussion. The effect of changing other parameters is also similar because decreasing costs in a shared network (greater economies of scope) has the same effect as
that of increasing costs in dedicated networks, and vice-versa.
The capacity costs are captured by introducing parameters for cost of bandwidth and
operational costs. The parameters b and bs capture the unit bandwidth costs for dedicated and shared networks. We assume that Service 2 requires λ units of more bandwidth than Service 1. The operational costs are captured by the parameters qd1 , qd2 and
166

qs1 , qs2 for dedicated and shared networks respectively. Therefore, the total capacity
costs for Service 1 and Service 2 in dedicated and shared networks are captured by the
following parameters:
Service 1 : ad1 = β + qd1 , as1 = βs + qs1

(A.14)

Service 2 : ad2 = λβ + qd2 , as2 = λβs + qs2
We will study the impact of the various cost parameters by considering the following
scenarios: (1) as1 is varied (i.e., qs1 varies), (2) as2 is varied (i.e., qs2 varies) , and (3)
both as1 and as2 are varies (i.e., bs varies). The effect of changing the other parameters is also similar because decreasing costs in a shared network (greater economies of
scope) has the same effect as that of increasing costs in dedicated networks, and viceversa. For example, increasing/decreasing b will have the same kind of impact as that
of decreasing/increasing bs .
Next, we provide the analysis for the scenarios discussed previously, starting with
the impact of variable costs, followed by that of capacity costs.

A.4.1

Varying vs1 and vs2 together

We consider the case where vs1 and vs2 vary together. If we substitute in the values for
∗ , and γ into Π > Π , we can rearrange the terms to obtain the inequality.
K2∗ , Ks2
s
d

vs2 +

a2s2
2vs1 X1
−
< γ1
X2max
(1 − α)(p2 − vs2 ) + αas2
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(A.15)

Where
γ1 = ad2 −

1

[as2 (X2 + 2X1 ) + 2(cs − cd1 − cd2 ) − 2ad1 X1 ]
X2max
a2d2
2vd1 X1
−as2 + max + vd2 −
X2
(1 − α)p2 + αad2 − (1 − α)vd2

(A.16)

Note that the cost parameters, vs2 = es2 + ηs and vs1 = ηs , both vary when ηs is
varying. We will therefore study the impact of changing ηs on the validity of Πs > Πd .
Introducing the above parameters in (A.15), we obtain:


a2s2
2X1
ηs 1 + max −
< γ1 − es2
X2
(1 − α)(p2 − es2 ) + αas2 − (1 − α)ηs

(A.17)

Let βηs = (1 − α)(p2 − es2 ) + αas2 and γ2 = γ1 − es2 then:


a2s2
2X1
ηs 1 + max −
< γ2
X2
βηs − (1 − α)ηs
Notice that ηs can vary only between 0 and

βηs −as2
1−α

(A.18)

(because p2 − es2 − as2 > ηs for

Π > 0).


2X1
A single intersection between ηs 1 + X max − βη
2

a2s2
−(1−α)η
s
s

and γ2 will mark a switch

from shared to dedicated (or vice versa). Next, we prove that two intersections can
never arise i.e., multiple switching between shared and separate does not occur when
vs1 and vs2 vary together. We proceed to prove by the method of contradiction.
If two crossings were to occur, the baseline of γ2 must intersect the left hand side


a2s2
2X1
function ηs 1 + X2 − βη −(1−α)η
twice. This function is concave between ηs = 0
s
s

and ηs =

βηs −as2
1−α

(and the second derivative w.r.t to ηs is

−2a2s2 (1−α)2
(βηs −(1−α)ηs )3

for γ2 to cut the line twice, the slope of the function at ηs =
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βηs −as2
1−α

< 0). Therefore,

must be negative,

which requires,


a2s2 (1 − α)
2X1
1 + max −
X2
[βηs − (1 − α)ηs ]2

ηs =

βηs −as2
1−α

<0

However, we find that this is not possible because (A.19) simplifies to

(A.19)
2X1
X2max

+ α < 0,

which can never occur because X1 , X2max , and α are always positive. Therefore,
it is never possible that the network choice will be switch twice as the costs increase/decrease.

A.4.2

Impact of varying as1

∗ in Π > Π and rewriting
Consider the case where as1 varies. Substituting in K2∗ , Ks2
s
d

the expression in terms of as1 , we get:
2X1
as1 > γ4
X2max

(A.20)

where
γ4 =

a2d2
− 2as2
(1 − α)(p2 − vd2 ) + αad2


a2s2
vs2 X2max
2
−
+ vs1 X1 + cs
−
(1 − α)(p2 − vs2 ) + αas2 X2max
2


vd2 Dmax
2X1
2
−
+ vd1 X1 + cd1 + cd2 + max
(A.21)
2
X2
2ad2 −

The left hand side of A.20 is linear in as1 . Therefore, there can be at most one valid
crossing (dedicated to shared as as1 increases). However, in order for a crossing to
occur, p1 − vs1 − as1 > 0 must be satisfied. This results in the following constraint for
one crossing.
169

X2max
< p1 − vs1
0 < γ4
2X1

(A.22)

If this constraint is not satisfied, then no crossing occurs i.e., one type of network
is always chosen. The constraint shows that when capacity cost, as1 , is low (i.e.,
economies of scope) a shared network is preferred but if as1 is high, dedicated networks are preferred.

A.4.3

Varying as2

∗ in Π > Π
Now, let us consider the case where we vary as2 . If we substitute K2∗ , Ks2
s
d

and rewrite it in terms of as2 on one side, we get:
γ5 = 2as2 −

a2s2
βas2 + αas2

(A.23)

where βas2 = (1 − α)(p2 − vs2 ) and
γ5 =


a2d2
vs2 X2max
2X1
2
2ad2 −
− max (as1 − ad1 ) − max
βas2 + αad2 d2
X2
2
 

max
vd2 X2
+vs1 X1 + cs −
+ vd1 X1 + cd1 + cd2
2

As before, for multiple switches between shared and dedicated to occur, γ5 must intersect the function 2as2 − βa
as2 can vary from 0 to

βas2
1−α ,

a2s2
+αas2
s2

twice. Note that under the constraint from Π2 > 0,

and the function 2as2 − βa

a2s2
+αas2
s2

is monotonically increas-

ing in the domain of as2 . This is because its slope w.r.t. βas2 is:


βas2
as2
2−
1+
βas2 + αas2
βas2 + αas2
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(A.24)

The above expression for the slope is always positive since both
βas2
βas2 +αas2

as2
βas2 +αas2

< 1 and

< 1. Since the function is monotonically increasing, it can not have more than

one intersection with the constant baseline of γ5 . Hence, increasing as2 can only create
at most one transition from dedicated to shared and vice-versa.

A.4.4

Varying as1 and as2 together

Lastly, consider the case when as1 and as2 vary together. As before, if we substitute K2∗ ,
∗ in Π > Π and rearrange the terms with a and a on one side of the inequality,
Ks2
s
s1
s2
d

we get:

γ6 < 2as2 −

a2s2
X1
+ 2as1 max
(1 − α)(p2 − vs2 ) + αas2
X2

(A.25)

where
γ6 =


a2d2
vs2 X2max
2X1
2
2ad2 −
+ max ad1 − max
βas2 + αad2 X2
X2
2
 

max
vd2 X2
+vs1 X1 + cs −
+ vd1 X1 + cd1 + cd2
2

(A.26)

Substituting as2 = λbs + qs2 and as1 = bs + qs1 leads to the following inequality:
γ7 < ψ1 bs −

(λbs + qs2 )2
βas1 as2 + αλbs

(A.27)

1
where γ7 = γ6 − 2qs2 − 2qs1 XXmax
, βas1 as2 = (1 − α)(p2 − vs2 ) + αqs2 and ψ1 = 2λ +
2

2X1
X2max .

We will study the impact of changing the parameter bs which varies both as1 and
as2 . Specifically, we need to show that increasing bs can not create situations where the
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preferred network choice switches between shared and dedicated twice. The proof that
two switches does not occur requires proving that γ7 cannot intersect the left hand side
2

s +qs2 )
function ψ1 bs − β(λb
twice. bs can take values between 0 and
a a +αλbs
s1 s2

βas1 as2 −qs2
(1−α)λ

(from

the profit constraint p2 − vs2 − as2 > 0). This function is monotonically increasing
in the domain of bs because its derivative w.r.t bs i.e., 2λ(1 − (

λbs +qs2
)+
2X1
+αλbs
βas1 as2 )+ X max
2

λbs +qs2
2
s2
αλ( βa λba s +q
+αλbs ) , is always positive. This is because ( βa a +αλbs ) is a fraction (from
s2 s2

the upper bound on bs =

s1 s2

βas1 as2 −qs2
(1−α)λ ),

and all the other parameters are positive. But

since γ7 is a constant and the function is monotonically increasing, there can be at most
one crossing. Once again, we find that the network choice cannot alter back and forth
between shared and dedicated more than once.
The analysis shows that the diseconomies/economies of scope in cost components
can trigger at most one switch in the network choice i.e., from shared to dedicated or
vice-versa. These translate to choosing one type of network when the parameter value
is small (as would be the case if economies of scope were to be realized in some costs)
and the other when it is large (e.g., diseconomies of scope). Moreover, we showed
that there cannot be switches back and forth between shared and dedicated networks
as the costs increase/decrease. In other words, outcomes where one type of network
is preferred at both high and low costs, and the other for intermediate values do not
arise. This result is in contrast with the behavior observed previously for the parameter
α (reprovisioning coefficient), and hence provides additional support for models that
incorporate reprovisioning ability in its analysis of network choice.
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Appendix B

Appendix: Network Technology
Adoption

B.1

Generalized Region Partition

The analysis of solution regions in the above subsection was based on the fact that
for linear externality functions, the (x1 , x2 )-plane can be partitioned into nine regions,
each representing a unique ordering of the indifference points, and therefore different
expressions for Hi (x) and diffusion trajectory. The unique points P and Q on the line
θ01 (x) = θ02 (x) acted as ‘pivots’ for the partition of the plane into nine regions. Although one may expect that for arbitrary externality functions, the lines denoting the
region boundaries will intersect in arbitrary ways, we show here that even for more
generic monotonically increasing network externality functions, the two ‘pivot’ points
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P and Q remain unique. This uniqueness of P and Q, along with constraints on how
the boundary lines can intersect as imposed by the monotonic property of externality
functions, result in the partitioning of the plane into “nine” regions.
Let the network externality of the two technologies, Technology 1 and 2 be given by
positive increasing externality functions g1 (x1 ) and g2 (x2 ) for the respective adoption
levels of x1 and x2 (i.e., gi (xi ) ≥ 0, g0i (xi ) > 0, i = {1, 2}).
The end user’s utility from using Technologies 1 and 2 is given by:
U1 = θq1 + (g1 (x1 ) + α1 βg2 (x2 )) − p1

(B.1)

U2 = θq2 + (βg2 (x2 ) + α2 g1 (x1 )) − p2

(B.2)

Setting Ui (θ, x) = 0, we get
θ01 (x) =
θ02 (x) =

p1 − (g1 (x1 ) + α1 βg2 (x2 ))
q1
p2 − (βg2 (x2 ) + α2 g1 (x1 ))
q2

(B.3)
(B.4)

Similarly, setting U1 (θ, x) = U2 (θ, x) gives
θ12 (x) =

(1 − α2 )g1 (x1 ) − β(1 − α1 )g2 (x2 ) + p2 − p1
q2 − q1

(B.5)

To simplify notation, we use from now on θ0i and θ12 instead of θ0i (x) and θ12 (x). After
simple manipulations, we get
q2
(θ0 − θ01 ),
q2 − q1 2
q1
=
(θ0 − θ01 )
q2 − q1 2

θ12 − θ01 =

(B.6)

θ12 − θ02

(B.7)
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Given that Technology 2, the entrant, is technically superior (i.e., q2 > q1 ), from the
above relation we establish the following Proposition.

Proposition 13 If θ01 < θ02 , then θ12 > θ02 > θ01 . If θ01 ≥ θ02 , then θ12 ≤ θ02 ≤ θ01 .

H1 (x) =




 [θ12 ][0,1] − [θ0 ][0,1]
1

if θ01 < θ02



 0

otherwise
(B.8)

H2 (x) =




 1 − [θ12 ][0,1]

if θ01 < θ02



 1 − [θ02 ][0,1]

otherwise

where x[a,b] is the projection of x into the interval [a, b], i.e., is equal to x for x ∈ [a, b],
a for x < a, and b for x > b.
As the preference levels θ of all users lie in [0, 1], Equation (B.8) fully determine
Hi (x), albeit with possibly different expressions depending on the outcome of the projections of the indifference thresholds on [0, 1]. Hence, we partition the (x1 , x2 ) plane
into regions where Hi (x) has a unique expression. This can be achieved by combining
Equation (B.3) to (B.5) with Equation (B.8).
The line θ01 (x) = θ02 (x) separates regions that require different expressions of
Hi (x), i = {1, 2}. For points above that line (θ01 (x) > θ02 (x)), the expression of H2 (x)
depends on the projection of θ02 (x) on [0, 1]. Therefore the lines θ02 (x) = 0 and θ02 (x) = 1
delineate regions associated with different H2 (x). Similarly, for points below that line,
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the lines θ01 (x) = 0, θ01 (x) = 1, θ12 (x) = 0 and θ12 (x) = 1 introduce additional region
boundaries for Hi (x), i = {1, 2}. Expressions for all the lines can be obtained from
eqs. (B.3) to (B.5).
Next we show that irrespective of the choice of system parameters, the lines θ02 (x) =
0, θ01 (x) = 0 and θ12 (x) = 0 always intersect at a point P, and the lines θ02 (x) = 1, θ01 (x) =
1 and θ12 (x) = 1 always intersect at a point Q, with both P and Q lying on the line
θ01 (x) = θ02 (x). The points P and Q act as “anchors” of the partition of the solution
space.
We denote the lines θ01 (x) = 0 and θ02 (x) = 0 by functions f1 (x1 , x2 ) = 0 and
f2 (x1 , x2 ) = 0.

Let (x1∗ , x2∗ ) denote the co-ordinates in (x1 , x2 )-plane where these

lines intersect (i.e., fi (x1∗ , x2∗ ) = 0, i = {1, 2}). Note that the lines θ12 (x) = 0 and
θ01 (x) = θ02 (x), which can then be represented as f2 (x1 , x2 ) − f1 (x1 , x2 ) = 0 and
(1/q2 ) f2 (x1 , x2 ) − (1/q1 ) f1 (x1 , x2 ) = 0 respectively, also must pass through (x1∗ , x2∗ ).
This point of intersection of all these lines can be labeled as P. Additionally, it can be
seen that if any two of these lines intersect at some point, all the other curves must also
pass through that point. Similarly, we obtain the other ‘pivot’ point, Q, at which the
lines θ01 (x) = θ02 (x), θ02 (x) = 1, θ01 (x) = 1 and θ12 (x) = 1 must intersect.

Proof of Uniqueness of P and Q
Let us consider the intersection of the lines θ01 (x) = 0, θ02 (x) = 0, θ12 (x) = 0 and
θ01 (x) = θ02 (x) at some point P as shown in Figure B.1. Assume that there exist another
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Figure B.1: Generalized Region Partitions

such point P0 where all the lines again intersect (because we showed that whenever
any two of these lines intersect, the other lines should also intersect). However, using
eqn.(3.5-3.7) and g0i (xi ) ≥ 0, i = {1, 2}, we see that the line θ12 = 0 is always increasing
in x1 and x2 , while the line θ10 = 0 is decreasing in x2 for increase in x1 . Therefore in the
entire region θ01 < θ02 the lines can only intersect once, and therefore the point P must
be unique. A similar argument holds for point Q as well.
Thus the (x1 , x2 )-plane can only be partitioned into the nine regions shown in Figure
B.1, and the relative positions of these regions in the plane remain fixed. Moreover,
each of these regions is a connected set. As shown in the figure, each region corresponds
to a different arrangement of the indifference points with respect to the 0, 1 boundary
under the two feasible orderings (from Proposition 13). The classification of these nine
regions based on the different orderings is provided in Table B.1. A brief explanation
of the meaning of the regions is provided next.
Meaning of Regions
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Table B.1: Partitions characterizing Hi (x)
θ01 ≥ θ02

θ01 < θ02

Region

condition

Region

condition

R1

θ02 ≤ 0

R4

θ12 ≤ 0,

0 ≤ θ01

R2

0 < θ02 < 1

R5

0 < θ12 < 1,

θ01 ≤ 0

R3

1 ≤ θ02

R6

0 < θ12 < 1,

0 < θ01 < 1

R7

1 ≤ θ12 ,

θ01 ≤ 0

R8

1 ≤ θ12 ,

0 < θ01 < 1

R9

1 ≤ θ12 ,

1 ≤ θ01

Each region correspond to a particular ordering of the indifference points, which
in turn maps to unique expressions for Hi (x) in eqn.(B.8). For example, consider the
region R8 , which is the set of all (x1 , x2 ) penetration levels for which θ01 < θ02 , 1 ≤ θ21
and 0 ≤ θ01 < 1. In this region, because θ21 > 1 for any current (x1 , x2 ) adoption levels,
no user has a preference for choosing Technology 2 over 1. But since 0 < θ01 < 1, some
users whose preference θ01 < θ derive positive utility from Technology 1, will be willing
to adopt it. Therefore if at any instant t, the system reaches adoption levels (x1 , x2 ) in
Region R8 , the diffusion from that point on in the inside of Region R8 will proceed with
a decrease in the value of x2 i.e., users leave Technology 2 as θ12 > 1. This fact is also
reflected in the exponentially decreasing value of the x2 (t) co-ordinate of the diffusion
trajectory in R8 (as given in Table B.2). Each region can be interpreted in a similar
manner, and Table B.1 essentially connects this abstract notion of each region to the
corresponding ordering of the indifference thresholds that define it.
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B.2

Trajectories and Equilibria (validity & stability)

The expressions for equilibria in R5 and R6 , x∗R5 and x∗R6 of Tables B.2, B.3 and B.4 are
provided separately as eqs. (B.9) and (B.10) respectively for better readability.

(p2 − p1 ) − β(1 − α1 )
(q2 − q1 ) − [(1 − α2 ) + β(1 − α1 )]
(q2 − q1 ) − (p2 − p1 ) − (1 − α2 )
= 1 − x1∗ R5 =
(q2 − q1 ) − [(1 − α2 ) + β(1 − α1 )]

x1∗ R5 =
x2∗ R5

x1∗ R6 =
x2∗ R6 =

p1 q2 − p2 q1 + βα1 (p2 − q2 ) − β(p1 − q1 )
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 )
p2 q1 − p1 q1 − p2 + p1 α2 + q1 2 − q1 q2 + q2 − q1 α2
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 )
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(B.9)

(B.10)

Table B.2: Technology adoption trajectories
x1 (t)

x2 (t)

R1

x1 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )

R2

c1 e−γ(t−t0 )

(x2 (t0 )−1) −γt
x1 (t0 ) e
p2 −q2
β−q2

+1

+ c2 e−γ(1−β/q2 )(t−t0 ) − c1 αβ2 e−γt

c2 = [x2 (t0 ) + α2 xβ1 (t0 ) −

c1 = x1 (t0 )

p2 −q2
β−q2 ]

R3

x1 (t) = x1 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )

x2 (t) = x2 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )

R4

same as R1

same as R1

R5

∗ + c e−γ(t−t0 )
x1R
2
5

∗ + c (1−α2 ) e−γ(t−t0 )
x2R
2 β(1−α )
5
1

(1−α2 )+β(1−α1 )
(−1+
)γ(t−t0 )
q2 −q1

−c1 e

+c1 e
c1 =

β(1−α1 )
∗
1−α2 +β(1−α1 ) (x2R5

(1−α2 )+β(1−α1 )
(−1+
)γ(t−t0 )
q2 −q1

1)
c2 = ( 1−αβ(1−α
+β(1−α ) )[x1 (t0 ) + x2 (t0 ) − 1]

− x2 (t0 ))

2

1

∗
2
− 1−α 1−α
+β(1−α ) (x1R5 − x1 (t0 ))

R6

2

1

∗ +c K e
x1R
1 1
6

A+

+c2 K2 e
c1 =

A2 −4B
γ(t−t0 )
2

A2 −4B
γ(t−t0 )
2

+c2 e

∗ −x (t )−K (x∗ −x (t ))}
(1−α2 ){x1R
2 0
1 0
2 2R

√

6

(q2 −q1 )

c2 =

6

A2 −4B

√

α2 +β(1−α1 )−q2 /q1 −(q2 −q1 )
2(1−α2 )

A2 −4B

K2 =

α2 +β(1−α1 )−q2 /q1 +(q2 −q1 )
2(1−α2 )

A2 −4B

−γ(1− q1 )(t−t0 )

+ c1 e

1

A2 −4B
γ(t−t0 )
2

√

A−

A2 −4B
γ(t−t0 )
2

6

√

(q2 −q1 )

6

A2 −4B

1−α2 +β(1−α1 )
q2 −q1

+ q11 − 2

1−α2 βα1
1)
B = ( q11 − 1)( β(1−α
q2 −q1 − 1) + q2 −q1 ( q1 − 1)

(x1 (t0 ) − 1)e−γ(t−t0 ) + 1
p1 −q1
1−q1

√

A+

∗ −x (t ))+K (x∗ −x (t ))}
(1−α2 ){−(x1R
2 0
1 0
1 2R

A=

√

x2 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )

− c2 βα1 e−γ(t−t0 )

c1 = [x1 (t0 ) + βα1 x2 (t0 ) −
R9

∗ +c e
x2R
1
6

√

A−

K1 =

R7
R8

√

p1 −q1
1−q1 ]

c2 e−γ(t−t0 )
c2 = x2 (t0 )

x1 (t) = x1 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )

x2 (t) = x2 (t0 )e−γ(t−t0 )
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Table B.3: Conditions for stable, valid Equilibria
Region

Equilibria

Stability Conditions

R1

(0, 1)

always locally stable

R2

2 −q2
(0, pβ−q
)

β < q2

2

Validity and Stability Conditions
p2 ≤ β, α1 ≤

p1
β

+ qq12 (1 −

p2
β )

β < p2 < q2
α1 β(q2 − p2 ) ≤
β(q1 − p1 ) + p1 q2 − p2 q1

R4

(0, 1)

p1 < α1 β,

always locally stable
p1
β

R5

+ qq12 (1 −

p2
β ) ≤ α1

≤ 1+

p1 −p2
β

∗ , 1 − x∗ )
(x1R
1R5
5

q2 − q1 >

p2 − p1 > β(1 − α1 )

(See Eq. (B.9))

1 − α2 + β(1 − α1 )

q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 ) ≥ 1 − α2
q2 − q1 > β(1 − α1 ) + 1 − α2
α1 β(α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 ) ≥
β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))

R6

∗ , x∗ )
(x1R
2R6
6

See Table B.4

∗ + x∗
0 < x1R
2R6 < 1
6

(See Eq. (B.10))
R7

(1, 0)

∗ , 0 < x∗ ,
0 < x1R
2R6
6

always locally stable

p1 ≤ 1,
α2 ≤ 1 + p2 − p1 − (q2 − q1 )

R8

1 −q1
, 0)
( p1−q
1

1 < q1

1 < p1 < q1
α2 (q1 − p1 ) ≤
(1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )
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Table B.4: Stability conditions for x∗R6
Case

Conditions

A2 − 4B ≥ 0

A < 0 ⇔ β(1 − α1 ) − α2 < 2(q2 − q1 ) − qq21

(Ref. Table B.2 for exp. of A and B)

B > 0 ⇔ (q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 ) < 0

A2 − 4B < 0

A < 0 ⇔ β(1 − α1 ) − α2 < 2(q2 − q1 ) − qq21
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B.3

Conditions for valid and stable equilibria

The expressions in Table B.3 and B.4 for the validity and stability conditions for each
of the equilibrium are rearranged and presented below for clarity.

Region R1 – Equilibrium: (0, 1)
Validity and Stability Conditions are:
p2 ≤ β
α1 ≤

(B.11)

p1 q1
p2 
+
1−
β q2
β

(B.12)

2 −q2
Region R2 – Equilibrium: (0, pβ−q
)
2

Validity and Stability Conditions:
β < p2 < q2
α1 ≤

β(q1 − p1 ) + p1 q2 − p2 q1
β(q2 − p2 )

(B.13)
(B.14)

Region R3 – Candidate equilibrium (0, 0)
By assumption, this is not a feasible equilibrium.
Region R4 – Equilibrium: (0, 1)
Validity and Stability Conditions:
p1
≤
α1 β


p1 q1
p2
p1
p2
+
1−
≤ α1 ≤
+1−
β q2
β
β
β
183

(B.15)
(B.16)

Region R5 – Equilibrium: (x1∗R5 , x2∗R5 )
(p2 − p1 ) − β(1 − α1 )
(q2 − q1 ) − [β(1 − α1 ) + (1 − α2 )]
(q2 − q1 ) − (p2 − p1 ) − (1 − α2 )
= 1 − x1∗R5 =
(q2 − q1 ) − [β(1 − α1 ) + (1 − α2 )]

x1∗R5 =
x2∗R5

Rewriting the Validity and Stability conditions given in Table B.3, we have:
p2 − p1 > β(1 − α1 )
q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 ) ≥ 1 − α2
q2 − q1 > β(1 − α1 ) + 1 − α2
α1 β(α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 ) ≥ β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))

(B.17)
(B.18)
(B.19)
(B.20)

Region R6 – Equilibrium: (x1∗R6 , x2∗R6 )
x1∗R6 =
x2∗R6 =

p1 q2 − p2 q1 + βα1 (p2 − q2 ) − β(p1 − q1 )
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 )
p2 q1 − p1 q1 − p2 + p1 α2 + q21 − q1 q2 + q2 − q1 α2
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 )

The validity conditions for these equilibrium expression requires x1∗R6 ≥ 0, x2∗R6 ≥ 0
∗
∗
and x1∗R6 + x2∗R6 < 1. We will denote the numerators of x1R
and x2R
in eq. (B.10) as
6
6

N1 and N2 , respectively, and their common denominator as D. Table B.4 shows that the
if A2 − 4B ≥ 0 the stability conditions require A < 0 and B > 0, while if A2 − 4B < 0
then A < 0 is required (and B > 0 since B > A2 /4 > 0). Thus an equilibrium in R6
can satisfy stability conditions only if B > 0 and A < 0. Additionally B > 0 implies
that the denominator of the expressions for the equilibrium adoption levels (given in
eqs. (B.10)) is negative (i.e., D < 0).
184

Therefore a valid, stable equilibrium in R6 must have:
A<0:
β(1 − α1 ) − α2 < 2(q2 − q1 ) −

q2
q1

(B.21)

D < 0 (B > 0) :
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q1 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 ) < 0

(B.22)

N1 ≤ 0 :
α1 β(q2 − p2 ) ≥ β(q1 − p1 ) + p1 q2 − p2 q1

(B.23)

N2 ≤ 0 :
α2 (q1 − p1 ) ≥ (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )

(B.24)

N1 + N2
<1:
D
α1 β(α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 )
< β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))

(B.25)

Region R7 – Equilibrium: (1, 0)
Validity and Stability Conditions:
p1 ≤ 1

(B.26)

α2 < 1 + (p2 − p1 ) − (q2 − q1 )

(B.27)

1 −q1
Region R8 – Equilibrium: ( p1−q
, 0)
1
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Validity and Stability Conditions:
1 < p1 < q1
α2 (q1 − p1 ) ≤ (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )

(B.28)
(B.29)

Region R9 – Equilibrium: (0, 0)
By assumption, (0, 0) is not a feasible equilibrium.

B.4

Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 5:
In this proof we will show that the following pairs of equilibria cannot coexist
together as valid and stable equilibria. Consequently, it is easy to verify that the
only combination of multiple equilibria that can coexist are the ones mentioned in
Proposition 5.
1. (1, 0) and x∗R8
2. (1, 0) and x∗R5
3. (0, 1) and x∗R2
4. (0, 1) and x∗R5
5. x∗R8 and x∗R5
6. x∗R8 and x∗R6
7. x∗R2 and x∗R6
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8. x∗R5 and x∗R6

The following analysis will use the expressions for validity and stability conditions
for the different equilibria listed in the Subsection B.3 of the Appendix.
1. (1, 0) and x∗R8

This pair cannot coexist because the equilibrium (1, 0) in R7 requires p1 ≤ 1 (eq.
(B.26)) while the equilibrium x∗R8 requires p1 > 1 (eq. (B.28)).

2. (1, 0) and x∗R5

Eq.(B.27) for equilibrium (1, 0) in R7 and condition in eq.(B.18) for x∗R5 have
contradictory requirements, and therefore these pair cannot coexist.

3. (0, 1) and x∗R2

The equilibrium (0, 1) can either exist in Region R1 or R4 . In either it requires
β ≥ p2 for being a valid, stable equilibrium. While this is explicit for Region R1 (refer
to eq.(B.11)), the relation is implicitly implied by the conditions of Region R4 . Note
that eq.(B.15) and eq.(B.16) can be written together as 0 ≤ α1 β − p1 ≤ β − p2 . Thus
(0, 1) equilibria requires β ≥ p2 which contradicts with the requirement in eq.(B.13)
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for x∗R2 .

4. (0, 1) and x∗R5

The equilibrium (0, 1) is valid in R4 if α1 ≤
is stricter i.e., α1 ≤

p1
β


+ qq12 1 − pβ2 (since

q1
q2

However equilibrium x∗R5 requires α1 >

p1
β

+ 1 − pβ2 . It is valid in R1 if the bound

< 1 and β ≥ p2 ).

p1
β

+1−

p2
β

from eq.(B.17). Therefore the

two equilibria cannot coexist.

5. x∗R8 and x∗R5

Equilibria x∗R8 requires q1 > p1 from eq.(B.28). When this relation holds, the condition in eq.(B.29) for x∗R8 and eq.(B.18) for equilibria x∗R5 can be written as:
(1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )
≥ α2
q1 − p1
> 1 − (q2 − q1 ) + p2 − p1
⇒ (q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 ))
> p1 (q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 ))

(B.30)

Since (q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 )) ≥ 1 − α2 ≥ 0 from eq.(B.18), we must have p1 < 1, which
contradicts with the requirement in eq.(B.28) for the equilibrium x∗R8 . Therefore this
pair cannot coexist.
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6. x∗R8 and x∗R6

Condition in eqs.(B.28) and (B.29) when considered together contradicts the
requirement of eq.(B.24). Therefore these equilibria cannot coexist as valid, stable
equilibria.

7. x∗R2 and x∗R6

Eqs.(B.13) and (B.14) for x∗R2 together contradict the requirement in eq.(B.23) for
x∗R6 , and thus cannot coexist as valid, stable equilibria pair.

8. x∗R5 and x∗R6

The condition in eq.(B.20) for x∗R5 and eq.(B.25) cannot hold together and therefore
these equilibria never coexists as a pair of valid, stable equilibria.

Proof: No combination of three or more equilibria can coexist as valid, stable
equilibria in the presence of converters

Given Proposition 5, all but one combination of three equilibria can be excluded
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from further consideration as at least a pair of equilibria in these combinations will
not coexist as per the proposition. The only combination of three equilibria that can
potentially coexist is {(0, 1), (1, 0), x∗R6 }. We will show that the validity and stability
conditions of these three equilibria cannot be satisfied together. Thus since no pair of
three equilibria may coexist, it will directly follow that no combination of four or more
equilibria can therefore coexist, thus proving the present proposition.
The equilibrium (0, 1) to exist in R4 can be shown to require β ≥ p2 and α1 β ≤
β + p1 − p2 from eqs.(B.15) and (B.16). For (0, 1) to exist in R1 the constraint imposed
by eq.(B.12) is even more stringent than α1 β ≤ β + p1 − p2 . Therefore the validity
and stability of (0, 1) requires at least α1 β ≤ β + p1 − p2 and β ≥ p2 . Using this and
eq.(B.27) for (1, 0) in R7 , we have:
(α1 − 1)β ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ 1 − α2 − (q2 − q1 )
⇒ (α1 − 1)β

≤

1 − α2 − (q2 − q1 )

Using the above inequality and eq.(B.21), we get:
⇒ q2 − q1 − 1 ≤ β(1 − α1 ) − α2
< 2(q2 − q1 ) − q2 /q1
⇒ (q2 − q1 )(q1 − 1) > 0
⇒ q1 > 1 (as q2 > q1 )
Eq.(B.24) gives:
(α2 − q1 )(q1 − p1 ) ≥ (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 )
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Since we have 1 ≥ p1 from eq.(B.26) as a condition for the (1, 0) equilibrium in R7 and
we established that q1 > 1, we get q1 > p1 . This in addition to the relation q1 > 1 ≥ α2 ,
enforces q2 > p2 for the previous inequality expression.
Eq.(B.24) could also be rearranged as:
(α2 − q1 + q2 − p2 )(q1 − p1 ) ≥ (q2 − p2 )(1 − p1 )
The expression on the right hand side is positive since q2 > p2 and 1 ≥ p1 as discussed
previously. Therefore the left hand side expression also needs to be positive. Using
eq.(B.25) and q1 > p1 , we must have α2 − q1 + q2 − p2 > 0.
Now using eqs.(B.23) and (B.25), and the facts q2 > p2 and α2 − q1 + q2 − p2 > 0
as established above, we can write:
β(q1 − p1 ) + p1 q2 − p2 q1
≤ α1 β
q2 − p2
β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))
<
α2 + q2 − q1 − p2
⇒ α2 (q1 − p1 ) < (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )
It can be easily seen that the above inequality contradicts with the condition in
eq.(B.24).
Hence all the validity and stability conditions for the three equilibria
{(0, 1), (1, 0), x∗R6 } cannot be satisfied together.
Additionally, since no pair of three valid, stable equilibria can coexist a set of given
parameter values, it follows that no combinations of four or more equilibria can coexist
either, thus completing the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
The proposition has two parts: converters can help a technology (i) alter market
equilibrium from a scenario where it has been eliminated to one where it coexist with
the other technology; (ii) and even succeed in nearly eliminating it.
Condition (i) is relatively easy to establish. Consider a scenario where one of the
technologies has been eliminated, i.e., an equilibrium of the form (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, x2∗ )
or (x1∗ , 0). The validity conditions from Table B.3 identify the minimum converter
efficiency required to invalidate that equilibrium. From the table, such an invalidation
is easily seen to correspond to the re-emergence of the other technology (these are the
only equilibria whose validity conditions are compatible with the invalidation of the
previous equilibrium), and thus co-existence of the two technologies.
Turning to condition (ii), assume that for a given set of system parameters, (0, 1)
is the initial equilibrium in the absence of converters. Users with the lowest technology valuation (θ = 0) must, therefore, derive greater utility from Technology 2 than
Technology 1 i.e., U1 (θ = 0) < U2 (θ = 0). This implies
β > p2 − p1

(B.31)

Next, using perfect, symmetric converters (α1 = α2 = 1), we show that is is possible
to satisfy both eq. (B.31) and the validity conditions of an equilibrium of the form
(1−x2∗ , x2∗ ), with x2∗ arbitrarily small. This identifies a configuration satisfying condition
(ii).
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An equilibrium of the form (1 − x2∗ , x2∗ ) requires that users of preference θ = 0 adopt
Technology 1, i.e., U1 (θ = 0) ≥ 0, thus
x2∗ ≥

p1 − 1
β−1

(B.32)

and users with preference θ = 1 − x2∗ are to be indifferent to the two technologies i.e.,
U1 (1 − x2∗ , x2∗ ) = U2 (1 − x2∗ , x2∗ ). This gives
x2∗ = 1 −

p2 − p1
q2 − q1

(B.33)

From eq. (B.33), for Technology 2 to nearly disappear, i.e., x2∗ ≈ 0, we need p2 − p1 .
q2 − q1 . We also need β large enough for eqs. (B.32) and (B.31) to continue holding.
Combinations of system parameters that allow these conditions to be simultaneously
satisfied are easily found, which establishes that the introduction of converters can take
the system from an equilibrium of the form (0, 1) to one of the form (1 − ε, ε), where
ε ≈ 0.
Consider now the reverse scenario, where the equilibrium in the absence of converters is (1, 0) for α1 = α2 = 0. For this, we need θ12 > 1 and θ10 < 0, i.e.,
1 + p2 − p1 > q2 − q1

(B.34)

p1 < 1

(B.35)

As before, we assume next perfect, symmetric converters, and establish that with them
it is possible to achieve a new equilibrium of the form (x1∗ , 1 − x1∗ ), where x1∗ ≈ 0. The
new equilibrium requires that users with preference θ = 0 derive positive utility from
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the Technology 1, i.e.,
(β − 1)x1∗ < β − p1 ,

(B.36)

and that users with preference θ = x1∗ be indifferent to the two technologies i.e.,
U1 (x1∗ , 1 − x1∗ ) = U2 (x1∗ , 1 − x1∗ ).
x1∗ =

p2 − p1
q2 − q1

(B.37)

It is again easy to find a combination of system parameters that simultaneously satisfy
eqs. (B.34) to (B.37), while ensuring x1∗ ≈ 0.

Proof of Proposition 7:
We first consider Technology 1 hurting itself by introducing or improving a converter. Converter efficiencies affect the expressions of the adoption levels only for the
equilibria in R5 and R6 (eq.(B.9) and (B.10)). Region R5 is easily eliminated from consideration as its validity conditions can be shown to force a positive derivative of x1∗
w.r.t. α1 . Therefore, the remainder of the proof focuses on a stable equilibrium in R6 .
∗
∗
As before, the numerators of x1R
and x2R
in eq. (B.10) are denoted as N1 and N2
6
6

respectively, and with D as their common denominator. The stability of the equilibrium
can be shown to imply that D < 0. The requirement D < 0 implies N1 < 0 and N2 < 0,
which has important consequences on the impact of converter efficiency.
Specifically, better converters hurt Technology 1 if
∗
∂x1R
6

∂α1

=

(β − q2 )N2
<0
D2
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(B.38)

Since N2 < 0, the derivative is negative only if β > q2 . As a result, for better converters
to hurt the incumbent, the condition β > q2 and one of the sets of stability conditions
in Table B.4 must be simultaneously satisfied. We use the Mathematica symbolic manipulation software to establish that the intersection of parameter sets satisfying these
combinations of conditions is non-empty. Figure 3.4 is an instance of one combination
of parameters in that intersection.
To prove that α1 β > 1 is a necessary condition for this behavior to arise, we will
show that if α1 β ≤ 1 then the validity and stability conditions of R6 and the condition β > q2 , required for this behavior, cannot hold together. The proof will proceed
by considering several subcases depending on the relationships between the parameters.

(A) Case: q1 > 1
From eq. (B.22) for D < 0 we have
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) + (q2 − α1 β)(q1 − α2 ) < 0
Using the fact that β > q2 and q1 > 1 > α2 , we find that the above inequality can
only hold if q1 < α1 β ⇒ α1 β > 1.

(B) Case: q1 ≤ 1
Here we will need to consider two subcases for q1 ≥ α2 and q1 < α2 .

(B.1) Subcase: q1 ≥ α2
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Since β > q2 and q1 ≥ α2 , it implies β > α2 + q2 − q1 . Note that this is also the
condition for the converter of Technology 1 to hurt the overall market penetration. We
show in the proof of Proposition 8 that this condition for the drop in overall penetration,
can only be satisfied with the validity and stability conditions for x∗ R6 only if α1 β > 1.
Therefore this particular subcase will require α1 β > 1 to hold.

(B.2) Subcase: q1 < α2
For this subcase we will again need to consider two more subcases: (a) q2 ≥ p2 and
(b) q2 < p2 .

(B.2.a) subcase: q2 ≥ p2
If q2 ≥ p2 and q1 < α2 then α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 > 0. From eqs. (B.23) and (B.25) and
using the fact that β > q2 ≥ p2 , we have
β(q1 − p1 ) + p1 q2 − p2 q1
≤ α1 β
q2 − p2
β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))
<
α2 + q2 − q1 − p2
⇒ α2 (q1 − p1 ) < (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 ) + q1 (q1 − p1 )
It can be easily seen that the above inequality contradicts the condition in eq.(B.24).
Therefore, the relationships considered in this subcase cannot hold together.

(B.2.b) subcase: q2 < p2
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In this subcase we again need to consider two further subcases depending on the
parameter relations: (i) q1 ≥ p1 and (ii) q1 < p1 .
When q1 ≥ p1 , using the facts that β > q2 , q1 ≥ p1 , q2 < p2 and eq. (B.23), we get
α1 β ≤ q1 . This also implies α1 q2 < q1 since β > q2 . However, the relation, α1 q2 <
q1 < α2 < 1, and eq.(B.21) together imply q1 > q2 which contradicts the requirement
q2 > q1 of the model. Therefore this subcase cannot arise.
The subcase q1 < p1 also cannot arise by our assumption that (0, 0) is an invalid
equilibrium. When both q1 < p1 and q2 < p2 then both θ01 (x1 = 0, x2 = 0) > 0 and
θ01 (x1 = 0, x2 = 0) > 0, which makes (0, 0) a valid equilibrium.

Technology 2 cannot hurt itself while improving its converter efficiency, α2 .

Proof: The only equilibrium outcomes where the adoption level of Technology 2
varies as a function of α2 are those that arise in regions R5 and R6 (as given by Eqs. (B.9)
and (B.10)). If the equilibrium is in R5 (i.e., the technologies coexist at full market
penetration) the derivative of the adoption level x2 w.r.t. α2 is
∂x2∗R

5

∂α2

=

(p2 − p1 ) − β(1 − α2 )
[(q2 − q1 ) − (1 − α2 ) − β(1 − α1 )]2

(B.39)

This expression is always positive since (p2 − p1 ) > β(1 − α2 ) is a required validity
condition for the equilibrium in R5 . thus increasing α2 cannot hurt Technology 2 for an
equilibrium in R5 .
Next we consider the effect of α2 on the equilibrium in R6 . In this region, the
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indifference points obey the relation 0 < θ01 ≤ θ02 ≤ θ12 < 1. To show that Technology 2
cannot hurt itself by increasing α2 , we will consider the two cases α1 β ≤ 1 and α1 β > 1
separately.
For α1 β ≤ 1, consider that x1∗R (0) and x2∗R (0) are the initial equilibrium adoption
6

6

levels. Since
U2 −U1 = θ(q2 − q1 ) + β(1 − α1 )x2 − (1 − α2 )x1 − (p2 − p1 )
on increasing α2 , the difference of U2 −U1 is increased. Therefore a small fraction, say
δ, of users of Technology 1 switch to Technology 2, thus making x1∗R (1) = x1∗R (0) − δ
6

6

and x2∗R (1) = x2∗R (0) + δ. The indifference point θ12 shifts to the right to θ12 (1) =
6

6

θ12 (0) − δ. The second order effect of the switch-overs leads to changes in the adoption
decisions of the lower-end users of Technology 1. The indifference point θ01 shifts to
θ01 (1) = θ01 (0) − (α1 β−1)δ
. Since α1 β ≤ 1, if θ01 shifts, it will shift to the right; thus
q1
further decreasing x1 . The new adoption level of Technology 1, therefore, becomes
x1∗R (1) = x1∗R (0) − δ + (α1 β−1)δ
. Given these new values for x1∗R (1) and x2∗R (1), a new
q1
6

6

6

6

value can be computed for θ12 :
δ
[β + (1 − α1 β)(1 + q11 )].
θ12 (1) = θ12 (0) − δ − q2 −q
1

Since q2 > q1 and α1 β ≤ 1, the change in θ12 (1) − θ12 (0) is again negative i.e., θ12
shifts further to the left, leading to more users switching from Technology 1 to 2. Thus,
the compounding of the first and second order effects of a small increase in α2 leads
to decreases in x1 decreases and increases in x2 . Both reinforce the initial increase in
U2 − U1 after increasing α2 . As a result, as the process converges to a new equilibria
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after an increase in α2 , the final x2 value exceeds the original one. Hence, improving
its converter cannot hurt Technology 2.
We consider next the case α1 β > 1. In this scenario, we know36 that the overall
market penetration must increase when increasing α2 . Therefore, if Technology 2’s
market share were to drop upon increasing α2 , then the market share of Technology 1
must increase so that the overall market share increases. We proceed to show that such
a scenario is infeasible.
Assume that α1 β > 1 and Technology 2 hurts itself by increasing α2 , i.e., the indifference point θ12 moves to the right to θ12 + ε1 , (ε1 & 0), then a user with preference θ is
in the range θ12 < θ < θ12 + ε1 will switch from using Technology 2 to using Technology
1. The switch-over of each such users decreases the utility U1 of Technology 1 users
by an amount (α1 β − 1) > 0. This affects the lower-end users of Technology 1, i.e.,
users with preference in the range θ01 < θ < θ01 + ε2 , (ε2 & 0), whose utility then
becomes negative. These users, therefore, disadopt Technology 1. These disadoptions
imply that the overall market penetrations decreases, which contradicts the fact that the
overall market cannot drop when α1 β > 1. This establishes that it is not possible for
Technology 2 to hurt itself by increasing α2 .

36 Using

derivative

the notation form the proof of Proposition 8, note that N1 ≤ 0. Therefore, for α1 β > 1, the

∗ +x∗ )
∂(x1R
2R
6

6

∂α2

=

(1−α1 β)N1
D2

is strictly positive for N1 < 0 while it equals zero for N1 = 0. However

N1 = 0 corresponds to the x1∗R = 0, i.e., Technology 1 has no users, in which case an increase in α2 can
6

never hurt x2 . Therefore our present discussion only requires us to consider the case where the derivative
is strictly increasing.
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Proof of Proposition 8:
Using the same notation as in Proposition 7, decreasing the overall market penetration by increasing the converter efficiency of Technology 1 requires
∗ + x∗ )
∂(x1R
2R6
6

∂α1

=

∗ +x∗ )
∂(x1R
2R
6

∂α1

6

< 0.

β(β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ))N2
D2

Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 7, a valid and stable equilibrium in R6 implies D < 0, and consequently N2 < 0. The above derivative is, therefore,
negative only if β > (q2 − q1 ) + α2 . There are many combinations of parameters
that simultaneously satisfy this condition and the validity and stability conditions
of an equilibrium in R6 . Figure 3.4 is again one such combination. Furthermore,
this condition β > (q2 − q1 ) + α2 can only hold along with the validity and stability
conditions for the equilibrium in R6 only if α1 β > 1. We now provide the proof for
this.

Proof: α1 β > 1 is a necessary condition for the incumbent to hurt the overall market

First consider the case when q1 ≤ 1. From eq. (B.21) and β > (q2 − q1 ) + α2 , we have
0 < β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ) < α1 β + q2 − q1 − qq21
⇒ α1 β − q 1 >
⇒

α1 β−q1
1−q1

>

q2
q1

q2
q1 (1 − q1 )

>1

Since q1 ≤ 1, we need α1 β > 1.
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Next consider the case when q1 > 1. For this case, we will need to consider two
subcases, corresponding to α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 > 0 and α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 < 0.

Subcase (1): Let α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 > 0
When q1 > 1, the above condition implies q2 − p2 > q1 − α2 > 0 (i.e., q2 > p2 ).
However, when α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 > 0 and q2 > p2 , then eqs. (B.23) and (B.25)
together result an inequality that contradicts the inequality in eq. (B.24). Since the
conditions considered in this subcase cannot hold together, we do not need to consider
it further.

Subcase (2): Let α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 < 0
Let us assume that α1 β < 1. We show here that the conditions for validity and
stability of the R6 equilibrium, and β > (q2 − q1 ) + α2 cannot hold together if α1 β < 1.
Using eq.(B.25), we have
α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 < β − p2 − p1 (β − α2 − (q2 − q1 )) ⇒ p1 < 1 < q1
From eq.(B.22) we have
(q1 − 1)(β − q2 ) < (q1 − α2 )(α1 β − q1 ) < 0
which implies β < q2 (since q1 > 1).
Using the condition β − α2 − (q2 − q1 ) > 0 needed for hurting the overall market
and eq.(B.24) and the condition p1 < 1 < q1 obtained previously, we get
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β − (q2 − q1 ) > α2 >

(1−q1 )(q2 −p2 )+q1 (q1 −p1 )
q1 −p1

⇒ (β − q2 )(q1 − p1 ) > (1 − q1 )(q2 − p2 )
⇒ q2 > p2 since β < q2 and q1 > 1 > p1 .

Now using the condition of this subcase i.e., α2 + q2 − q1 − p2 < 0 and eq. (B.24) we
get p1 > 1, which contradicts the previously obtained relation p1 < 1 < q1 . Therefore
when α1 β < 1, all these conditions do not hold together and the so behavior will not
arise for this case.
However, when α1 β > 1, it can be shown using Mathematica that for this subcase
there exists numerical values for the various parameters for which the overall market
drops. The above analysis of all the different cases establishes that α1 β > 1 is a necessary condition for this behavior to arise.
Similarly, when Technology 2 increases its converter efficiency, the overall market
penetration will drop if
∗ + x∗ )
∂(x1R
2R6
6

∂α2

=

(1 − α1 β)N1
<0
D2

(B.40)

For a valid, stable equilibrium in R6 , we have N1 < 0, and therefore the above expression is negative only if α1 β < 1. This establishes the second part of Proposition 8.

Proof of Proposition 9:
In Figure 3.7 we identified a scenario where instabilities in adoption dynamics arose
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for α1 β > 1, and the parameter values satisfied A2 − 4B < 0.
To prove that α1 β > 1 is necessary for the formation of cyclic instability, we proceed
in two steps: (i) we show that if A2 − 4B ≥ 0 then cycles (closed orbits) cannot arise
in the adoption trajectories, and (ii) if α1 β ≤ 1 then A2 − 4B ≥ 0 always holds, and
therefore there cannot be any closed orbits.
It may be noted that if any such ‘closed orbit’ or cycle were to arise in the adoption
process, then its locus must be the equilibrium in R6 . This follows from the Index
Theory which states that if J is a closed orbit37 of a system enclosing an open set D
(i.e., A = D ∪ J is a compact set), then the set D must include an equilibrium point.
Thus, every closed orbit in the plane encloses an equilibrium point. In our adoption
process, a cyclic trajectory can either lie entirely inside the S-plane or may touch
its boundaries. Note that when the trajectory touches or includes a portion of the
boundary, it is not possible to have an equilibrium on the boundary itself because
then the system would have attained stability as soon as the trajectory reaches that
equilibrium. Therefore every closed trajectory must enclose an equilibrium that lie
exclusively in the interior of the S-plane. The equilibrium in R6 is the only equilibrium
that satisfies this requirement (as all the others lie on the boundaries i.e., x1 , x2 -axes or
the line x1 + x2 = 1 by their definition). So the equilibrium in R6 will be the focus for
the proof of the two steps mentioned earlier.

37 It

is a trace of the trajectory of a non-trivial (i.e. not a point) periodic solution [75]
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(i) Proof: If A2 − 4B ≥ 0 then cycles cannot arise in the adoption trajectories
To show that cycles cannot arise in the adoption trajectories when A2 − 4B ≥ 0,
we have to consider the two possibilities that the equilibrium in R6 is either stable or
unstable.

(a) A2 − 4B ≥ 0 and xR6 is stable.
We will prove that for this case, the entire R6 region is the basin of attraction of
the stable equilibrium xR6 and therefore a closed trajectory cannot pass through (or be
entirely located in) R6 as it would have converged to that equilibrium. Furthermore, we
show that it is not possible to realize any closed trajectory that has the R6 equilibrium
as its locus but does not ever pass through the Region R6 . These statements together
eliminates the possibility of cycles in this case.
A stable equilibrium in R6 requires A < 0 and B > 0. When A2 −4B ≥ 0, we have A−
√
√
A2 − 4B ≤ A + A2 − 4B < 0. Therefore once a trajectory enters R6 , the exponential
terms in its expression (Table B.2) decrease exponentially over time and converges to
the equilibrium. In other words, the entire R6 region is the basin of attraction of the
stable equilibria located in it. Hence a closed trajectory cannot be realized if it were to
pass through R6 .
Recall that in order to necessarily eliminate the possibility of (0, 0) being a valid
equilibrium, the point P (in Figure 3.1) cannot lie in the positive quadrant of the (x1 , x2 )
plane. As a result, the region R6 will always touch either the boundary x1 or x2 axis.
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Recall that we previously established that if a closed orbit were to arise in this system,
the equilibrium in R6 must lie in its interior. However, since the region R6 touches
at least one of the axes, it is never possible to realize a closed orbit that encircles the
equilibrium in R6 as its locus but doesn’t pass through this region. Therefore, cyclic
instabilities cannot be realized for this case.

(b) A2 − 4B ≥ 0 and xR6 is unstable.
In this proof we will need two more results from the Index Theory. First, the index
of a closed orbit, J, is +1

38 .

All such closed orbits (trajectories) must encircle the

equilibrium in R6 . Moreover, since the equilibrium xR6 is the only equilibrium point
enclosed by J, the index of this equilibrium is I(xR6 )=+1 39 . Therefore a closed contour,
C, around xR6 in its neighborhood set must also have the same index as I(xR6 ) i.e., +1.
However, C can have an index of +1 only if either all the trajectories are pointing
radially inward(outward) towards(from) the equilibrium. But we show below that
when A2 − 4B ≥ 0 and the equilibrium is unstable, the trajectories in R6 take the shape
of hyperbolas, which implies that all the trajectories are not directed consistently either
inward or outward from the equilibrium, and thus the index computed for the closed
contour, C, will not be +1. This contradiction implies that a closed orbit J cannot be
present, which will therefore eliminate the possibility of cyclic instability in this case.

38 ref.
39 ref.

[49], pp. 299, lemma 7.1(c)
[75], pp.50
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Using the expressions for the trajectories in R6 provided in Table B.2 and the fact
that A2 − 4B ≥ 0 and the equilibrium is unstable, the expressions for the trajectories
around xR6 can be rearranged in the following form to show their hyperbolic shapes:

∗
∗
∗
∗
))
− K1 (x2 − x2R
))(x1 − x1R
− K2 (x2 − x2R
(x1 − x1R
6
6
6
6

= −c1 c2 (K1 − K2 )2 eAγ(t−t0 )

(B.41)

q

Substituting x1 =

∗ ,
x1 − x1R
6

x2 =

∗ ,a
x2 − x2R
6

=

α2 +β(1−α1 )− q2
1
√
,
(q2 −q1 ) A2 −4B

we have K1 = a −

1, K2 = a + 1.
Eqn. (B.41) can therefore be written as:
(x1 − ax2 )2 − x2 2 = −4b2 c1 c2 eAγ(t−t0 )

(B.42)

The above expression clearly shows that at any time t, the trajectories around the equilibrium have hyperbolic shapes.
Thus, when A2 − 4B ≥ 0, irrespective of whether the equilibrium in R6 is stable or
not, there cannot be any cyclic trajectories in the adoption process.

(ii) Proof: If α1 β ≤ 1 then A2 − 4B ≥ 0

206

Note that a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab for any real numbers a, b. Hence we have
2
1 − α2 + β(1 − α1 )
1
+ 2
2
(q2 − q1 )
q1
2(1 − α2 ) + 2β(1 − α1 )
≥
>0
q1 (q2 − q1 )
since 0 < α1 < 1, 0 < α2 < 1, β > 0.

Using the expression for A2 − 4B and the above inequality, we get:

A2 − 4B ≥

4(1 − α1 β)(1 − α2 )
≥ 0 i f α1 β ≤ 1
q1 (q2 − q1 )

Since we can only have cyclic instability in the system when A2 − 4B < 0 and that
this condition can only be satisfied when α1 β > 1, it also becomes necessary that β > 1
(as α1 < 1).
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Appendix C

Appendix: Network Platform Design

C.1

Platform Utility Simplification

This appendix explains briefly the parameter relabeling and normalization method used
in the utility function of Equation (4.1). Suppose that the total customer population for
the two market sides, developers and consumers, are Nd and Nc , respectively. Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) can be written as
Ud = αxc Nc − bd − K(F) − φτ

(C.1)

Uc = θβnd Nd − pc

(C.2)

Therefore, the platform’s utility function can be written as
U p = pc xc Nc + bd nd Nd −C(F)

208

(C.3)

Substituting pc = (1 − xc )βnd Nd and bd = αxc Nc − K(F) − nd τ, we have


U p = (1 − xc )βnd xc + (αxc − nd − K(F))nd −C(F) τNd

(C.4)

where β = (βNc )/τ, α = (αNc )/τ, K(F) = K(F)/τ and C(F) = C(F)/(Nd τ). Thus,
with these proper normalization of the parameter values, the platform’s optimization
problem reduces to an equivalent maximization problem, max0≤n∗d ,xc∗ ≤1U p , where
U p = ((1 − xc∗ )βn∗d )xc∗ + (αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F))n∗d −C(F)
= pc xc∗ + bd n∗d −C(F)

(C.5)
(C.6)

where pc = (1 − xc∗ )βn∗d and bd = αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F). Note that the normalized function
in Equation (C.6) is structurally identical to Equation (4.1) used in Section 4.2.2, and
similarly, pc and bd are equivalent to pc and bc of Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7) in
Section 4.3.1.

C.2

Alternative Utility Functions

C.2.1

Competition among Developers: Same-side Externalities

In our model we consider that the applications that developers innovate, although differentiated in their offering and characteristics, share some degree of homogeneity in
terms of the underlying functionalities they use. Consequently, developers may have to
compete for same advertisement revenue sources and consumers, and thus incur negative same-side externalities from each other’s presence. To account for such situations,
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we show that our model can be easily generalized to include competition among the
developers.
In the utility function of developers given in Equation (4.2), we include a term −ηnd
where nd is the fraction of developers on the platform and η captures the marginal
externality that each developer imposes on the other. Therefore, the new utility function
becomes
Ud = αxc − ηnd − bd − (K(F) + τφ)

(C.7)

In using Equation (C.7) to compute the equilibrium adoption levels (as done in Section
4.3.1), the developer who is indifferent between joining and not joining the platform
(Ud = 0) is obtained from b
φ = nd :
τb
φ = τnd = αxc∗ − ηnd − bd − K(F)
⇒ nd (τ + η) = αxc∗ − bd − K(F)

(C.8)

If all the parameters are normalized with respect to τ + η, the resulting expression is
identical to Equation (4.5). Therefore, the qualitative outcomes observed from our earlier model do not change upon introducing competition among developers, only the
quantitative values need to be adjusted with respect to the new normalization coefficient.
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C.2.2

Consumer heterogeneity in Intrinsic benefits

In this section, we consider alternative consumer utility function that capture scenarios
where all consumers have similar valuation for the number of available applications,
but are heterogeneous in how they evaluate the platform’s intrinsic qualities (e.g., reliability, performance, brand name etc). This is typically true for platforms that deliver a
strong core value and the availability of software applications are added bonuses. For
example, consider a gaming platform (e.g., Xbox 360) where almost all users value the
availability of interesting games equally but are quite heterogeneous in how they perceive the platform’s intrinsic quality, as determined by the screen resolution, controls,
loading time etc. The utility function for the consumers in this scenario is:
Uc = θq + βnd − pc

(C.9)

The term q stands for the intrinsic value of the platform to the consumers, and it is
weighted by their individual preference parameter θ. We assume θ to be uniformly
distributed in [0, 1], and that it value is a private information for each consumer, but
its distribution is known. The term βnd captures the cross-externality benefits that the
consumers enjoy from the presence of nd developers on the platform. As before, β
captures the marginal externality benefit that each developer brings to the consumers.
pc is the flat fee paid to the platform. All the parameters of the model are appropriately
normalized with respect to the customer population on each side and the maximum
fixed cost that developers may incur (i.e., τ = 1). The utility functions for the platform
and the developers remain the same, as in Equations (4.1) and (4.2), respectively.
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Using the solution methodology outlined in Section 4.3, we get the following
outcomes in the three stages:

Adoption Stage:
For a given functionality level, F, and a set of prices, pc and bd , for the consumers
and developers respectively, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between joining
and not joining the platform is b
θ = 1 − xc =

pc −βn∗d
q

and similarly, the marginal indiffer-

ent developer is b
φ = nd = αxc∗ −bd −K(F) At equilibrium, we have xc∗ = xc and n∗d = nd .

Pricing Stage:
As before, we solve the platform provider’s profit maximization problem to find
the ‘optimal’ prices for the two market sides and the equilibrium adoption levels at
these prices. The interesting situation is one where neither market side has reached full
adoption, i.e., where the outcome of the equilibrium adoption is an interior solution of
the maximization problem. The results for it are provided below.

The optimal price levels (p∗c , p∗d ) and the optimal adoption levels of consumers and
developers (xc∗ , n∗d ) of the two-sided market, which maximize the platform provider’s
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profit are given by
q(2q + (α − β)K(F) − α(α + β))
4q − (α + β)2
(α − β)q − (2q − β(α + β))K(F)
=
4q − (α + β)2
2q − (α + β)K(F)
=
4q − (α + β)2
(α + β − 2K(F))q
=
4q − (α + β)2

p∗ =

(C.10)

b∗

(C.11)

xc∗
n∗d

(C.12)
(C.13)

For the above outcome to be an interior solution, 0 < {2q − (α + β)K(F), (α + β −
2K(F))q} < 4q − (α + β)2 needs to be satisfied. The second order condition for the
Hessian to be positive definite is also satisfied when the above inequality holds.

Design Stage:
The optimal level of built-in functionalities (F ∗ ) for the platform which maximizes
its profit is given by
C0 (F ∗ )
2q
(α + β)q
=
K(F ∗ ) −
0
∗
2
K (F ) 4q − (α + β)
4q − (α + β)2
C0 (F ∗ )
⇒ 0 ∗ = −n∗d (F ∗ )
K (F )
2q[K 0 (F ∗ )]2
C00 (F ∗ ) > −n∗d (F ∗ )K 00 (F ∗ ) +
4q − (α + β)2

(C.14)
(C.15)
(C.16)

As before with the utility functions of Section 4.3, we have the following result by
using the conjugate pair theorem. The level of functionality investment by the platform
increases with increase in cross-externality benefits enjoyed by either customer side,
∗

∂2U

p
i.e., sign ∂F
∂α = sign ∂F∂α > 0, i.e.,

∂F ∗
∂α

∗

∂2U

p
> 0 and sign ∂F
∂β = sign ∂F∂β > 0, i.e.,
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∂F ∗
∂β

> 0.

C.3

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 10:

The utility functions of the developers and consumers at the indifferent points provides the price levels, pc and bd , as in Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7). Substituting
these prices into the profit function of the platform provider in Equation (4.1), we get
the first order condition for each market side,

∂U p
∂xc∗

= 0 and

∂U p
∂n∗d

= 0, which gives

∂U p
= (1 − 2xc∗ )βn∗d + αn∗d = 0
∂xc∗
∂U p
= (1 − xc∗ )βxc∗ + αxc∗ − 2n∗d − K(F) = 0
∗
∂nd
Solving the above equations simultaneously gives xc∗ and n∗d , which also gives p∗c and
b∗d for the optimal two-sided pricing by the platform.
α+β
2β
(α + β)2 − 4βK(F)
=
8β

xc∗ =
n∗d

The conditions for interior solution, i.e., 0 < xc∗ , n∗d < 1, are satisfied when α < β and
4βK(F) < (α + β)2 < 4β(2 − K(F)). The second order maximization conditions for a
negative definite Hessian (principle minors have alternate signs), |H1 |(xc∗ ,n∗d ) = −2βn∗d <
0 and |H2 |(xc∗ ,n∗d ) = 4βn∗d > 0, also hold true for interior solutions.
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